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INTRODUCTION
A persistent challenge to originalist theories of constitutional
interpretation is the claim that originalism, if faithfully and consistently
applied, would lead to results that modern Americans would find
“intolerable.” 1 While originalists have adopted a number of strategies in
responding to such criticisms, one particularly common approach has been
to deny the underlying factual premise by seeking to demonstrate that
originalism would not, in fact, lead to intolerable consequences.2
An important focus of this debate has been the question of whether
originalism is capable of justifying the Supreme Court’s landmark decision
in Brown v. Board of Education.3 From an early date, certain originalists
attempted to defend the holding of Brown, if not necessarily its reasoning,
as consistent with originalism notwithstanding the widespread belief that
the Fourteenth Amendment’s framers and ratifiers did not intend to prohibit
racially segregated public schools. 4 Given the central role Brown has
assumed in modern constitutional theory, originalists’ desire to reconcile
the decision with their own methodology is unsurprising. As Professor
1

See, e.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN, RADICALS IN ROBES: WHY EXTREME RIGHT-WING
COURTS ARE WRONG FOR AMERICA, 76 (2005) (asserting that if “taken seriously,”
originalism “would lead in intolerable directions.”); DAVID A. STRAUSS, THE LIVING
CONSTITUTION 12-18 (2010) (identifying the constitutionality of sex discrimination, the
inapplicability of the Bill of Rights to the states and the unconstitutionality of many federal
labor, environmental and consumer protection laws as examples “of what the law would be
if originalism were to prevail.”); cf. Michael Stokes Paulsen, Does the Constitution
Prescribe Rules for Its Own Interpretation?, 103 NW. L. REV. 857, 898 (2009) (describing
and responding to criticisms of originalism grounded in the “argument from bad results”).
2
See, e.g., Paulsen, supra note 1, at 899 (asserting that “original meaning textualism
does not yield bad outcomes” or at least “yields fewer than its critics imagine”); Steven G.
Calabresi & Livia Fine, Two Cheers for Professor Balkin’s Originalism, 103 NW. U. L.
REV. 663, 686 (2009) (arguing that “incorporation” of the Bill of Rights and “the extension
of the Constitution’s equality command to sex discrimination” are “correct on originalist
grounds”).
3
347 U.S. 483 (1954).
4
See, e.g., Robert Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47
IND. L.J. 1, 12-15 (1971) (contending that originalism could support a “plausible”
resolution of Brown consistent with the Court’s holding); Edwin Meese, III, Construing the
Constitution, 19 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 22, 27 (1985) (contending that Brown did not involve
“adapting a ‘living,’ ‘flexible’ Constitution to new reality” but rather “restoring the original
principle of the Constitution to constitutional law.”). For the more conventional view, see,
for example, Michael J. Klarman, Brown, Originalism, and Constitutional Theory: A
Response to Professor McConnell, 81 VA. L. REV. 1881, 1881 (1995) (“[T]he
overwhelming consensus among legal academics has been that Brown cannot be defended
on originalist grounds.”); Alexander M. Bickel, The Original Understanding and the
Segregation Decision, 69 HARV. L. REV. 1, 58 (1955) (deeming it an “obvious conclusion”
from the historical evidence that the Fourteenth Amendment was not “meant to apply … to
… segregation.”).
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Michael McConnell explains:
Such is the moral authority of Brown that if any particular theory does not
produce the conclusion that Brown was correctly decided, the theory is
seriously discredited. Thus, what once was seen as a weakness in the
Supreme Court’s decision in Brown [i.e., the apparent inconsistency of the
decision with the original understanding] is now a mighty weapon against the
proposition that the Constitution should be interpreted as it was understood by
the people who framed and ratified it.5

Over time, the number of originalists willing to question Brown’s
correctness has declined, such that the ability of originalism to justify the
Court’s decision is now a widely shared assumption of originalist
scholarship.6
A similar story cannot be told, however, about Brown’s companion
case, Bolling v. Sharpe, 7 which invalidated a similar racial segregation
policy applicable to public schools in the District of Columbia. Because the
Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause applies only to “state”
governments, 8 the holding in Brown did not control the resolution of
Bolling, which presented the distinct question of whether the Constitution
prohibits the federal government from discriminating on the basis of race.
The Court answered that question in the affirmative and based its decision
on the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.9 The Bolling Court made
no effort to ground its holding in the original meaning of the Fifth
Amendment and only a cursory effort to reconcile its decision with either
the text of the Due Process Clause or the Court’s own earlier interpretations
of that provision. Instead, the lynchpin of the Court’s analysis was Chief
Justice Warren’s conclusory assertion that “[i]n view of our decision that
the Constitution prohibits the states from maintaining racially segregated
public schools, it would be unthinkable that the same Constitution would

5

Michael W. McConnell, Originalism and the Desegregation Decisions, 81 VA. L.
REV. 947, 952-53 (1995). This observation is hardly unique to Professor McConnell. See,
e.g., Mark V. Tushnet, Reflections on the Role of Purpose in the Jurisprudence of the
Religion Clauses, 27 WM. & MARY L. REV. 997, 999 n.4 (1986) (“For a generation, one
criterion for an acceptable constitutional theory has been whether that theory explains why
[Brown] was correct.”).
6
See, e.g., Paulsen, supra note 1 at 901 (arguing that Brown is “right on originalmeaning textualist grounds that focus on the meaning of the words of the Equal Protection
Clause rather than subjective specific intention or expectation”); Calabresi & Fine, supra
note 2, at 686 (“[W]e think Brown v. Board of Education is correct on originalist
grounds.”).
7
347 U.S. 498 (1954).
8
U.S. Const. amd. XIV § 1 (“No state shall … deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”).
9
347 U.S. at 499-500.
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impose a lesser duty on the Federal Government.”10
The considerable textual and historical difficulties presented by the
Bolling opinion—which from start to finish, spans only three pages of the
United States Reports11—are well known.12 The failure of the Bolling Court
to support its decision with textual or historical analysis and the Court’s
decision to ground its holding in a provision that most scholars agree was
originally understood to regulate only matters of procedure,13 has led most
to conclude that the Court’s holding was unsupportable on originalist
grounds.14
Early originalists, such as Raoul Berger and Robert Bork, condemned
the decision as “exemplif[ying]” the Warren Court’s “naked judicial
revision of the Constitution.”15 Over time, such explicit originalist critiques
have grown increasingly rare, as originalist theory has moved away from its
early focus on criticizing the Warren Court and as Bolling’s core holding
has become more firmly entrenched in modern constitutional law.16 But
Bolling has not inspired the same vigorous efforts at originalist
10

Id. at 499.
Id. at 498-500.
12
See, e.g., Kermit Roosevelt, III, Forget the Fundamentals: Fixing Substantive Due
Process, 9 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 983, 997 (2006) (observing that “[t]he argumentation … in
Bolling is somewhat less than satisfactory” and that “[t]his fact has been widely noted”).
13
See, e.g., Ryan C. Williams, The One and Only Substantive Due Process Clause,
120 YALE L.J. 408, 428-60 (2010) (examining evidence indicating that meaning of Fifth
Due Process Clause in 1791 likely did not encompass substantive rights).
14
See, e.g., JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL
REVIEW 18 (1980) (describing the proposition “that the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment incorporates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment” as
“gibberish both syntactically and historically.”); Peter J. Rubin, Taking its Proper Place in
the Constitutional Canon: Bolling v. Sharpe, Korematsu, and the Equal Protection
Component of the Fifth Amendment Due Process, 92 VA. L. REV. 1879, 1879-80 (2006)
(“[I]t is widely accepted, by those who defend the decision as well as those who attack it,
that [Bolling’s] doctrinal innovation cannot be easily justified by the Fifth Amendment’s
text or its history ….”).
15
Raoul Berger, The Ninth Amendment: The Beckoning Mirage, 42 RUTGERS L. REV.
955, 975 (1990); see also, e.g., ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE
POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW 83-84 (1990) (expressing sympathy for the result
reached in Bolling “as a matter of morality and politics,” but nonetheless criticizing the
decision as a “clear rewriting of the Constitution by the Warren Court”); Lino A. Graglia,
Constitutional Law: A Ruse for Government by an Intellectual Elite, 14 GA. ST. U. L. REV.
773-74 (1998) (citing Bolling as an example of “the irrelevance of the Constitution to
constitutional law”).
16
See, e.g., Richard Primus, Constitutional Expectations, 109 MICH. L. REV. 94, 104
(2010) (observing that “as official racial discrimination became a consensus evil, Bolling
ceased to have detractors”); cf. Keith Whittington, The New Originalism, 2 GEO. J.L. &
PUB. POL’Y 599, 599-601, 607-08 (2004) (observing that unlike early originalism, modern
originalism “is no longer primarily a critique of the Warren Court’s rights jurisprudence”).
11
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rehabilitation that have been offered in defense of Brown. For example,
Professor McConnell, the leading academic originalist defender of Brown,
did not even mention Bolling in his pathbreaking 1995 article Originalism
and the Desegregation Decisions, 17 which sought to justify Brown as
consistent with the understandings of the Fourteenth Amendment’s
framers.18 This relative inattention to Bolling is consistent with originalist
scholarship more generally, which has devoted relatively little attention to
either the decision itself or to the broader federal antidiscrimination norm
for which the case has come to stand.19
The presumed inability of originalism to justify Bolling presents a
continuing challenge to originalist methods of constitutional interpretation.
Although Bolling has not attained Brown’s status as a touchstone of
interpretive correctness, the decision itself is both reasonably well known
and politically popular.20 More significantly, Bolling’s core holding—that
the federal government, like the states, is prohibited from engaging in racial
17

McConnell, supra note 5.
Professor McConnell did address Bolling in a subsequent work but did not attempt
to defend the case’s constitutional holding, suggesting instead that the same result could
have been reached by narrowly construing Congress’s statutory grant of authority to the
District of Columbia’s local government. See Michael W. McConnell, McConnell, J.,
concurring in the Judgment, in WHAT BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION SHOULD HAVE
SAID 166-68 (Jack M. Balkin ed., 2001).
19
See, e.g., Stephen A. Siegel, The Federal Government’s Power to Enact ColorConscious Law: An Originalist Inquiry, 92 NW. U. L. REV. 477, 480 (1998) (observing
that because Bolling “has not acquired the iconic status of Brown,” “there are almost no
originalist studies of the federal government's power to enact race conscious laws”). There
have been occasional efforts to ground an originalist defense of Bolling in provisions other
than the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause. See, e.g., Akhil Amar, Intratextualism,
112 HARV. L. REV. 747, 768-72 (1999) (arguing that Bolling could be justified by the
original meanings of, among other provisions, the Bill of Attainder and Titles of Nobility
Clauses of Article I); Michael J. Perry, Brown, Bolling, & Orginalism: Why Ackerman and
Posner (Among Others) Are Wrong, 20 S. ILL. U. L. J. 53, 69-72 (1995) (suggesting the
Ninth Amendment as “a much more plausible basis” for Bolling). But the dominant
scholarly reaction has been to regard such arguments as “unconvincing apologetics.”
Richard A. Primus, Bolling Alone, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 975, 977 n.7 (2004); see also, e.g.,
Michael C. Dorf, A Nonoriginalist Perspective on the Lessons of History, 19 HARV. J. L. &
PUB. POL’Y 351, 357 (1996) (referring to originalist defenses of both Brown and Bolling
and observing that “at some point, one wonders whether the revisionism is not motivated
by the hope that original meaning can be made to fit the preferred modern understanding”).
20
A good indication of Bolling’s popularity is provided by the testimony of Judge
Robert Bork during his Supreme Court nomination hearings in 1987. Although Judge Bork
expressed a willingness during those hearings to revisit several cases he believed had been
incorrectly decided, he refused to endorse a similar approach to Bolling, suggesting that the
decision should be allowed to stand as a matter of stare decisis. See Primus, supra note 16,
at 109 (observing that Bork “pronounced himself willing to hack away a good deal of
modern constitutional law in the name of the integrity of the Constitution itself—but …
would not dream … of overruling Bolling.”).
18
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discrimination—is an important part of modern constitutional doctrine that
is embraced across a broad range of ideological and jurisprudential
perspectives. 21 Unsurprisingly, the assumed inability of originalism to
justify the constitutional ban on federal discrimination is frequently invoked
by critics as a principal example of the type of “intolerable” result that
originalism requires.22
But such uses of Bolling by originalism’s critics tell only half the story.
When discussed outside the specific context of the originalism debate,
scholarly reaction to the Warren Court’s rather cavalier treatment of text
and history in Bolling is decidedly more ambivalent. Despite its firmly
entrenched status in modern constitutional doctrine, Bolling has long
occupied a somewhat “uncomfortable place in the constitutional cannon.”23
The conventional academic narrative surrounding the decision views the
Court’s holding as unsupportable on traditional interpretive grounds and as
premised on considerations that were primarily political rather than legal in
nature.24 But even among scholars who embrace this “political” explanation
and view the decision as normatively justified, there often remains a
pervading sense of discomfort with the “controversial and even dangerous
form of argument” such a justification requires.25
This Article challenges the conventional wisdom regarding Bolling’s
assumed originalist indefensibility. Although the specific rationale on
which the Warren Court relied is difficult to defend on originalist grounds,
21

See, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Legitimacy and the Constitution, 118 HARV. L. REV.
1787, 1823 (2005) (“Justices of all substantive persuasions have felt entitled not only to
uphold Bolling but also to expand upon its commitments”).
22
See, e.g., SUNSTEIN, supra note 1, at 63 (asserting that “[h]onest [originalists] have
to admit that according to their method, the national government can segregate the armed
forces, public schools, or anything it chooses”); STRAUSS, supra note 1, at 14 (observing
that “[e]ven the originalists who think they can justify Brown find it difficult to escape
th[e] conclusion” that “[t]he federal government could discriminate against racial
minorities (or anyone else) pretty much any time it wanted to”); Paul Brest, The
Misconceived Quest for Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L. REV. 204,232-33 (1980) (“[A]
moderate originalist cannot easily justify the incorporation of principles of equal treatment
into the due process clause of the fifth amendment … .”).
23
Rubin, supra note 14, at 1882.
24
See, e.g., id. at 1880 (“The conventional account is that the decision was …
essentially political rather than judicial”).
25
Fallon, supra note 21, at 1835; see also Rubin, supra note 14, at 1896 (observing
that “even many supporters of the Bolling decision … readily accepted or internalized the
criticism of the decision’s reasoning and accepted … that it represented a breathtaking (and,
corollary, legally indefensible) innovation”); cf. David E. Bernstein, Bolling, Equal
Protection, Due Process, and Lochnerphobia, 93 GEO. L.J. 1253, 1253 (2004) (observing
that many “scholars more sympathetic to Warren Court jurisprudence embrace the result in
Bolling, but reject, or at least refuse to endorse, its reliance on the Fifth Amendment’s Due
Process Clause”).
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it does not follow that the holding itself is similarly indefensible. In fact, a
surprisingly strong originalist argument supporting both Bolling’s specific
holding and the broader unconstitutionality of most forms of invidious
federal racial discrimination26 can be made by looking to the original public
meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Citizenship Clause, which
provides that “[a]ll persons born or naturalized in the United States and
subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of
the State wherein they reside.”27
This Article is not the first to suggest the Citizenship Clause, which,
unlike the Equal Protection Clause, applies to the federal government as
well as the states,28 as a possible alternative basis for Bolling’s constitutional
holding. A number of prominent constitutional scholars, including
Professors Akhil Amar, Jack Balkin, Drew Days and Bruce Ackerman, have
suggested that the Citizenship Clause, rather than the Due Process Clause,
might have provided a more textually defensible basis for the Bolling
decision. 29 But existing scholarship drawing a connection between the
Citizenship Clause and the prohibition of federal racial discrimination has
been largely content to suggest the connection without engaging in the type
of detailed historical analysis necessary to ground the connection firmly in
the actual original meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment.30 The relative
26

I use the term “invidious” to bracket the important question of whether the
Fourteenth Amendment prohibits only laws that burden minority groups or whether it also
prohibits “benign” race-conscious enactments intended to benefit minorities, such as racebased affirmative action. Cf. Siegel, supra note 19, at 478 n.3 (drawing similar distinction
between “invidious” and “benign” color-conscious laws). Though I do not take a position
on that question here, I am reasonably confident that, whatever the correct answer to this
question may be as a matter of the Fourteenth Amendment’s original meaning, that answer
should be the same for both state and federal policies. See infra Section IV.B (discussing
overlap between federal and state equality requirements under the Fourteenth Amendment).
27
U.S. Const. amd. XIV § 1.
28
See, e.g., Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 507-08 (1999) (“[T]he protection afforded to
the citizen by the Citizenship Clause … is a limitation on the powers of the National
Government as well as the States.”).
29
See, e.g., Amar, supra note 19, at 768-69; Jack Balkin, Opinion of Jack Balkin, C.J.,
in WHAT BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION SHOULD HAVE SAID, supra note 18, at 87;
Drew S. Days, III, Drew S. Days, III (concurring), in id. at 92, 97-98; Bruce Ackerman,
Bruce Ackerman (concurring), in id. at 100, 114-16; cf. Siegel, supra note 19, at 482, 58486 (concluding that the Citizenship Clause was susceptible to an interpretation that “some
originalists might accept as limiting federal power to enact laws invidiously burdening
minorities”).
30
For example, in a 1999 article, Professor Amar supported his suggestion that the
Citizenship Clause might support the result in Bolling with a single sentence from Justice
Harlan’s famous dissent in Plessy v. Ferguson—an opinion written nearly twenty-eight
years after the Fourteenth Amendment’s ratification. See Amar, supra note 19, at 768-69
(pointing to Harlan’s statement that “All citizens are equal before the law” as support for
reading the Citizenship Clause to include an equality component) (quoting Plessy v.
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paucity of supporting evidence identified in the most prominent scholarly
discussions drawing a link between Bolling and the Citizenship Clause has
contributed to the perception that the Citizenship Clause justification, like
other attempted originalist defenses of Bolling, reflects nothing more than
an effort by clever lawyers to find historical support for a result they favor
on non-originalist grounds.31
The Citizenship Clause argument, however, is not so easily dismissed.
The Citizenship Clause was adopted in 1868—following a Civil War fought
over the issue of slavery and the adoption of a constitutional amendment
forbidding the practice. And while race-based discrimination had hardly
been eradicated by the time of that provision’s adoption, protecting the civil
rights of free African Americans was a principal goal of the Amendment
and the Citizenship Clause itself was specifically targeted at repudiating the
racist logic of Chief Justice Taney’s infamous Dred Scott decision.32 When
considered in combination, these circumstances confer upon the Citizenship
Clause argument an aura of historical plausibility that arguments grounded
in the original meaning of constitutional provisions adopted in the late
eighteenth century cannot hope to match.
Moreover, as Part I of the Article explains, the Citizenship Clause was
adopted against a longstanding political and legal tradition that closely
associated the status of “citizenship” with the entitlement to legal equality.
Although the precise contours of this equal citizenship principle were illdefined—as were the mechanisms through which constitutional citizenship
could be acquired—there was a strong presumption throughout the
antebellum period that a person’s status as a “citizen” entitled that person to,
at a minimum, full legal equality with respect to “fundamental” civil
rights. 33 Part I also explores the challenges this egalitarian conception of
citizenship created when applied to the rights and privileges of free African
Americans and the legal theories through which free blacks’ claims to
citizenship and legal equality were defended and denied.34
Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 556 (1896) (Harlan, J. dissenting)); see also, e.g., AKHIL AMAR,
AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY, 381-82 (2005) (citing negative public reaction
to Chief Justice Taney’s decision in Dred Scott and Justice Harlan’s majority opinion in
Gibson v. Mississippi, 162 U. S. 565 (1896) as support for an “equal citizenship”
interpretation of the Citizenship Clause).
31
See, e.g., Martha Minow, A Proper Objective: Constitutional Commitment and
Educational Opportunity after Bolling v. Sharpe and Parents Involved in Community
Schools, 55 HOW. L.J. 575, 596-97 (2012) (referring to Citizenship Clause and other
alternative textual arguments for Bolling as “imaginative” but declaring that such
“arguments can make no claim to discerning the original intent of the framers”).
32
Cf. infra Part I.C (discussing Taney’s Dred Scott opinion).
33
See infra Part I.A.
34
See infra Parts I.B and I.C.
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Part II examines the political debates leading up to the Fourteenth
Amendment’s adoption, focusing particularly on the debates surrounding
the adoption of the Citizenship Clause’s predecessor provision in the Civil
Rights Act of 1866, which attempted to extend citizenship to free blacks by
statute, and the conceptions of “citizenship” reflected in the drafting and
ratification history of the Fourteenth Amendment itself. These debates
reflect the profound influence of the Civil War in shifting mainstream
Republican thinking toward recognizing blacks’ status as United States
citizens and linking that status with their claims to legal equality.35 Nor
were Republicans alone in linking the status of citizenship with the
entitlement to legal equality. During both the Civil Rights Act debates and
the subsequent Fourteenth Amendment debates, opponents of black equality
repeatedly asserted that extending citizenship to blacks would require not
only that they be given equal civil rights, such as the right to contract and to
own property, but full political rights and privileges as well.36
Part III examines the persistence of these understandings in early
interpretations of the Fourteenth Amendment, including in debates
surrounding early Congressional efforts to enforce the Amendment and in
early judicial decisions examining its meaning. Part III also explores the
shift away from the citizenship-focused account of the Amendment in the
wake of the Supreme Court’s notorious 1873 decision in the SlaughterHouse Cases,37 which imposed a narrow and constrained interpretation on
the Amendment’s Citizenship and Privileges or Immunities Clauses that
effectively negated those Clauses’ ability to provide meaningful protection
to civil rights.
Part IV examines the evidence considered in Parts I through III of the
Article in light of modern originalist theory. Although the diversity of
originalist theories renders it difficult to make categorical claims about
whether a particular outcome either is or is not reconcilable with
“originalism” in the abstract, this Part argues that there is a strong argument
for recognizing an equality component in the Fourteenth Amendment’s
Citizenship Clause that would require that the federal government extend to
all citizens equality rights that are at least as broad as those that states are
required to extend to all “persons” under the Equal Protection Clause.
*

*

*

Of course, any comprehensive originalist defense of Bolling would
almost certainly require a defense of Brown’s interpretive correctness as

35

See infra notes 168-176 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 200, 259-271 & 290 and accompanying text.
37
83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).
36
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well.38 As noted above, the proposition that Brown can be reconciled with
originalism has been embraced by many self-described originalist scholars.
But this position remains deeply controversial.39 The question of Brown’s
consistency with the original understanding and/or meaning of the
Fourteenth Amendment is among the most thoroughly examined questions
in all of constitutional law and attempting to engage this question
adequately would take me far afield from the core focus of the present
inquiry.40 For purposes of this Article, I will therefore limit myself to the
more modest objective of demonstrating that Bolling is no more
problematic than Brown as a matter of constitutional text and original
meaning. This proposition is sufficiently novel and controversial to merit
sustained attention.41
I.

CONSTITUTIONAL “CITIZENSHIP” BEFORE THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT
A. Republican “Citizenship” and Equality in Early America

The change in governmental form that accompanied the American
Revolution resulted in a changed relationship between the people and their
respective governments that was reflected in the terminological change
from “subjects” to “citizens.”42 As historian Gordon Wood observes, the
very idea of “[r]epublican citizenship” during the Founding era “implied
equality.”43
38

Cf. Michael C. Dorf, What Does the Second Amendment Mean Today?, 76 CHI.KENT L. REV. 291, 326 (2000) (“Clever lawyers can concoct all sorts of arguments for why
Bolling is no more problematic than Brown but for an originalist that still leaves the puzzle
of Brown itself.”) (footnote omitted).
39
See supra note 6.
40
See, e.g., Jamal Greene, Fourteenth Amendment Originalism, 71 MARYLAND L. REV.
978, 982 (2012) (“The original understanding of the Equal Protection Clause regarding
racial segregation was debated extensively in the briefing to Brown v. Board of Education
and has been a central concern of constitutional historians and theorists ever since.”)
(footnote omitted).
41
Even originalists who defend Brown as correctly decided often concede the
unavailability of any similar defense of Bolling’s constitutional holding. See, e.g., BORK,
supra note 15, at 83-84; McConnell, supra note 18, at 166-68; Paulsen, supra note 1, at
901.
42
See, e.g., GORDON WOOD, THE RADICALISM OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION, 169
(1991) (discussing relationship between citizenship and republicanism in Revolution-era
American thought).
43
Id. at 233; see also, e.g., DOUGLAS BRADBURN, THE CITIZENSHIP REVOLUTION:
POLITICS AND THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN UNION 1774-1804, at 11 (2009) (“When
dressed in the language of Revolution, subjecthood and citizenship were understood to be
polar opposites with subjecthood representing a feudal status of perpetual allegiance and
inferiority, and citizenship representing a ‘modern’ status of equality and freedom …”). As
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The idea that American citizenship necessarily implied equal citizenship
was commonplace in American political and legal writing of the late
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. For example, in a 1784 pamphlet
urging the adoption of a new constitution for his state, South Carolina
politician Thomas Tudor Tucker described the constitution as “a social
covenant entered into by express consent of the people, upon a footing of
the most perfect equality with respect to every civil liberty.”44 “No man,”
according to Tucker, “has any privilege above his fellow-citizens, except
whilst in office, and even then, none but what they have thought proper to
vest in him, solely for the purpose of supporting him in the effectual
performance of his duty to the public.”45 A pamphlet discussing the nature
of United States citizenship published in 1787 by Tucker’s fellow South
Carolinian, David Ramsay, described American “citizens,” as distinguished
from English “subjects,” as being “so far equal, that none have hereditary
rights superior to others,” with each citizen possessing “as much of the
common sovereignty as another.”46 Chief Justice John Jay’s 1793 opinion
in Chisolm v. Georgia,47 explained his rejection of state sovereign immunity
by reference to the difference between the European systems, which
regarded the person of the sovereign “as the object of allegiance, and
exclude[d] the idea of his being on an equal footing with a subject,” and the
American system, in which “the citizens ... are equal as fellow citizens, and
as joint tenants in the sovereignty.”48
Wood observes, the term “citizen” itself had etymological roots connecting the idea of
“citizenship” with the inhabitants of a town or city, and thus stood in contradistinction to
members of “the landed nobility or gentry.” WOOD, supra note 42, at 233; see also, e.g.,
SAMUEL JOHNSON, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (3rd ed. 1768) (unpaginated)
(defining “citizen” as “a townman; not a gentleman”); see also id. (defining “gentleman” as
“a man of birth; a man of extraction, though not noble”).
44
PHILODEMUS (THOMAS TUDOR TUCKER), CONCILIATORY HINTS, ATTEMPTING, BY A
FAIR STATE OF MATTERS, TO REMOVE PARTY PREJUDICE (CHARLESTON, 1784), reprinted in
1AMERICAN POLITICAL WRITING DURING THE FOUNDING ERA 1760–1805, at 606, 612–13
(Charles S. Hyneman & Donald S. Lutz eds., 1983).
45
Id. at 613.
46
DAVID RAMSAY, A DISSERTATION ON THE MANNER OF ACQUIRING THE CHARACTER
AND PRIVILEGES OF A CITIZEN OF THE UNITED STATES, 5 (1789).
47
2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793).
48
Id. at 471-72 (Jay, C.J.); see also, e.g., 1 BLACKSTONE’S COMMENTARIES WITH
NOTES AND REFERENCES TO THE CONSTITUTION AND LAWS OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
OF THE UNITED STATES AND OF THE CONSTITUTION, (Appendix), 28 (Henry St. George
Tucker, ed., Philadelphia, William Young Birch & Abraham Small 1803) (describing the
“perfect equality of rights among citizens” as “indispensably necessary to the very
existence of” the American species of democracy); BENJAMIN LYNDE OLIVER, THE RIGHTS
OF AN AMERICAN CITIZEN: WITH A COMMENTARY ON STATE RIGHTS, AND ON THE
CONSTITUTION AND POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES, at 51 (1832) (observing that “[a]s all
men are naturally equal in their rights, there can be no doubt … that no individual would be
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During the early and middle decades of the nineteenth century, this
principle of citizen equality became a staple of American political rhetoric
and was closely associated with the political ideology of the era’s dominant
Jeffersonian and Jacksonian political coalitions. 49 This principle also
manifested itself in the era’s legal doctrine, particularly in the substantial
body of state-court decisions prohibiting “special” or “class” legislation that
imposed special burdens or accorded special benefits to particular “classes”
of citizens.50
B. The Problem of Free Black Citizenship
1. The Uncertain Status of United States Citizenship Under the
Constitution of 1787
Though the original Constitution of 1787 presupposed a class of persons
identified as “citizens of the United States,” it said virtually nothing about
the identities of such “citizens” or what rights or privileges attached to the
status of citizenship.51 The Constitution explicitly conferred a handful of
relatively narrow rights on United States “citizens,” including eligibility for
certain federal offices and the ability to maintain actions in the federal
courts in certain categories of cases. 52 The Privileges and Immunities
willing to join in organizing a society, unless he were put on an equal footing with others,
as to all rights secured to him in the social compact, or constitution of society.”); Wilkins’
Lessee v. Allenton, 3 Yeates 273 (Pa. 1801) (rejecting proposed construction of a land
grant as “oppose[d]” to “that just equality, which ought to prevail amongst the citizens of a
free government”).
49
On the role of civic equality in Jeffersonian and Jacksonian ideology, see, for
example, HOWARD GILLMAN: THE CONSTITUTION BESIEGED: THE RISE AND DEMISE OF
LOCHNER ERA POLICE POWERS JURISPRUDENCE at 33-45 (1993); cf. WILLIAM E. NELSON,
THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT: FROM POLITICAL PRINCIPLE TO JUDICIAL DOCTRINE, 3638 (1988) (observing linkage between ideas of equality and “citizens’ rights” rhetoric in
antebellum political and legal arguments).
50
See, e.g., Ward v. Barnard, 1 Aik. 121, 127 (Vt. 1825) (“An act conferring upon any
one citizen, privileges to the prejudice of another, and which is not applicable to others, in
like circumstances, … does not enter into the idea of municipal law, having no relation to
the community in general.”); GILLMAN, supra note 49, at 22-60 (describing public and
judicial resistance to such “class legislation” during the antebellum period); Melissa
Saunders, Equal Protection, Class Legislation, and Color-Blindness, 96 MICH. L. REV.
245, 251-68 (1997) (same).
51
Cf. WILLIAM RAWLE, A VIEW OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA 85 (Philadelphia, 2nd ed., 1829) (“It cannot escape notice that no definition of
the nature and rights of citizens appears in the Constitution. The descriptive term is used
with a plain indication that its meaning is understood by all …”).
52
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2 (eligibility for House of Representatives); id. art. I, § 3
(Senate eligibility); id. art. II, § 1 (presidential eligibility); id. art. III, § 2 (designating
citizenship of the parties as a basis for jurisdiction for certain categories of suits).
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Clause of Article IV (also known as the Comity Clause) suggested the
existence of a much broader and more amorphous category of “privileges
and immunities” of citizenship that the Constitution itself did not define. 53
Although the plain language of the Comity Clause appeared to require
that each state extend to citizens of other states literally “all” the privileges
and immunities its own citizens possessed, this interpretation was almost
uniformly rejected by antebellum courts, which instead embraced a
narrower interpretation of the provision as extending only to “fundamental”
state-law rights and privileges. 54 Justice Bushrod Washington’s circuit
opinion in Corfield v. Coryell,55 one of the leading antebellum authorities on
the meaning of the provision, exemplified this approach. Washington
identified the “privileges and immunities” protected by the Clause as “those
... which are in their nature fundamental,” “which belong of right to the
citizens of all free Governments” and “which have, at all times, been
enjoyed by the citizens of the several states which compose this Union,
from the time of their becoming free, independent, and sovereign.” 56
Washington also suggested an illustrative, though explicitly non-exhaustive
list of the rights he viewed as falling within the scope of the provision’s
protection.57
The ambiguity surrounding the rights attaching to citizenship was
53

U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1 (“The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all
Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States.”).
54
See, e.g., Earl M. Maltz, Fourteenth Amendment Concepts in the Antebellum Era, 32
AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 305, 336 (1988) (“[M]ost courts concluded that the concept of
privileges and immunities did not encompass all rights which were associated with
citizenship in a particular state; rather, only those rights which were in some sense
‘fundamental’ were viewed as protected.”).
55
6 F. Cas. 546 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3,230); see also John Harrison,
Reconstructing the Privileges or Immunities Clause, 101 YALE L.J. 1385, 1398 (1992)
(describing Corfield as “the most famous Comity Clause case of all”).
56
Id. at 551-52.
57
Washington provided the following illustrative list of rights he viewed as falling
within the scope of the provision’s protection:
The right of a citizen of one state to pass through, or to reside in any other state,
for purposes of trade, agriculture, professional pursuits, or otherwise; to claim the
benefit of the writ of habeas corpus; to institute and maintain actions of any kind
in the courts of the state; to take, hold and dispose of property, either real or
personal; and an exemption from higher taxes or impositions than are paid by the
other citizens of the state; may be mentioned as some of the particular privileges
and immunities of citizens, which are clearly embraced by the general description
of privileges deemed to be fundamental: to which may be added, the elective
franchise, as regulated and established by the laws or constitution of the state in
which it is to be exercised. These, and many others which might be mentioned,
are, strictly speaking, privileges and immunities …
Id. at 551-52.

14

ORIGINALISM AND BOLLING

[2012

matched by a similar ambiguity regarding the persons entitled to
recognition as “citizens.” The Constitution gave Congress the power to
prescribe a “uniform Rule of Naturalization”58 but was otherwise silent on
the question of how citizenship could be acquired. The dominant view
during the antebellum period was that United States citizenship was
derivative of state citizenship, with state citizenship generally viewed as
following the English common law jus soli doctrine, which recognized birth
within a nation’s territory as sufficient to establish citizenship.59
While this jus soli principle worked tolerably well as applied to white
Americans, it presented special problems as applied to other groups,
particularly Native Americans, slaves and free African Americans.60 The
denial of citizenship to Native Americans and African American slaves
raised relatively few conceptual difficulties. Most American courts and
legal commentators viewed the birthright citizenship principle as
inapplicable to Native Americans due to the allegiance they owed to their
quasi-sovereign tribal governments, which placed them in a position
analogous to that of foreigners. 61 The denial of citizenship to slaves was
similarly easy to justify based on their legal status as property and a civil
law tradition, stretching back to ancient Rome, which recognized an explicit
distinction between “slave” and “citizen.”62 The legal status of free blacks,
however, was not so easily assimilated to a pre-existing legal status that
could be defined in contradistinction to the status of “citizen.”63
Under English law, both free-born African Americans and emancipated
slaves had been considered English subjects based on their birth within the
territorial jurisdiction of the sovereign.64 But this formal legal status was
58

U.S. Const., art. I, § 8, cl.
See, e.g., JAMES H. KETTNER, THE DEVELOPMENT OF AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP, 1608–
1870, 287 (1978); (“Americans” of the antebellum period “merely continued to assume that
‘birth within the allegiance’ conferred the status [of citizenship] and its accompanying
rights.”).
60
See generally id. at 288-333 (discussing contested citizenship status of Native
Americans and African Americans).
61
See, e.g., ROGERS M. SMITH, CIVIC IDEALS: CONFLICTING VISIONS OF CITIZENSHIP
IN U.S. HISTORY, 106-10, 181-85 (1997); KETTNER, supra note 59, at 288-300.
62
See, e.g., KETTNER, supra note 59, at 311 (“Although it was impossible to avoid
confronting problems of slave status … the debates could be argued in terms that did not
raise the issue of citizenship explicitly.”); Douglas G. Smith, Citizenship and the
Fourteenth Amendment, 34 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 681, 738-43 (1997) (discussing influence
of Roman law distinction between citizens and slaves on antebellum legal thought).
63
KETTNER, supra note 59, at 311 (observing that “when free Negroes were
considered within the context of the general assumptions governing the concept of
citizenship, there seemed to be no theoretically consistent way to deny them the rights and
privileges of citizens.”).
64
SMITH, supra note 61, at 64-65.
59
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not viewed as implying legal equality with white subjects and free blacks
were widely subjected to various civil and political disabilities, including
denial of the right to vote and hold office, the right to serve on juries and to
testify against whites. 65 Though the separation from England and the
transition of former colonists from English “subjects” to American
“citizens” highlighted the ambiguous legal status of free blacks in the newly
independent states, the change in governmental form led to relatively few
practical changes in their legal treatment. Both northern and southern states
maintained a variety of race-based distinctions that had existed under
Colonial-era laws and enacted new racially discriminatory legislation to
address newly perceived problems.66
2. The Missouri Controversy and the Emergence of Free Black Citizenship
as a National Political Issue
Explicit consideration of the citizenship status of free blacks was
relatively rare during the nation’s earliest years and opinion among those
who did address the issue was divided.67 But in 1820, the question of free
blacks’ citizenship emerged as a source of national political controversy
when anti-slavery northern members of Congress sought to derail
Missouri’s application for statehood under an aggressively pro-slavery
constitution that would require the state’s legislature to “prevent free
negroes and mulattoes from coming to and settling in this State, under any
pretext whatsoever.” 68 Anti-slavery forces contended that this proposed
migration restriction would violate the rights of free black citizens under the
Comity Clause.69
Supporters of Missouri’s admission responded to such arguments by
denying that free blacks either were or could be “citizens” of any state
within the meaning of the Constitution. The denial of free blacks’
citizenship by supporters of Missouri’s admission rested on a strongly
65

Id. at 65. Bans on interracial marriage and sexual relations also existed throughout
the American colonies. Id.
66
See, e.g., Siegel, supra note 19, at 494-513 (surveying race-based laws restricting
legal rights of free blacks in both northern and southern states following the Revolution).
67
MARK GRABER, DRED SCOTT AND THE PROBLEM OF CONSTITUTIONAL EVIL, 52-53
(2006).
68
For useful discussions of the political background of the controversy over
Missouri’s admission, see ROBERT PIERCE FORBES, THE MISSOURI COMPROMISE AND ITS
AFTERMATH, 33-141 (2007); and DON E. FEHRENBACHER THE DRED SCOTT CASE: ITS
SIGNIFICANCE IN AMERICAN LAW AND POLITICS, 100-13 (1978).
69
See, e.g., 37 Annals of Cong., 16th Cong. 2d Sess., at 47 (1820) (Rep. Burris)
(contending that proposed migration restriction as “entirely repugnant to the Constitution
of the United States.”); id. at 92 (Rep. Otis) (proposed restriction was in “palpable collision
with” the Comity Clause).
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egalitarian conception of citizenship that insisted on the full political and
civil equality of all citizens. For example, Representative Louis McLane of
Delaware declared his understanding “that a person, to be a ‘citizen’ under
one government, must be a member of the civil community, and entitled as
[a] matter of right to equal advantages in that community.”70 Representative
Philip Barbour of Virginia similarly contended that that “[t]he term citizen
… could not with propriety be applied to anyone unless … he should be
possessed of all at least of the civil rights, if not of the political, of every
other person in the community, under like circumstances, of which he is not
deprived for some cause personal to himself.”71 The corollary of such claims
was that the unequal treatment of free blacks under the existing laws of
most states, including northern states where slavery was illegal,
demonstrated that such individuals could not truly be considered “citizens”
of any state. 72 Those opposed to Missouri’s admission countered such
arguments by observing that many white citizens, including women,
children and property-less white men, did not enjoy full civil and political
privileges in many states but were nonetheless recognized as “citizens” of
those states.73
The controversy over Missouri’s proposed exclusion of free blacks
ended somewhat anticlimactically in a compromise that allowed the state’s
admission under its proposed constitution—including the provision
restricting free blacks’ migration—but that premised admission on the state
legislature’s acknowledgement that the constitution would “never be
construed to authorize the passage of any law ... by which any citizen, of
either of the States in this Union, shall be excluded from the enjoyment of
70

Id. at 615.
Id. at 545; see also, e.g., id. at 585 (Rep. Archer) (arguing that while “[c]itizens
might be admitted in various degree to the exercise of political rights” and “might even be
admitted in various degrees to the enjoyment of civil rights,” “those could not be
considered as belonging to the ranks of citizens who, … by … the positive enactments of
law, were every where excluded from an equality with even the lowest rank of citizens, as
respected the ordinary and most essential relations of domestic and social rights.”).
72
See, e.g., id. at 546 (Rep. Barbour) (contending that free blacks could not be
considered citizens of any state because such individuals were “in all the States deprived of
many of the rights of white men.”); id. at 87-88 (Rep. Holmes (pointing to denial of voting
rights and right to keep and bear arms as illustrating that free blacks were not citizens); cf.
id. at 93-94 (Rep. Otis) (observing that the arguments of nearly all proponents of
Missouri’s admission rested upon “a single foundation stone,” namely the contention that
free blacks “were not citizens … because … they are, or have been, made liable to certain
disabilities not common to … free white citizens”).
73
See, e.g., id. at 93-94 (Rep. Otis) (observing that “[i]n every country women and
minors are subject to disqualifications” in the exercise of important civil and political
rights”); id. at 596 (Rep. Hemphill) (observing that “[d]iscriminations are familiar to us, in
the several States, both as to political and civil rights; but it never was believed that they
effected a total extinguishment of citizenship”).
71
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any of the privileges and immunities to which such citizen is entitled under
the Constitution of the United States.”74
The resolution of the Missouri controversy did not end the sectional
debate over the citizenship of free blacks and their rights under the Comity
Clause. In 1822—less than a year after the Congressional debates over
Missouri concluded—South Carolina enacted a law authorizing state
officials to board any ship entering the state’s harbors and arrest any
African American crew members found on board.75 The passage of this law,
and similar “Negro Seamen’s Acts” by other southern states, 76 prompted
strenuous objections from New England states, led by Massachusetts, which
objected that South Carolina’s conduct violated the Article IV Comity
Clause. In response to Massachusetts’ objections, and its efforts to institute
a legal challenge to the law’s constitutionality, 77 the South Carolina
legislature issued a proclamation denying that “free negroes or persons of
color” were “citizens of the United States” within the meaning of the
Comity Clause and condemning Massachusetts’ for its attempted
interference with the internal affairs of a sister state.78
The antagonism between the southern states and the New England states
regarding the constitutionality of the Negro Seamen’s Acts kept the
question of free black citizenship alive as a national political issue
throughout the antebellum period.79

74

Philip Hamburger, Privileges or Immunities, 105 NW. L. REV. 61, 87-88 (2011).
See generally W. Jeffrey Bolster, “To Feel Like a Man”: Black Seamen in the
Northern States, 1800–1860, 76 J. AM. HIST. 1173, 1192-93 (1990) (describing the Negro
Seamen’s Acts of South Carolina and other southern states).
76
Similar laws were subsequently adopted by North Carolina, Georgia, Florida,
Alabama, and Louisiana. Id. at 1192.
77
In 1844, Massachusetts sent official delegations to South Carolina and Louisiana to
protest those states’ Negro Seamens’ Acts and to institute legal challenges to the acts. Both
delegations were forced to leave shortly after their arrival in the destination states after
local officials made clear that they would not be protected against mob violence. PAUL
FINKELMAN, SLAVERY, FEDERALISM AND COMITY, 109 n.28 (1981); see also WILLIAM
WIECEK, THE SOURCES OF ANTISLAVERY CONSTITUTIONALISM IN AMERICA, 1760–1848,
128-40 (1977). The mistreatment of the Massachusetts delegation became a staple of
antislavery political rhetoric that was repeatedly invoked throughout the antebellum period.
See Maltz, supra note 54, at 340-41.
78
STATE DOCUMENTS ON FEDERAL RELATIONS: THE STATES AND THE UNITED STATES,
238 (Herman V. Ames, ed. 1970). The legislatures of Alabama, Arkansas, Georgia and
Mississippi all issued proclamations endorsing the actions of South Carolina and
condemning Massachusetts. Id. at 237.
79
See, e.g., Maltz, supra note 54, at 340 (observing that the “Negro Seamen’s Acts
were a more or less constant source of friction in the antebellum era”).
75
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3. Legal Theories of Free Black Citizenship
The controversy over the citizenship of free blacks and their rights
under the Comity Clause did not confine itself to the political arena. During
the middle and later decades of the antebellum period, arguments
concerning the citizenship of free blacks were frequently pressed upon
courts and other legal officials resulting in an extensive body of legal
decisions and commentary addressing the issue. The legal theories
developed in connection with such claims gave rise to at least three distinct
theories of free blacks’ citizenship—(1) the pro-Southern, anti-citizenship
position, which viewed the pervasive denial of legal equality to free blacks
as conclusive evidence of their incapacity for citizenship; (2) the
abolitionist position, which accepted the posited link between citizenship
and equality suggested by the pro-Southern position but argued that free
blacks were citizens and thus entitled to the same civil rights as white
citizens; and (3) a more moderate pro-citizenship position, which attempted
to steer a middle ground between these two extremes by defending the
citizenship of free blacks while, at the same time, embracing an extremely
narrow conception of what “citizenship” entailed.
a. The Anti-Citizenship Position
In 1822, less than a year after the issue of free black citizenship emerged
as a point of national contention in the Missouri debates, Kentucky’s
highest court decided Amy v. Smith—one of the earliest cases to address the
question of whether free blacks could be considered “citizens” within the
meaning of the Comity Clause.80 The plaintiff, a purported “free woman of
color” who alleged she was being unlawfully held as a slave, claimed
citizenship under the laws of Pennsylvania and Virginia based on her
temporary residence in those states and contended that the refusal of
Kentucky to recognize her claim to freedom violated her rights under the
Comity Clause. 81 Echoing the arguments offered by pro-slavery forces
during the Missouri debates, the Kentucky court held that no one could, “in
the correct sense of the term,” be considered “a citizen of a State, who is not
entitled, upon the terms prescribed by the institutions of the State, to all the
rights and privileges conferred by those institutions upon the highest class
of society.” 82 Because “[f]ree negroes and mulattoes” were “almost
everywhere, considered and treated as a degraded race of people,” the court
believed that “national sentiment on the subject” warranted a “presumption
80

Amy v. Smith, 11 Ky (1 Litt.) 326, 327 (Ct. of App. 1822).
Id. at 327.
82
Id. at 333.
81
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that no State had made persons of color citizens,” unless “positive evidence
to the contrary” could be shown.83
In dissent, Judge Benjamin Mills called attention to the many
absurdities the majority’s restrictive definition of “citizenship” would
require, including denying citizenship to not only all women and children
but also to all white males who lacked the requisite age and residency
requirements for the state’s highest offices.84 Mills identified the majority’s
“mistake” as having arisen from its failure to “attend[] to a sensible
distinction between political and civil rights.”85 According to Mills, civil
rights, including “liberty of person and of conscience, the right of acquiring
and possessing property, of marriage and the social relations, of suit and
defense, and security in person, estate and reputation,” along “with some
others which might be enumerated,” were what “constitute the citizen.”86
Political rights, by contrast, were “not necessary ingredients” of citizenship
and a state could thus “deny all her political rights to an individual” without
depriving that person of citizenship.87
The large majority of antebellum courts faced with claims regarding the
citizenship of free blacks adopted the more restrictive conception of
citizenship endorsed by the majority in Amy v. Smith rather than the more
permissive view urged by Judge Mills.88 Almost invariably, these courts
premised their rejection of free blacks’ claims to citizenship on the unequal
legal treatment of free blacks under existing state laws.89
83

Id.
Id. at 342. Two years earlier, Mills had authored an opinion rejecting an argument
that free blacks were not protected by the bill of rights in the state’s constitution, observing
that although such individuals did not possess “every benefit or privilege which the
constitution secures,” they were nonetheless “in some measure, parties” to the political
compact and thus within the scope of many of the constitution’s protections. Ely v.
Thompson, 10 Ky. (3 A.K. Marsh) 70 (1820).
85
Id.
86
Id.
87
Id.
88
See GRABER, supra note 67, at 29 (observing that “[v]irtually every state court that
ruled on black citizenship before 1857 concluded that free persons of color were neither
state nor American citizens.”).
89
See, e.g., State v. Claiborne, 19 Tenn. (Meigs) 331, 339 (1838) (“[F]ree negroes, by
whatever appellation we call them, were never in any of the States, entitled to all the
privileges and immunities of citizens, and consequently were not intended to be included,
when this word [i.e., the word “citizens” in the Comity Clause] was used in the
Constitution”); Jackson v. Bulloch, 12 Conn. 38, 42-43 (1837) (holding that exclusion of
“all coloured persons” from the elective franchise indicated that “such persons were
considered as excluded from the social compact” and thus could not claim protection under
equality provision in state’s bill of rights); Cooper and Worsham v. The Mayor and
Aldermen of Savannah, 4 Ga. 68, 72 (1848) (“Free persons of color have never been
recognized here as citizens; they are not entitled to bear arms, vote for members of the
84
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Though no federal case prior to Dred Scott “explicitly discussed who
was eligible for American citizenship,”90 the anti-citizenship position was
endorsed by multiple officials in the federal Executive branch. In 1821,
U.S. Attorney General William Wirt, a Virginia slaveowner, issued a formal
opinion denying that free blacks of his native state could be “citizens of the
United States” within the meaning of the federal Constitution.91 Invoking
the Comity Clause and the apparent absurdity of allowing “a person born
and residing in Virginia, but possessing none of the high characteristic
privileges of a citizen of the State” to nevertheless acquire “all the
immunities and privileges of a citizen” upon removing to a different state,
Wirt declared his opinion that a “citizen of the United States,” within the
meaning of the Constitution was limited to “those only who enjoyed the full
and equal privileges of white citizens in the State of their residence.” 92
Wirt’s decision that free blacks could not be “citizens” within the meaning
of the Constitution was followed by his successors Caleb Cushing93 and, in
an unpublished opinion that foreshadowed the reasoning of his later Dred
Scott opinion, future Chief Justice Roger Taney.94
Although the citizenship question arose in a variety of contexts, the
specter of the Comity Clause—and the rights that might be claimed by free
legislature, or to hold any civil office.”); Aldridge v. The Commonwealth, 4 Va. (2 Va.
Cas.) 447, 449 (1824) (holding that “[n]otwithstanding the general terms used” in the
state’s bill of rights, free blacks could not claim protection under it because “[t]he
numerous restrictions imposed on this class of people in our Statute Book … demonstrate,
that” the constitution was “not considered to extend equally to both classes of our
population.”).
90
GRABER, supra note 67, at 53.
91
William Wirt, Rights of Virginia Free Negroes, 1 Op. Att’y Gen. 506 (Nov. 7,
1821). Although the opinion addressed the meaning of the phrase “citizens of the United
States” in a federal statute, Wirt “presum[ed] that the description, ‘citizens of the United
States,’ as used in the constitution, has the same meaning that it has in the several acts of
Congress,” allowing the constitutional description to serve as the “standard of meaning” for
interpreting the statute. Id. at 506-07.
92
Id. at 507.
93
See Caleb Cushing, Right of Expatriation, 8 Op. Att’y Gen. 139, 142 (Oct. 31,
1856); see also Caleb Cushing, Relation of Indians to Citizenship, 7 Op. Att’y Gen. 746,
751-52 (July 5, 1856).
94
Roger B. Taney, The South Carolina Police Bill, reprinted in H. Jefferson Powell,
Attorney General Taney & the South Carolina Police Bill, 5 GREEN BAG 2d 75, 101
(2001). The only moderate dissent on this point issuing from the Attorney General’s office
during the antebellum period came from Attorney General Hugh Legare, who, in a brief
1843 opinion, interpreted a federal statute restricting eligibility to purchase federal lands to
“citizens of the United States” as having been intended to exclude only aliens and not
native-born free blacks. Hugh S. Legare, Pre-emption Rights of Colored Persons, 4 Op.
Att’y Gen. 147,147 (1843). Legare made clear, however, that his opinion went solely to
the legislative intent underlying the particular statute at issue and did not address the
question of black citizenship more generally. Id.
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blacks if they were recognized as “citizens” within the meaning of that
Clause—pervaded discussions of blacks’ citizenship, even when the Clause
itself was not directly at issue.95 A common assumption among those who
espoused the anti-citizenship view was that if free blacks were recognized
as “citizens” within the meaning of the Comity Clause, they would be
entitled to claim an equality of rights when travelling in southern states with
all citizens of the destination state—including rights that the destination
state had reserved to its white citizens.96 Implicit in this assumption was a
conception of the Comity Clause as encompassing not only a bare
protection against residency-based discrimination but rather a guarantee of
substantive equality with respect to certain rights that inhered in the status
of citizenship itself.97 The anti-citizenship position thus implicitly rejected
the proposition that individual states could limit the “privileges and
immunities” to which free blacks from other states would be entitled by
imposing similar restrictions on their own free black populations.98
95

For example, in rejecting a claim that free blacks should be considered “freemen”
within the meaning of a state constitutional voting rights provision, the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court identified the federal Comity Clause as an “insuperable” obstacle to such
an interpretation, suggesting that, if Pennsylvania conferred citizenship on its free blacks,
such citizenship would “overbear the laws” of southern states imposing “countless
disabilities” on free blacks in those states. Hobbs & Others v. Fogg, 6 Watts 553, 560 (Pa.
1837).
96
See, e.g., Wirt, supra note 91, at 507 (assuming that “if a person born and residing in
Virginia, but possessing none of the high characteristic privileges of a citizen of the State,”
were recognized as a “citizen” under the federal Constitution, such person could “acquire[]
all the immunities and privileges of a citizen” in a different state “although he possessed
none of them in the State of his nativity”).
97
As the Supreme Court of Tennessee explained in rejecting a claim to free black
citizenship under the Comity Clause:
[I]n speaking of the rights which a citizen of one State should enjoy in every other
State as applicable to white men, it is very properly said that he should be entitled
to all the “privileges and immunities” of citizens in such other State. The meaning
of the language is, that no privilege enjoyed by, or immunity allowed to, the most
favored class of citizens in said State shall be withheld from a citizen of any other
State. How can it be said that he enjoys all the privileges of citizens, when he is
scarcely allowed a single right in common with the mass of the citizens of the
State? It can not be; and therefore either the free negro is not a citizen in the sense
of the Constitution, or, if a citizen, he is entitled to “all the privileges and
immunities” of the most favored class of citizens.
State v. Claiborne, 19 Tenn. (Meigs) 331, 339 (1838); cf. 2 JOHN CODMAN HURD, THE
LAW OF FREEDOM AND BONDAGE IN THE UNITED STATES 352-53, 376 (1862) (contending
that the construction of the Comity Clause “which harmonizes best with the general
character of the Constitution” was as a protection of individual rights that were national in
character).
98
Cf. infra Part I.B.3 (describing moderate pro-citizenship position).
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b. The Abolitionist Position
The origins of abolitionist theories of free black citizenship can be
traced to the prosecution of Connecticut educator Prudence Crandall in the
1830’s. 99 Crandall was prosecuted under an ordinance prohibiting the
education of non-resident free blacks without the consent of local
authorities.100 Crandall’s attorneys, led by William W. Ellsworth and Calvin
Goddard, constructed a defense based on the proposition that the
Connecticut statute under which Crandall was prosecuted violated the
Comity Clause by denying free blacks from other states the right to seek an
education in the state. The judge presiding at Crandall’s trial—Chief
Justice David Daggett of the Connecticut Supreme Court—rejected this
argument, instructing the jury that “it would be a perversion of terms” to
say that free blacks were citizens within the meaning of that provision in the
Comity Clause.101
In his argument before the Connecticut Supreme Court on appeal,
Ellsworth insisted that “[a] distinction founded in color in fundamental
rights is novel, inconvenient and impracticable.”102 Because free blacks, by
virtue of their birth, owed allegiance to the government and were bound to
follow its laws, Ellsworth argued that they were entitled to claim from the
government the “correlative” obligation of “protection and equal laws.”103
Ellsworth drew upon Justice Washington’s explication of the Comity
Clause in Corfield as a guarantee of “fundamental rights” and insisted that
education was such a fundamental right, describing it as the “fundamental
pillar on which our free institutions rest ...” 104 Citing the constitutional
treatise of Justice Story, who had described the Comity Clause as having
established a “general citizenship” among the citizens of the several
states,105 Ellsworth contended that the purpose of the Comity Clause had
99

See, e.g., WIECEK, supra note 77, at 163-66; Randy E. Barnett, Whence Comes
Section One? The Abolitionist Origins of the Fourteenth Amendment, 3 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS
165, 174-75 (2011).
100
The background of Crandall’s prosecution and its influence on subsequent
abolitionist theories of free black citizenship are discussed in WIECEK, supra note 77, at
163-64.
101
Crandall v. State, 10 Conn. 339, 347 (1834) (quoting trial court’s jury instruction).
102
REPORT OF THE ARGUMENTS OF COUNSEL IN THE CASE OF PRUDENCE CRANDALL
PLFF. IN ERROR VS. STATE OF CONNECTICUT BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT OF ERRORS AT
THEIR SESSION AT BROOKLYN, JULY TERM 1834, 6 (Boston, Garrison & Knapp, 1834).
103
Id. at 7.
104
Id. at 12.
105
3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES,
675 (Bos., Hilliard, Gray & Co. 1833) (“The intention of this clause was to confer on [the
citizens of each state], if one may so say, a general citizenship, and to communicate all the
privileges and immunities which citizens of the same State would be entitled to under like

2012]

ORIGINALISM AND BOLLING

23

been “to declare a citizen of one state to be a citizen of every state, and as
such, to clothe him with the same fundamental rights, be he where he might,
which he acquired by birth in a particular state.”106
Though Ellsworth’s arguments were not embraced by the Connecticut
Supreme Court, which overturned Crandall’s conviction on technical
grounds,107 they proved highly influential in the subsequent development of
abolitionist theories of constitutional citizenship. 108 In 1835, New York
abolitionist William Jay published a tract condemning the American
Colonization Society, in which he devoted nineteen pages to contesting the
constitutional theories underlying the trial court’s controversial jury
instruction denying that free blacks were citizens.109 In that same year, the
Ohio Antislavery Convention adopted arguments similar to those of
Ellsworth and Goddard in condemning various “enactments in the Ohio
legislature, imposing disabilities upon the free blacks, emigrating from
other states,” as inconsistent with the Comity Clause and thus “entirely
unconstitutional.”110
Similar invocations of the Comity Clause in defense of the rights of free
blacks recurred in abolitionist constitutional arguments throughout the
middle decades of the nineteenth century. Leading abolitionists, including
Charles Dexter Cleveland, Salmon P. Chase, Benjamin Shaw and Byron
Paine, all invoked the Comity Clause in condemning South Carolina and
other southern states for imprisoning the “free citizens of Massachusetts”
and other Northern states pursuant to their infamous “Negro Seamen’s
Acts.”111 Certain “radical” abolitionists, including Lysander Spooner and
circumstances.’”).
106
Id. at 11.
107
Crandall, 10 Conn. at 372.
108
See WIECEK, supra note 77, at 163-66; Howard J. Graham, The Antislavery Origins
of the Fourteenth Amendment, 1950 WIS. L. REV. 479, 505 (describing Ellsworth and
Goddard’s arguments as “the first comprehensive crystallization of abolitionist
constitutional theory”).
109
WILLIAM JAY, AN INQUIRY INTO THE CHARACTER AND TENDENCY OF THE
AMERICAN COLONIZATION AND AMERICAN ANTI-SLAVERY SOCIETIES 38-45 (4th ed. 1837).
Both the attorney who prosecuted the case and Chief Justice Daggett who presided over the
trial were members of the American Colonization Society and Jay argued that the
prosecution had been motivated by a desire to further the Society’s goal of encouraging
free blacks to migrate to American-established colonies in Africa. Id.
110
PROCEEDINGS OF THE OHIO ANTI-SLAVERY CONVENTION: HELD AT PUTNAM, ON
THE TWENTY-SECOND, TWENTY-THIRD, AND TWENTY-FOURTH OF APRIL, 36-40 (Beaumont
& Wallace, 1835); see also Graham, supra note 102, at 494-98.
111
See Charles Dexter Cleveland, Address of the Liberty Party of Pennsylvania to the
People of the State, in SALMON PORTLAND CHASE & CHARLES DEXTER CLEVELAND, ANTISLAVERY ADDRESSES OF 1844 AND 1845, at 47 & n.* (Philadelphia, J.A. Bancroft & Co.
1867); see also Barnett, supra note 99, at 193-94, 213-15, 219, 241-42 (summarizing
arguments of Cleveland, Chase, Shaw and Paine regarding citizenship and privileges or
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Joel Tiffany, sought to demonstrate that not only free blacks but slaves as
well were “citizens” of the United States by virtue of their birth on U.S.
soil.112 Spooner and Tiffany contended that the citizenship of free blacks,
combined with the Comity Clause, provided the federal government with
constitutional authority to abolish the slave laws of the southern states.113
Although more mainstream abolitionists generally rejected the argument
that the federal government had constitutional authority interfere with
slavery in the states, 114 both the nationalistic conception of “citizenship”
embraced by the radicals and their vision of the Comity Clause as
protecting equality with respect to a nationally determined baseline of
“fundamental” rights were well within the mainstream of abolitionist
political thought.115 Mainstream abolitionists rejected both the proposition
that states were free to deny citizenship to their free, native-born inhabitants
and the related claim that states were free to limit the rights of free black
travelers from other states by denying similar rights to their own similarly
situated black inhabitants.116
The mainstream abolitionist position thus shared a good deal in
common with the theories underlying the denial of black citizenship. Like
opponents of black citizenship, abolitionists viewed the Comity Clause as
protecting rights that persons enjoyed by virtue of their status as United
States citizens, rather than rights conferred by the local law of any particular
state. And, like the opponents of black citizenship, abolitionists denied that
the rights of sojourning citizens were limited by the destination state’s
treatment of its own similarly situated inhabitants. The two sides obviously
differed on the question of how citizenship was acquired and the consequent
eligibility of free blacks to claim that status. But the logic of both the
abolitionist and the anti-citizenship positions required that all those who
were entitled to citizenship must be extended full equality with respect to all
immunities).
112
See JOEL TIFFANY, A TREATISE ON THE UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF AMERICAN
SLAVERY: TOGETHER WITH THE POWERS AND DUTIES OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT IN
RELATION TO THAT SUBJECT, 84-97 (Miami, Mnemosyne Publishing Co. 1969) (reprint)
(1849); LYSANDER SPOONER, THE UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF SLAVERY, 90-94 (Boston,
Bela Marsh 1847).
113
TIFFANY, supra note 112, at 95-97; SPOONER, supra note 112, at 93-94; see also
Barnett, supra note 99, at 205-08, 224-28.
114
Barnett, supra note 99, at 191.
115
See id. at 254 (summarizing arguments of numerous abolitionist leaders that
“equated the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States with their
fundamental rights … rather than the privileges or benefits conferred by state law” and
observing that these arguments “did not mention discrimination against out-of-staters” but
rather “simply condemned the violations of the fundamental rights of persons from outside
the state, regardless of how in-staters were treated.”).
116
Id. at 253-54.
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“fundamental” rights of citizenship.117
c. The Moderate Pro-Citizenship Position
The anti-citizenship position endorsed by the majority of southern
courts and the pro-citizenship theories of abolitionists did not exhaust the
conceptual possibilities regarding the citizenship of free blacks. A third
view, embraced by certain moderate jurists, including Chancellor James
Kent of New York, denied the strongly egalitarian premises underlying both
the anti-citizenship and abolitionist positions by rejecting their common
assumption that recognizing particular persons as “citizens” would
necessarily entitle them to full legal equality.
In the initial edition of his highly influential treatise on American law,
Kent obliquely suggested this position by using the example of “free
persons of colour” to illustrate his understanding of the Comity Clause.118
According to Kent, that provision entitled citizens to only “the privileges
that persons of the same description are entitled to in the state to which the
removal is made, and to none other.”119 “[T]herefore,” according to Kent, if
“free persons of colour are not entitled to vote in Carolina; free persons of
colour emigrating there from a northern state, would” likewise “not be
entitled to vote.” 120 Kent’s treatise rigidly adhered to the birthright
citizenship rule and acknowledged no exception from that principle based
on color.121
In subsequent editions, Kent and his son William, who assumed control
of the treatise after his father’s death in 1847, continued to endorse the
native-birth citizenship test notwithstanding the increasing strain placed on
that position as applied to free blacks by the growing body of case law
rejecting claims of black citizenship. While acknowledging that “[t]he
African race, even when free, are essentially a degraded caste of inferior
rank and condition in society,” and pointing readers to several cases
expressing the “judicial sense of their inferior condition,” Kent’s treatise
nonetheless maintained that “[t]he better opinion” was that “[i]f a slave born
in the United States ... be lawfully discharged from bondage, or if a black
man be born within the United States, and born free,” such a person would
“become[] thenceforward a citizen,” though he would remain subject to
“such disabilities as the laws of the states respectively may deem it
117

Cf. supra Section I.B.3.a (describing theories underlying the anti-citizenship
position).
118
See 2 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW, 605 (New York, O.
Halsted 1827).
119
Id.
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Id.
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Id. at 33-36.
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expedient to prescribe to free persons of color.”122
C. The Dred Scott Decision and Its Aftermath
By far the most salient judicial decision addressing the citizenship of
free blacks at the time of the Fourteenth Amendment’s adoption was the
United States Supreme Court’s 1857 decision in Dred Scott v. Sanford.123
The Dred Scott decision is particularly relevant for purposes of
understanding the Fourteenth Amendment’s Citizenship Clause as the
majority’s holding that free blacks could not be considered “citizens” within
the meaning of the Constitution provided the principal impetus for that
Clause’s adoption.124
The basic facts of the case are relatively straightforward—the plaintiff,
an African American born into slavery, brought suit in a federal court in
Missouri claiming that he and his family had gained their freedom when his
former master had brought them to live temporarily in two jurisdictions
where slavery was illegal—the state of Illinois and the federal territory of
Wisconsin.125 The defendant, Scott’s new owner, sought dismissal of the
case arguing that the federal court lacked diversity jurisdiction under Article
III because Scott was not a “citizen” of Missouri as he had alleged in his
pleading.126
1. Chief Justice Taney’s Opinion
At the outset of his opinion for the majority, Chief Justice Taney framed
the question the case presented as being whether:
a negro, whose ancestors were imported into this country, and sold as slaves,
[can] become a member of the political community formed and brought into
122

2 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 290-92 n.(b) (William Kent,
9th ed. 1858). A similar position was embraced by the North Carolina Supreme Court in
State v. Manuel, 20 N.C. 21 (1838), a rare decision by a southern court acknowledging the
citizenship of free blacks. While the North Carolina court declared that “slaves
manumitted here become free-men-and therefore if born within North Carolina are citizens
of North Carolina,” id. at 24, it made clear that the legislature could prescribe different
punishments for different “classes” of citizens, including prescribing harsher punishments
for free blacks than for similarly situated white citizens. Id. at 37.
123
60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
124
See, e.g., The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 73 (1873) (Citizenship Clause
was adopted primarily “[t]o remove th[e] difficulty” presented by the holding in Dred Scott
concerning African American citizenship).
125
See Scott, 60 U.S. at 397-99. Additional details regarding the background of the
case and its complex procedural history are provided in FEHRENBACHER, supra note 68, at
239-304.
126
60 U.S. at 400.
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existence by the Constitution of the United States, and as such become entitled
to all the rights, and privileges, and immunities, guarantied by that instrument
to the citizen.127

Taney’s framing of the relevant inquiry as whether the Constitution
authorized recognition of free blacks as “member[s] of the political
community” brought into existence by the United States Constitution
shifted attention away from the specific language of Article III, which
focused solely on whether the parties to the case were “[c]itizens of
different states,” 128 to the separate question of United States citizenship.
Taney’s decision to frame the question as one of United States citizenship,
rather than state citizenship, was consistent with what had by then become
the standard approach to framing questions of free black citizenship by both
sides of the controversy.129
Taney denied that there was any necessary connection between “the
rights of citizenship which a State may confer within its own limits, and the
rights of citizenship as a member of the Union.”130 While each state had the
right “confer on whomsoever it pleased the character of citizen ... and to
endow him with all its rights,” such rights were “confined to the boundaries
of the State” and did not constitute the person so designated “a citizen in the
sense in which that word is used in the Constitution of the United States.”131
Congress’s exclusive power over naturalization deprived the individual
states of the power to “introduce a new member into the political
community created by the Constitution …”132
Because the states could not unilaterally confer national citizenship, the
key question, according to Taney, was whether members of the African race
had been “citizens” of the original thirteen states at the time of the
Constitution’s adoption.133 After surveying a variety of discriminatory laws
that had existed in the northern states at the time of the Constitution’s
adoption, Taney concluded that it would:
hardly [be] consistent with the respect due to these States, to suppose that they
regarded at that time, as fellow-citizens and members of the sovereignty, a
class of beings whom they had thus stigmatized ... and upon whom they had

127

Id. at 403.

U.S. Const. art. III, § 2.
See, e.g., Hamburger, supra note 74, at 93 (observing that “both sides in the Comity
Clause controversies took for granted that the privileges and immunities guaranteed by the
Comity Clause were rights secured to citizens of the United States.”).
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60 U.S. at 405.
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impressed such deep and enduring marks of inferiority and degradation.134

“More especially,” Taney argued, it could not “be believed that the large
slaveholding States regarded [free blacks] as included in the word citizens,
or would have consented to a Constitution which might compel them to
receive them in that character from another State,” as doing so would
necessarily “exempt them from the operation of the special laws and from
the police regulations which they considered to be necessary for their own
safety.”135
This reasoning was sufficient to support Taney’s conclusion that Scott
“was not a citizen of Missouri within the meaning of the Constitution of the
United States, and not entitled as such to sue in its courts.” 136 But two
additional aspects of his opinion, neither of which was strictly necessary to
the case’s outcome, warrant mention. First, although no federal statute had
attempted to confer citizenship on former slaves or their descendants, Taney
went out of his way to declare that any such law would be unconstitutional
because Congress’s naturalization power was “confined to persons born in a
foreign country, under a foreign Government” and was “not a power to raise
to the rank of a citizen any one born in the United States, who … belongs to
an inferior and subordinate class.”137
Second, Taney adopted a relatively expansive view of the “privileges
and immunities” protected by the Comity Clause. Among other things,
Taney insisted that if free blacks were recognized as “citizens” within the
meaning of the Comity Clause, such persons would not only possess “the
right to enter every other State whenever they pleased, singly or in
companies, without pass or passport, and without obstruction,” but also the
rights to “full liberty of speech in public and in private upon all subjects
upon which its own citizens might speak; to hold public meetings upon
political affairs, and to keep and carry arms wherever they went.”138 Taney
rejected a contrary interpretation of the Comity Clause that would have
allowed states to subject free black citizens of other states to the same
police regulations applied to their own free black inhabitants, on the ground
that such an interpretation would render the provision “unmeaning” and
leave the sojourning citizen without any rights “but what the State itself
chose to allow him.”139
134

Id. at 416.
Id. at 416-17.
136
60 U.S. at 427.
137
Id. at 417.
138
Id. at 422-23.
139
Id. at 423. Justice Daniel’s concurring opinion was even more expansive on this
point. See id. at 476 (“[T]here is not, it is believed, to be found … an exposition of the
term citizen which has not been understood as conferring the actual possession and
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2. Justice Curtis’s Dissent
The principal dissent on the citizenship issue was authored by Justice
Benjamin Curtis. Rather than disputing Taney’s reading of Article III,
Curtis acquiesced in Taney’s framing of the relevant question as being one
of Scott’s eligibility for United States citizenship rather than state
citizenship.140 Curtis observed that the “natural born citizen” qualification
for presidential eligibility set forth in Article II presupposed the existence of
“citizens of the United States” at the time of the Constitution’s adoption in
1787 and observed that “it may safely be said that the citizens of the several
States” at that time were “citizens of the United States” within the meaning
of the Constitution. 141 Therefore, according to Curtis, “[t]o determine
whether any free persons, descended from Africans held in slavery were
citizens of the United States ... at the time of the adoption of the
Constitution of the United States, it is only necessary to know whether any
such persons were citizens of either of the States ... at the time of” the
Constitution’s adoption.142
“Of this,” Curtis asserted, “there can be no doubt,” pointing principally
to the fact that free blacks were allowed to vote under the laws of at least
five states at the time of the Constitution’s adoption.143 But while Curtis
endorsed the proposition that “every free person born on the soil of a State,
who is a citizen of that State by force of its Constitution or laws, is also a
citizen of the United States,”144 he premised this conclusion on a particularly
narrow conception of what such “citizenship” entailed. Agreeing with
Taney that “the enjoyment of the elective franchise” was not “essential to
citizenship,”145 Curtis went further, contending “that citizenship, under the
Constitution of the United States, is not dependent of a particular political
or even of all civil rights,” claiming that “any attempt so to define it must

enjoyment, or the perfect right of acquisition and enjoyment, of an entire equality of
privileges, civil and political.”).
140
60 U.S. (19 How.) at 571 (Curtis, J. dissenting) (“[U]nder the allegations contained
in this plea, and admitted by the demurrer, the question is, whether any person of African
descent, whose ancestors were sold as slaves in the United States, can be a citizen of the
United States.”). By contrast, Curtis’s fellow dissenter, Justice McLean, emphasized the
disconnect between Taney’s framing of the question and the plain language of Article III,
which focused on state citizenship. Id. at 532-33 (McLean, J. dissenting)..
141
Id. at 572.
142
Id.
143
Id. at 572-73. Curtis also pointed to the drafting history of the Comity Clause’s
predecessor provision in the Articles of Confederation and, particularly, to the rejection of
a proposal to limit that provision to “white” inhabitants. Id. at 575-76.
144
Id. at 576.
145
Id. at 581.
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lead to error.” 146 Just as the question of “[t]o what citizens the elective
franchise shall be confided” was “a question to be determined by each State,
in accordance with its own views of the necessities or expediencies of its
conditions,” the question of “[w]hat civil rights shall be enjoyed by its
citizens, and whether all shall enjoy the same, or how they may be gained or
lost” was “to be determined in the same way.”147
Thus, according to Curtis, the Comity Clause did “not confer on ...
citizens ... specific and enumerated privileges and immunities” and did not
entitle them to “[p]rivileges and immunities which belong to certain citizens
of a State, by reason of ... causes other than mere citizenship.”148 Instead,
each state was left free to “so frame their Constitutions and laws” as to
prescribe additional limitations or qualifications on the exercise of
particular privileges or immunities subject only to the restriction on overt
residency-based discrimination.149 Curtis’s views thus appear to correspond
reasonably closely to those of Chancellor Kent and other supporters of the
moderate pro-citizenship position, who endorsed both an expansive view of
the class of persons entitled to recognition as “citizens” and a narrow
conception of what “citizenship” entailed.150
3. Aftermath of the Scott Decision
The public reaction to the Dred Scott decision was both immediate and
intense. Democrats in both the North and the South celebrated Taney’s
citizenship ruling as well as the majority’s further holding that Congress
lacked constitutional authority to prohibit slavery in the federal territories.151
Northern Republicans were equally united in condemning the Court’s
territorial ruling, which struck at one of the core unifying principles of the
Republican coalition.152 Reaction to the Court’s citizenship ruling among
mainstream Republicans was somewhat more muted due to the greater
diversity of Republican opinion on the question and the danger that
focusing on that aspect of the Court’s decision might associate the party too
146

Id. at 583.
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Id. at 583-84.
149
Id.
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See supra Section I.B.3.c Kent and Curtis appear to have held similar views on the
slavery question. See, e.g., JOHN THEODORE HORTON, JAMES KENT: A STUDY IN
CONSERVATISM, 1763-1847, 274-75, 309-10 (1939) (discussing Kent’s “contemptuous”
attitude toward abolitionism and other social reform movements); Paul Finkelman, Scott v.
Sandford: The Court’s Most Dreadful Case and How It Changed History, 82 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 3, 30 (2007) (describing Curtis as a conservative Massachusetts Whig who “was not
even moderately antislavery”).
151
GRABER, supra note 73, at 33.
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closely with the still unpopular cause of racial equality.153
The most consequential challenge to Taney’s citizenship ruling came in
an official opinion from Attorney General Edward Bates in November
1862.154 Bates, an “ultraconservative” Republican from Missouri,155 was no
enthusiast for black equality, having previously “advocated compulsory
deportation of emancipated slaves.”156 But in response to a formal request
from Treasury Secretary Salmon Chase—a leading abolitionist and one of
the founders of the Republican Party—Bates issued an opinion concluding
that a “free man of color, ... if born in the United States, is a citizen of the
United States.”157 This opinion not only contradicted the Scott decision but
also conflicted with opinions issued by Bates’s own predecessors in
office.158
Bates opened his opinion with a complaint that he had been unable to
locate “in our law books and the records of our courts, ... a clear and
satisfactory definition of the phrase citizen of the United States” and that
“[e]ighty years of practical enjoyment of' citizenship, under the
Constitution, have not sufficed to teach us either the exact meaning of the
word, or the constituent elements of the thing we prize so highly.” 159
According to Bates, “[t]he phrase, ‘a citizen of the United States,’ without
addition or qualification, means neither more nor less than a member of the
nation,” who was “bound to it by the reciprocal obligation of allegiance on
the one side and protection on the other.”160
In discussing citizenship, Bates cautioned, it was essential “to mark the
natural and characteristic distinction between political rights,” which
“belong to all citizens alike, and cohere in the very name and nature of
citizenship,” and “political powers,” including the powers of “voting and
holding office,” which did “not belong to all citizens alike, nor to any
citizen, merely in virtue of citizenship” but rather “depend[] upon
extraneous facts and superadded qualifications ...” 161 Bates thus insisted
153
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that recognizing free blacks as “citizens” would not require that they be
given the right to vote or hold office, just as white women and children
could be acknowledged as “citizens” even though they did not possess such
rights. 162 But while Bates’s opinion was relatively clear in denying that
citizenship alone conferred rights of political participation, it was decidedly
less clear in specifying what rights and privileges did attach to that status.
Indeed, the only right incident to citizenship that Bates specifically
acknowledged was the citizen’s correlative claim to “protection” from the
government in exchange for his or her reciprocal duty of “allegiance.”163
Bates was clear, however, that whatever rights did attach to the status of
citizenship were by their very nature equal, observing that all citizens “are
politically and legally equal” and that “the child in the cradle and its father
in the Senate,” are “equally citizens of the United States.”164
II.

THE ADOPTION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT

The Civil War forced many Americans to confront for the first time
questions of citizenship that had been left unresolved during the antebellum
period. 165 In many ways, the War itself could be viewed as a contest
between competing conceptions of citizenship, with the Union committed to
a theory of paramount national citizenship under which citizens owed
principal allegiance to the federal government and the Confederacy
committed to a state-centered theory under which citizens owed principal
allegiance to their respective state governments with federal allegiance
owed only derivatively and contingently so long as the state chose to
continue its membership in the Union.166 The Union ultimately prevailed in
this contest by force of arms and imposed its vision of paramount national
citizenship on the defeated Confederate states.167
162
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RECONSTRUCTIONS: NEW PERSPECTIVES ON THE POSTBELLUM UNITED STATES 168-70
(Thomas J. Brown, ed. 2008) (discussing importance of “institutions such as prize courts,
claims commissions, and pension bureaus,” established during the Civil War and
Reconstruction in forcing Americans to “confront for themselves the ambiguity of their
national identity.”).
166
See, e.g., KETTNER, supra note 59, at 340 (characterizing the war as “a struggle
over the nature of the community created in 1789”); Robert J. Kaczorowski, Revolutionary
Constitutionalism in the Era of the Civil War and Reconstruction, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 863,
872-73 (1986) (describing resolution of questions regarding the nature of American
citizenship as “a corollary of the more fundamental constitutional issue central to the Civil
War, namely, whether ultimate sovereignty was constitutionally delegated to the national
or to the state governments”).
167
See, e.g., SMITH, supra note 61, at 274-75 (describing Union policies requiring
163
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This newly nationalistic conception of citizenship was matched by a
shift in mainstream Republican thinking regarding the citizenship of free
blacks. From the outset of the War, abolitionist leaders had urged Congress
to allow black soldiers to serve in the Union military, believing that such
service would strengthen their claims to citizenship and full legal
equality.168 Though the eventual admission of black soldiers was driven
more by considerations of military necessity than by racial egalitarianism,
the participation of black military units had the anticipated effect of moving
northern public opinion, and especially Republican opinion toward
supporting black citizenship. 169 By the war’s conclusion, mainstream
Republican opinion had shifted decisively toward recognizing freedom and
native birth as the sole criteria of United States citizenship without regard to
race or color. 170 Thus, Union general (and future Republican politician)
Benjamin Butler could confidently predict in January 1865, shortly after the
proposed Thirteenth Amendment had been approved by Congress, that upon
that Amendment’s ratification, “every negro slave” would be “made a
citizen of the United States, entitled as of right to every political and legal
immunity and privilege which belongs to that great franchise.”171
But almost immediately after the War’s conclusion, this expansive,
nationalistic conception of citizenship was tested by the infamous “Black
Codes” enacted by virtually all of the newly reconstructed southern state
governments. 172 These laws “restricted freed slaves’ rights to make and
enforce private contracts, to own and convey real and personal property, to
hold certain jobs, to seek relief in court, and to participate in common life as
ordinary citizens.”173 The Black Codes threatened to undermine the recently
adopted Thirteenth Amendment by maintaining the free black populations
of the southern states in a permanently subordinate condition and reducing
substantial portions of the black population to slavery-like conditions.
defeated or defecting Confederate troops to swear supreme loyalty to the national
government).
168
On the connection between black military service and blacks’ claims to citizenship
and to political and civil equality more generally, see, for example, JAMES MCPHERSON,
BATTLE CRY OF FREEDOM, 562-67 (1988); SMITH, supra note 61, at 274-75; and HERMAN
BELZ, A NEW BIRTH OF FREEDOM: THE REPUBLICAN PARTY AND FREEDMENS’ RIGHTS
1861-1866, 19-35 (2000).
169
See, e.g., BELZ, supra note 168, at 25-35.
170
Id. at 25-27; EARL M. MALTZ, CIVIL RIGHTS, THE CONSTITUTION AND CONGRESS,
1863-1869, 5-11 (1990).
171
SPEECH OF MAJ.-GEN. BENJ. F. BUTLER, UPON THE CAMPAIGN BEFORE RICHMOND,
1864, DELIVERED AT LOWELL, MASS. , Jan. 29, 1865, 82 (Wright & Potter, 1865).
172
On the background of the Black Codes and the specific disabilities imposed on the
freed slaves by such laws, see ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA’S UNFINISHED
REVOLUTION, 1863-1866, at 199-202 (1988).
173
Harrison, supra note 55, at 1388.
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Reports of the Black Codes and of racial violence against former slaves
“aroused an indignation” in the North “that spread far beyond the Radical
circles.” 174 President Andrew Johnson’s apparent acquiescence in the
southern states’ efforts to reestablish a labor system approximating slavery
opened a rift between his administration and mainstream Republicans in
Congress and impelled Congressional Republicans to undertake their own
efforts to ensure equality of civil rights for free blacks in the southern
states. 175 From the outset, these efforts to secure legal equality for free
blacks drew upon and were closely intertwined with, the Republican vision
of paramount national citizenship.176
A. The Civil Rights Bill and the Attempt to Define Citizenship by Statute
Although the Fourteenth Amendment’s Citizenship Clause is sometimes
characterized as having been tacked on as a last-minute “afterthought”
preceded by relatively little debate or deliberation, 177 the Amendment’s
definition of United States citizenship closely tracked a similar definition
that had been included in the Civil Rights Act of 1866.178 The citizenship
provision in the Civil Rights Act was extensively debated in both the House
and the Senate and twice approved by large majorities in both houses of
Congress (the second time over President Johnson’s veto) before the
proposal to add a similar definition to the Fourteenth Amendment was first
introduced in the Senate on May 30, 1866.179 In view of this background,
the debates surrounding the Civil Rights Act’s citizenship declaration
reflect an important source for understanding the Citizenship Clause’s
original meaning.180
As originally proposed, the Civil Rights bill, like the original version of
174

FONER, supra note 172, at 225.
Id. at 225-27, 239-55.
176
See, e.g., ROBERT J. KACZYROWSKI, THE NATIONALIZATION OF CIVIL RIGHTS, 34
(1987) (observing that the “members of the [Republican] Party were virtually unanimous in
the early months of 1866 in defining the freedom of the Negro in terms of United States
citizenship”).
177
See, e.g., Siegel, supra note 19, at 580 (characterizing the Citizenship Clause as
“something of an afterthought”); Alexander M. Bickel, Citizenship in the American
Constitution, 15 ARIZ. L. REV. 369, 374 (1973) (asserting that Citizenship Clause was
added “[a]s an afterthought” to assuage uncertainty regarding the meaning of the Privileges
or Immunities Clause).
178
Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27 (1866).
179
See infra Part II.C.
180
See Mark Shawhan, By Virtue of Being Born Here: Birthright Citizenship and the
Civil Rights Act of 1866, 15 HARV. LATINO L. REV. 1 2-3 (2012) (observing that
“[p]revious scholarship on the [Citizenship] Clause” has “given only limited consideration
to the debates over the [Civil Rights] Act”).
175
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the Fourteenth Amendment, did not contain any declaration of
citizenship.181 On January 29, 1866, Senator Lyman Trumbull of Illinois,
the bill’s principal sponsor in the Senate, introduced an amendment
declaring “all persons of African descent born in the United States” to be
citizens.182 The next day, Trumbull proposed a further revision removing
the reference to “African descent” and declaring “all persons born in the
United States, and not subject to any foreign power” to be citizens of the
United States.183
In his speech introducing the bill—which, in addition to defining
citizenship, prohibited “discrimination in civil rights or immunities among
the inhabitants of any State or Territory of the United States on account of
race, color, or previous condition of slavery” and specifically prohibited
discrimination with respect to certain designated rights 184 —Trumbull
identified the legislation as a response to the Black Codes and other
discriminatory legislation in the southern states targeted at the recently
emancipated slaves.185 Drawing upon Blackstone, Trumbull—who earlier in
his career had served as a justice on the Illinois Supreme Court—declared
that “[i]n the definition of civil liberty,” it “ought to be understood ... that
the restraints introduced by the laws should be equal to all, or as much so as
the nature of things will admit.”186 Therefore, “any statute which is not equal
to all, and which deprives any citizen of civil rights which are secured to
181

For a concise summary of the bill’s origins and early drafting history, see David P.
Currie, The Reconstruction Congress, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 383, 394-97 (2008).
182
Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 474 (1866).
183
Id. at 498.
184
As originally proposed, the bill’s first section, which Trumbull identified as “the
basis of the whole bill,” provided in full:
That all persons of African descent born in the United States are hereby declared
to be citizens of the United States, and there shall be no discrimination in civil
rights or immunities among the inhabitants of any State or Territory of the United
States on account of race, color, or previous condition of slavery; but the
inhabitants of every race and color, without regard to any previous condition of
slavery or involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the
party shall have been duly convicted, shall have the same right to make and
enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, and give evidence, to inherit, purchase, lease,
sell, hold, and convey real and personal property, and to full and equal benefit of
all laws and proceedings for the security of person and property, and shall be
subject to like punishment, pains, and penalties, and to none other, any law,
statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom to the contrary notwithstanding.
Id. at 474.
185
Id. at 498.
186
Id. The definition of “civil liberty” quoted by Trumbull was not in Blackstone’s
original eighteenth-century treatise but rather was added by a later editor and appeared in
most early nineteenth century American versions. Saunders, supra note 50, at 272 n.117.
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other citizens,” was “an unjust encroachment upon his liberty” and a “badge
of slavery” prohibited by the Constitution.187
In an effort to “arrive at a more correct definition of the term ‘citizen of
the United States,’” Trumbull surveyed several sources discussing the rights
protected by the Article IV Comity Clause, focusing particularly on Justice
Washington’s Corfield decision, which Trumbull described as “the most
elaborate [decision] upon this clause in the Constitution” and as
“enumerat[ing] the very rights belonging to a citizen of the United States
which are set forth in the first section of this bill.”188 Though Trumbull
recognized that the Comity Clause cases addressed only the rights that
citizens enjoyed upon removing from their home state to a different state, he
contended that “the native-born citizens of the State itself” should be even
more entitled to the equal enjoyment of such rights.189
Following the orthodox Republican position, Trumbull declared that
“[i]n my judgment, persons of African descent born in the United States, are
as much citizens as white persons who are born in the country.”190 Trumbull
acknowledged, however, that “in the slaveholding States, a different
opinion has obtained” and identified the southern states’ denial of blacks’
citizenship as the “principle” upon which “many of their laws making
187

Id.
Id. at 474-75. Trumbull then quoted a lengthy portion of Justice Washington’s
Corfield opinion identifying the “privileges and immunities of citizens” protected by the
Comity Clause. Id. at 475 (quoting Corfield, 6 F. Cas. at 551-52). Trumbull also cited and
quoted from other Comity Clause cases, including Campbell v. Morris, 3 H. & McH. 535
(Md. 1797) and Abbott v. Bayley, 23 Mass. (6 Pick.) 89 (1827), as well as from Justice
Story’s constitutional treatise, as indicative of the rights belonging to citizens of the United
States. Id. at 474-75.
189
Id. at 475. When challenged by an opponent of the bill, Trumbull conceded that the
Comity Clause cases he discussed in his opening speech “relate entirely to the rights which
a citizen in one state has on going into another State, and not to the rights of the citizens
belonging to the State,” but explained that he had introduced the cases “for the purpose of
ascertaining, if we could, by judicial decision, what was meant by the term ‘citizen of the
United States.’” Id. at 600. Trumbull further explained his purpose in discussing the cases
as follows:
188

[I]nasmuch as there had been judicial decisions upon this clause of the
Constitution in which it had been held that the rights of a citizen of the United
States were certain great fundamental rights …, I reasoned from that, when the
Constitution had been amended and slavery abolished, and we were about to pass
a law declaring every person, no matter what color, born in the United States a
citizen of the United States, the same rights would then appertain to all persons
who were clothed with American citizenship. That was the object for which the
cases were introduced.
Id.
190

Id.
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discriminations between the whites and the colored people are based ...”191
Although Trumbull viewed the citizenship provision as merely
“declaratory” of existing law, he argued that, even if this position were
incorrect, it was nonetheless “competent for Congress” to “settl[e]” the
citizenship question by passing a law “declaring all persons born in the
United States to be citizens thereof.”192
Trumbull and most of the bill’s other supporters identified the recently
enacted Thirteenth Amendment as the principal source of constitutional
authority for the bill’s non-discrimination provisions. 193 Opponents,
however, were quick to point out that this argument reflected a questionable
reading of the Thirteenth Amendment’s text and found little support in the
Amendment’s preenactment history. 194 Although most Congressional
Republicans adhered to the Thirteenth Amendment rationale, doubts about
the constitutional authority conferred by that measure led supporters to
supplement their Thirteenth Amendment arguments with other sources of
constitutional authority, including Congress’s naturalization power. This
line of argument was previewed in Senator Trumbull’s opening speech in
support of the measure in which he declared that a declaration of citizenship
pursuant to Congress’s naturalization power would “entitl[e]” the persons
so declared to “the rights of citizens,” including “[t]he great fundamental
rights set forth in this bill.”195
Other members of Congress offered similar justifications for the
proposed legislation grounded in either Congress’s naturalization power or
the federal government’s inherent power to protect the rights of its citizens.
For example, Representative Samuel Shellabarger of Ohio—who had
entertained doubts about the measure’s constitutionality—explained his
eventual decision to support the bill by observing that “the right of all
citizens to be secured in the enjoyment of whatever privileges their
citizenship does secure upon them” was “in its very nature equal” and that
the federal government possessed both the power and the duty to protect the
“fundamental” civil rights of its citizens against state infringement. 196
191

Id. Among supporters of the bill, the view that the citizenship provision was
declaratory of existing law was nearly universal. See, e.g., id. at 1262 (Rep. Broomall); id.
at 1115 (Rep. Wilson); id. at 1124 (Rep. Cook) ; id. at 1152 (Rep. Thayer).
192
Id.
193
See, e.g., id. at 475 (Sen. Trumbull); id at 503-04 (Sen. Howard); id. at 1151-52
(Rep. Thayer).
194
See generally Currie, supra note 181, at 395-97 (summarizing, and expressing
sympathy with, the opponents’ objections to the Thirteenth Amendment rationale).
195
Id.
196
Id. at 1293. In explaining his support for the bill, Shellabarger placed great
emphasis on the distinction between citizens’ substantive rights, which he viewed as
beyond the power of Congress to define and regulate, and their equality rights, which he
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Similarly, Representative James Wilson of Iowa, the Chairman of the
House Judiciary Committee and the principal sponsor of the Civil Rights
bill in the House, claimed that “so far as [the bill] declares the equality of
all citizens, it merely affirms existing law” and that Congress possessed the
inherent authority to protect the rights of its citizens against state
infringement.197 Representative M. Russell Thayer of Pennsylvania likewise
pointed to Congress’s naturalization power as support for both the
citizenship declaration and the substantive provisions of the bill, arguing
that under that power, Congress “has ample authority to confer the rights of
citizenship upon this class of people.”198
Arguments such as these evince a commonly held view among
Congressional Republicans that the legal status of “citizenship” carried with
it certain inherent rights, including, at a minimum, the right to equal
treatment with respect to the “fundamental” rights specifically identified in
the bill. For the most part, opponents of the measure did not contest the
position that equality of “civil rights” inhered in the very nature of
citizenship. 199 To the contrary, opponents embraced this definition as a
viewed as within the scope of Congress’s power to protect:
Now, Mr. Speaker, if this section did in fact assume to confer or define or regulate
these civil rights, which are named by the words contract, sue, testify, inherit, &c.,
then it would, as seems to me, be an assumption of the reserved rights of the
States and the people. But, sir, except so far as it confers citizenship, it neither
confers nor defines nor regulates any right whatever. Its whole effect is not to
confer or regulate rights, but to require that whatever of these enumerated rights
and obligations are imposed by State laws shall be for and upon all citizens alike
without distinctions based on race or former condition in slavery.
Id.
197

Id. at 1117-18. According to Wilson:

If citizens of the United States, as such, are entitled to possess and enjoy the great
fundamental civil rights which it is the true office of Government to protect, and
to equality in the exemptions of the law, we must of necessity be clothed with the
power to insure to each and every citizen these things which belong to him as a
constituent member of the great national family.
Id. at 1118. He further explained that “the possession of these rights by the citizens raises
by necessary implication the power in Congress to protect them.” Id. at 1119.
198
Id. at 1152. See also, e.g., id. at 1266 (Rep. Raymond) (“I desire, as the next step of
elevating [the African] race, to give them the rights of citizenship, or to declare by solemn
statute that they are citizens of the United States, and thus secure to them whatever rights,
immunities, privileges and powers belong as of right to all citizens of the United States… .
I for one am not inclined to disparage American citizenship … [T]he right of citizenship
involves everything else. Make the colored man a citizen of the United States and he has
every right which you or I have as citizens of the United States …”).
199
See, e.g., id. at 477-78 (Sen. Saulsbury) (“A civil right I define to be a right
belonging to the citizen, and which he possesses only by virtue of citizenship. I know of
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means of arguing that the bill’s protection would extend beyond the rights
specifically enumerated in the bill and would thus confer suffrage and other
politically unpopular rights upon the newly freed slaves.200
While the bill’s opponents did not contest the supporters’ broad
conception of citizenship, they did contest the authority of Congress to
confer citizenship by statute. Relying heavily on Taney’s Dred Scott
opinion, opponents contended that African Americans were not citizens of
the United States and that Congress lacked authority to confer citizenship
upon anyone other than foreign-born aliens.201 Among those expressing this
view was Senator Peter Van Winkle, a conservative Republican from West
Virginia.202 Though Van Winkle opposed making blacks citizens as a matter
of policy, he expressed a willingness “have the question submitted ... to the
people of the United States” in the form of a constitutional amendment.203
Van Winkle further declared that if such an amendment were adopted, he
would “feel very different about the vote that I should give in relation to
subject in my own State,” suggesting that if the Constitution were amended
to confer citizenship on blacks, he would “feel that they are entitled to the
right of suffrage” as a result. 204 A similar sentiment was expressed by
Indiana Democrat Thomas Hendricks, who criticized the bill’s citizenship
provision as reflecting the objectionable principle that “all persons living in
this country are to be equal before the law without distinction of color,” but
conceded that “if it is satisfactory to the white men of this country to admit
into the political community Indians and other colored people, I shall no
no clearer definition of civil rights than that …”); id. at 1122 (Rep. Rogers) (defining
“civil rights” as the “privileges and immunities created and granted to citizens of a country
by virtue of the sovereign power under which the citizen lives”).
200
See, e.g., id. at 478 (Sen. Saulsbury) (arguing that “civil rights” included the right to
vote); id. at 500 (Sen. Cowan) (arguing that the bill would prohibit all discrimination based
on race and would thus outlaw segregated schools); id. at 505 (Sen. Johnson) (contending
that the law would “repeal all legislation” barring intermarriage between blacks and
whites); id. at 1121 (Rep. Rogers) (arguing that bill would confer voting rights and prohibit
bans on intermarriage and segregated schools). In response to such criticisms, the bill’s
sponsors agreed to remove the bill’s general prohibition on “discrimination in civil rights
or immunities,” thereby limiting the bill to prohibiting discrimination only insofar as it
affected those rights specifically enumerated in the bill itself. MALTZ, supra note 170, at
68-69.
201
See, e.g., id. at 504 (Sen. Johnson); id. at 523 (Sen. Davis); id. at 1155 (Sen.
Eldridge).
202
Id. at 497 (Sen. Van Winkle ) (“I think it needs a constitutional amendment to make
these people citizens of the United States.”).
203
Id.
204
Id. at 497. Van Winkle further pledged that if blacks were “admitted to the rights
of citizenship” by a majority of the people through constitutional amendment, he would be
“among the first to endeavor to do my whole duty toward them by recognizing them as
citizens in every respect.” Id. at 498.
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longer object.”205
As statements such as these suggest, the view that the status of
citizenship conferred upon its recipients at least some minimal level of
equality rights was widely shared among both supporters and opponents of
the Civil Rights bill.206 The principal difference between the contending
sides was not whether “citizenship” carried with it an entitlement to equal
governmental treatment, but rather the scope of such equality rights and
whether Congress possessed constitutional authority to confer such
citizenship on native-born blacks.
Indeed, the view that citizenship did not carry with it an entitlement to
equal civil rights and privileges, at least with respect to those rights
specifically enumerated in the proposed Civil Rights bill, appears to have
been expressly defended by only one member of Congress—Republican
Senator John Henderson of Missouri. During an extended debate regarding
various proposals to amend the citizenship declaration so as to exclude
members of Indian tribes, Henderson questioned whether there would be
any harm in extending citizenship to such individuals on the ground that an
Indian “may be a citizen of the United States and yet not have all the
privileges and immunities of a citizen of the State in which he may be.”207
Henderson’s subsequent suggestion that the states would retain “a perfect
right” to deny Indians “the right to make contracts” notwithstanding a law
declaring them to be citizens drew an immediate and apparently
spontaneous protest from Democratic Senator Reverdy Johnson of
Maryland,208 and appears to have provoked genuine puzzlement on the part
of Republican supporters of the bill. 209 Henderson’s argument does not
205

Id. at 574.
Cf. Siegel, supra note 19, at 580-81 (observing that “Reconstruction era
constitution makers inherited, accepted, and even celebrated the norm” of citizen equality).
207
Id. at 571.
208
The exchange between Henderson and Johnson was as follows:
206

Mr. HENDERSON… . Why, sir, I suppose that any State, even after we declared
the Indians to be citizens of the United States would have the perfect right, if it
saw fit, … to deny them the right to make contracts.
Mr. JOHNSON: Oh, no.
Id. at 572. Johnson, a prominent Supreme Court advocate and former Attorney General of
the United States, was considered “the leading constitutional authority in the Senate during
the Reconstruction era.” Kaczorowski, supra note 166, at 892 n.119.
209
See, e.g., id. at 573 (Sen. Williams) (“I do not exactly understand what the Senator
means when he insisted that Congress shall make them citizens and does not claim that any
right attaches to that character”); id. at 574 (Sen. Ramsey) (contending that “confer[ring]
on all these Indians the rights of citizenship” would abolish the “many differences in State
laws between these Indians and white men”). As noted below, Henderson may have
subsequently changed his own view regarding the rights that attach to United States
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appear to have been accepted by any other member of Congress and the
proposed revision to which he had objected—inserting language that
specifically excluded “Indians not taxed” from the citizenship definition—
passed by a three-to-one margin in the Senate and remained in the final
version of the Civil Rights Act.210
The final version of the Civil Rights bill passed in the House on March
13, 1866 and was approved two days later by the Senate, which had already
given its assent to an earlier version of the bill.211 Although the bill passed
by wide margins in both Houses, President Andrew Johnson nonetheless
vetoed the bill on March 27, 1866.212 Johnson’s veto marked the definitive
break between his administration and Congressional Republicans and set
the stage for a dramatic override vote.213
The Congressional deliberations preceding the override vote consisted
primarily of two speeches, one delivered by Trumbull in the Senate and the
other by Representative William Lawrence of Ohio in the House. 214
Responding to the claim in Johnson’s veto message that acknowledging
Congress’s authority to pass the bill would concede a similar authority to
require black suffrage, Trumbull denied that citizenship carried with it
“political privileges” but reiterated his earlier stated view that United States
citizenship did entail equality with respect to certain rights, including the
“fundamental” civil rights enumerated in the bill:
To be a citizen of the United States carries with it some rights; and what are
they? They are those inherent, fundamental rights which belong to free
citizens, or free men in all countries, such as the rights enumerated in this bill,
and they belong to them in all the States of the Union. The right of American
citizenship means something. It does not mean, in the case of a foreigner, that
when he is naturalized he is left entirely to the mercy of State legislation. He
has a right, when naturalized, to go into any State of the Union and to reside
there and the United States government will protect him in that right.215

In the House, the task of responding to Johnson’s veto message fell to
Representative Lawrence, who, like Trumbull, had served as a state court

citizenship prior to the final vote on the Fourteenth Amendment. See infra note 273.
210
Id. at 575 (recording vote on proposed amendment); Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch.
31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27 (1866) (“[A]ll persons born in the United States and not subject to any
foreign power, excluding Indians not taxed, are hereby declared to be citizens of the United
States …”) (emphasis added).
211
Shawhan, supra note 180, at 32.
212
Id.
213
See FONER, supra note 172, at 250 (“For Republican moderates, the Civil Rights
veto ended all hope of cooperation with the President”).
214
Shawhan, supra note 180, at 32-33.
215
Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1757 (1866).
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judge before his election to Congress. 216 After briefly surveying and
summarizing the legal authorities that had been offered earlier in the
debates in support of both the preexisting nature of the birthright citizenship
rule and Congress’s authority to declare such a rule by statute, Lawrence
concluded that “[t]here is, then a national citizenship” and that this
“citizenship implies certain rights which are to be protected ...” 217 Like
Trumbull, Lawrence pointed to the rights identified in Justice Washington’s
Corfield opinion and other Comity Clause cases as indicative of the rights
belonging to all United States citizens. 218 These rights, according to
Lawrence, were inherently equal in nature, being so “necessary and
important to all citizens” that “to make inequalities in” them would be “rank
injustice.” Therefore, “[a]ny law that invades [this] fundamental equality is
void ...”219 According to Lawrence, the rights protected by the bill inhered
by their nature in “national citizenship” such that,
[f]rom the very nature of citizenship ... it must be clear that this bill creates no
new right, confers no new privilege but is declaratory of what is already the
constitutional rights [sic] of every citizen of every State, that equality of civil
rights is the fundamental rule that pervades the Constitution and controls all
State authority.220

Shortly after Trumbull and Lawrence delivered their respective
speeches, the Senate (on April 6) and the House (on April 10) approved the
bill by the requisite two-thirds majorities sufficient to enact the Civil Rights
bill into law over the President’s veto.221
B. The Privileges or Immunities “of Citizens of the United States”
The debates surrounding the proposed Civil Rights bill coincided with
consideration of various proposals for constitutional amendments that
eventually culminated in the Fourteenth Amendment.222 One such proposal,
which provided an important template for language that was eventually
selected for inclusion in the Amendment’s first section, was introduced by
216

McConnell, supra note 5, at 1003; cf. id. at 994 (describing Lawrence as “one of the
most careful lawyers among the Republican proponents” of the subsequent Civil Rights
Act of 1875).
217
Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1832 (1866).
218
Id. at 1835-36.
219
Id. at 1846.
220
Id.
221
See Cong Globe, 39th Cong, 1st Sess. 1809 (Apr 6, 1866) (Senate vote); id. at 1861
(Apr 10, 1866) (House vote).
222
A useful timeline of the Congressional deliberations concerning the proposed Civil
Rights bill and the contemporaneous deliberations that eventually culminated in the
proposed Fourteenth Amendment is provided in MALTZ, supra note 170, at 44-45.
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Representative John Bingham of Ohio on February 26, 1866. Bingham’s
proposal provided that:
The Congress shall have power to make all laws which shall be necessary and
proper to secure to the citizens of each State all privileges and immunities of
citizens in the several States, and to all persons in the several States equal
protection in the rights of life, liberty, and property.223

The “privileges and immunities” language of Bingham’s proposal mirrored
the language of the Comity Clause and Bingham himself argued that the
proposed amendment would “not impose upon any State of the Union, or
any citizen of any State of the Union, any obligation which is not now
enjoined upon them by the very letter of the [existing] Constitution.” 224
Rather, the sole effect of the amendment, according to Bingham, would be
to confer upon Congress sufficient legislative power to ensure that the states
complied with their preexisting duties.225
But Bingham’s understanding of what the existing Article IV provision
required differed from the orthodox understanding of that provision.226 In a
January 1866 speech in support of an early version of his proposal,
Bingham explained his understanding that Article IV’s “privileges and
immunities” language contained an unstated “ellipsis” identifying the rights
protected by the provision as rights citizens possessed by virtue of their
United States citizenship:
When you come to weigh these words, “equal and exact justice to all men,” go
read, if you please, the words of the Constitution itself: “The citizens of each
State (being ipso facto citizens of the United States) shall be entitled to all the
privileges and immunities of citizens (supplying the ellipsis ‘of the United
States’) in the several States.” This guarantee is of the privileges and
immunities of citizens of the United States in, not of, the several States.227

Although Bingham’s “ellipsis” phrasing was unusual, his association of
Article IV with rights of United States citizenship was hardly unheard of.
Throughout the antebellum period, the Comity Clause was routinely
paraphrased as protecting the “the privileges and immunities of citizens of
the United States.”228 Bingham’s interpretation of the provision, however,
223

Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1033-34 (1866).
Id.
225
Id.
226
On Bingham’s constitutional theories, which were heavily influenced by
abolitionist constitutionalism, see, for example, Kurt Lash, The Origins of the Privileges or
Immunities Clause, Part II: John Bingham and the Second Draft of the Fourteenth
Amendment, 99 GEO. L.J. 329, 346-49 (2011).
227
Id. at 158.
228
See, e.g., Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 403 (Taney, C.J.) (interpreting term “citizens” as
used in the Comity Clause and elsewhere in the Constitution to mean “citizens of the
United States”); id. at 571 (Curtis, J. dissenting) (same); Wirt, supra note 91, at 507 (same).
224
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diverged from the standard comity-based reading as a protection of
travelers’ interstate rights by reading it to protect citizens’ intrastate rights
against their own state governments as well.229
Other members of the 39th Congress appear to have understood that
Bingham’s proposal would do more than authorize federal legislation to
protect the rights of non-residents under the traditional understanding of the
Comity Clause. For example, Representative Giles Hotchkiss of New York
declared his understanding that Bingham’s proposal was designed “to
provide that no State shall discriminate between its citizens and give one
class of citizens greater rights than it confers upon another.” 230 Though
Hotchkiss supported the policy of this proposal, he opposed Bingham’s
amendment based on his understanding that it would unduly broaden the
powers of Congress while leaving the rights of citizens vulnerable to repeal
“[s]hould the power of” the federal government “pass into the hands of the
rebels ...”231 Hotchkiss opposed leaving the rights of citizens “to the caprice
of Congress” and insisted that protection against discrimination “should be
a constitutional right that cannot be wrested from any class of citizens ... by
mere legislation.”232
Immediately after Hotchkiss spoke, the House (Bingham included)
voted to postpone consideration of the amendment indefinitely.233 Bingham
thereafter persuaded the Joint Committee on Reconstruction, of which he
was a member, to include a substantially revised version of his proposal as
the first section of a new five-part amendment that formed the template for
the Fourteenth Amendment. 234 Bingham’s revised language, which tracks
the language eventually included in Section One’s second sentence,
followed Hotchkiss’s suggestion by replacing the grant of power to
Congress with a directly enforceable declaration of rights. 235 Bingham’s
229

Cf. Maltz, supra note 54, at 337 (“Bingham’s invocation of the comity clause as a
limitation of a state to deal with its own citizenry was truly novel.”). Bingham believed
that the “privileges and immunities” referred to in Article IV included the substantive
protections set forth in the first eight amendments to the Constitution and appears to have
understood both his original proposal and the parallel “privileges or immunities” language
that was ultimately included in Section One as embodying that understanding. See Lash,
supra note 226, at 348-55, 397-402. The extent to which this understanding was shared by
other members of the 39th Congress and the ratifying public more generally is a subject of
longstanding academic debate. See generally Hamburger, supra note 74, at 64 nn. 8&9
(collecting numerous sources on both sides of this debate).
230
Id. at 1095 (emphasis added).
231
Id.
232
Id.
233
Id.
234
MALTZ, supra note 170, at 84-92.
235
A separate grant of enforcement power was provided by the Amendment’s fifth
section. See U.S. Const. amd. XIV § 5 (“The Congress shall have power to enforce, by
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revised version also departed from his original strategy of attempting to
track the language of the Comity Clause verbatim and instead explicitly
identified the “privileges or immunities” protected by the provision as
“privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States.”
Bingham’s translation of the Comity Clause’s “privileges and
immunities” language as a specific reference to privileges and immunities
belonging to United States citizens provided further support to the inference
that the provision would do more than protect non-residents against state
discrimination, which, as noted above, had been suitably clear to at least
certain members of Congress under Bingham’s original language. 236 This
inference is strengthened by reading Bingham’s revised version in light of
earlier discussions of the Comity Clause by Trumbull, Wilson and other
supporters of the Civil Rights Act who acknowledged the orthodox
understanding of the provision as a protection against residency-based
discrimination but insisted that the rights recognized by the provision
inhered in the very nature of citizenship itself.237
Though a few Congressmen persisted in understanding Bingham’s
revised language as nothing more than a reiteration of the Comity Clause as
traditionally understood, 238 the more common understanding was that the
provision operated as a more general protection of the rights pertaining to
United States citizenship. 239 This understanding is clearly reflected in the
remarks of Senator Jacob Howard of Michigan when introducing the
proposed amendment in the Senate. 240 Howard began his remarks by
appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article.”).
236
See supra notes 230-233 and accompanying text.
237
See supra notes 189 & 197-198 and accompanying text.
238
The most prominent example is Senator Luke Poland of Vermont, who, in a speech
delivered after Bingham’s May 10 remarks, asserted that the “privileges or immunities”
language in Bingham’s revised proposal “secures nothing beyond what was intended by the
original provision in the Constitution [i.e., the Comity Clause].” Cong. Globe, 39th Cong.
1st Sess. 2961 (1866).
239
There is a vibrant academic debate regarding the original meaning of the Privileges
or Immunities Clause, an important focus of which involves the question of whether the
Clause is best understood as protecting antidiscrimination rights or substantive rights. See,
e.g., Kermit Roosevelt, III, What If Slaughter House Had Been Decided Differently?, 45
IND. L. REV. 61, 67-70 (2011) (summarizing reasoning underlying both antidiscrimination
and substantive rights interpretations). In my view, the evidence is quite strong that the
Fourteenth Amendment’s original meaning reflects an understanding of “citizenship” and
of the “privileges or immunities” of United States citizens that supports at least an
antidiscrimination reading of both the Citizenship and Privileges or Immunities Clauses.
See infra Part IV. But this conclusion does not necessarily exclude the possibility that the
latter provision might also be read to protect certain substantive rights against state
infringement. See, e.g., Harrison, supra note 55, at 1424-25 (considering this possibility).
The latter possibility involves questions that are beyond this Article’s scope.
240
Professor Lash describes Howard’s speech as “[p]robably the most studied speech
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observing that “[t]he first clause of this section relates to the privileges and
immunities of citizens of the United States as such, and as distinguished
from all other persons not citizens of the United States.” 241 While
acknowledging the difficulty of “defin[ing] with accuracy what is meant by
the expression, ‘citizen of the United States,’” Howard observed that the
phrase had been “held by the courts to [mean] a person who was born
within the limits of the United States and subject to their laws.”242
Howard then turned to a discussion of the Comity Clause, observing
that prior to the adoption of the federal Constitution, the citizens of each
state had been “in a qualified sense at least, aliens to one another” and that
the purpose of the Comity Clause had been “to prevent such confusion and
disorder, and to put the citizens of the several States on an equality with
each other as to all fundamental rights” by “constitut[ing] ipso facto the
citizens of each one of the original States citizens of the United States.”243
Though Howard declined “to go at any length into th[e] question” of what
“privileges and immunities” the citizens of the several states possessed
under the Comity Clause, he referred to Justice Washington’s Corfield
opinion as indicative “of what probably will be the opinion of the judiciary”
regarding the meaning of that provision. 244 Howard then pointed to the
rights protected by the Comity Clause, “whatever they may be,” as well as
“the personal rights guarantied and secured by the first eight amendments of
the Constitution” as “a mass of privileges, immunities, and rights, ...
guarantied by the Constitution or recognized by it,” that were “secured to
the citizen solely as a citizen of the United States and as a party in their
courts.”245
Howard’s speech has been the subject of a great deal of modern
commentary, most of which focuses on the extent to which his remarks
support “incorporation” of the bill of rights against state governments
and/or substantive protection of other “fundamental” rights through the
of the Thirty-ninth Congress regarding the Fourteenth Amendment …” Lash, supra note
235, at 402.
241
Cong. Globe, 39th Cong. 1st Sess. 2765 (1866).
242
Id. Howard’s speech was delivered before the addition of the Citizenship Clause,
which was added by the Senate on May 30. See infra Section II.C.
243
Id.
244
Id. Howard observed that the Supreme Court had not “undertaken to define either
the nature or extent of the privileges and immunities” protected by the Comity Clause and
alluded to a decision “not many years since” when the Court had “very modestly” declined
to address the question. Id. Howard’s statement most likely referred to Connor v. Elliott,
59 U.S. 591 (1855), in which the Court declined to “to attempt to define the meaning of
the” provision, deeming it “safer, and more in accordance with the duty of a judicial
tribunal, to leave its meaning to be determined, in each case, upon a view of the particular
rights asserted and denied therein.” 59 U.S. at 593.
245
Id. (emphasis added).
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Privileges or Immunities Clause. 246 For purposes of the present inquiry,
however, two features of Howard’s speech stand out as particularly
significant. First, Howard identified the rights protected by the proposed
Privileges or Immunities Clause as rights pertaining to United States
citizenship “as such,” distinguishing them from whatever rights may be
possessed by persons who are not citizens. Second, Howard associated
these rights of United States citizenship with the rights protected by the
Article IV Comity Clause, which, under the orthodox understanding of that
provision (including the understanding reflected in Corfield, Howard’s
principal illustrative source) were understood as antidiscrimination rights
rather than as directly enforceable substantive rights.
Thus, whatever Howard’s personal understanding of the Privileges or
Immunities Clause, his speech seems to provide relatively strong evidence
that at least one plausible way of understanding the Fourteenth
Amendment’s reference to the “privileges or immunities of citizens of the
United States” would be as referring to a class of preexisting rights that
individuals already possessed by virtue of their United States citizenship
and that these rights included, at least, the types of non-discrimination rights
that were protected under the traditional Corfield-based interpretation of the
Comity Clause.
C. The Addition of the Citizenship Clause
The initial version of the proposed Fourteenth Amendment that emerged
from the Joint Committee and that was approved by the House on May 10,
1866 contained no citizenship declaration, beginning instead with what is
now the second sentence of Section One. 247 When the Amendment was
introduced in the Senate on May 23, Senator Benjamin Wade of Ohio
proposed that the phrase “privileges or immunities of citizens of the United
States” be replaced with a reference to “the privileges or immunities of
persons born in the United States or naturalized by the laws thereof.”248 In
explaining his proposed revision, Wade cautioned that the “the word
246

For some of the representative positions scholars have taken regarding the meaning
of Howard’s speech, see, e.g., RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION:
THE PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY, 61-62 (2004) (interpreting Howard as supporting a broad
“natural rights” reading of the Privileges or Immunities Clause); Lash, supra note 235, at
402-08 (interpreting Howard as identifying the “privileges or immunities” protected by
Section One as including “the equal protection rights [but not substantive rights] of Article
IV and the substantive ‘personal rights’ of the first eight amendments”); Harrison, supra
note 55, at 1410 n.87 (stating that “[i]t is not clear whether Howard meant that the
Privileges or Immunities Clause would give the rights he listed substantive or
antidiscrimination protection”).
247
MALTZ, supra note 170, at 44-45.
248
Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2768 (1866)
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‘citizen’” was “a term about which there has been a good deal of
uncertainty in our Government,” that “courts” had “stumbled on the
subject,” and that even in the then-recent Congressional debates, the
question had still been “regarded by some as doubtful.” 249 Although he
considered the question “settled by the civil rights bill” Wade warned that,
absent a “strong and clear” description of the persons protected by the
amendment, it might be “construe[d] ... in such a way as we do not think it
liable to construction.”250
Debate quickly turned to other provisions of the proposed amendment
and no further action was taken on Wade’s proposal.251 But after that day’s
adjournment, Senate Republicans caucused together and agreed upon an
alternative revision that addressed Wade’s concerns.252 On May 30, Senator
Howard proposed to add to the Amendment a new introductory sentence
declaring “all persons born in the United States and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof” to be “citizens of the United States and of the States
wherein they reside.”253 Howard’s proposal, which closely tracks the final
language of the Citizenship Clause, 254 was modeled upon, but did not
perfectly mirror, the similar citizenship definition in the recently adopted
Civil Rights Act.255 In introducing the proposed revision, Howard noted
tersely that he did “not propose to say anything on that subject except that
the question of citizenship has been so fully discussed in this body as not to
need any further elucidation in my opinion.”256
Immediately after Howard proposed his revision, conservative Senator
James Doolittle of Wisconsin, who opposed the Amendment, proposed to
249

Id.
Id. at 2768-69.
251
Garrett Epps, The Citizenship Clause: A “Legislative History”, 60 AM. U. L. REV.
331, 353 (2010).
252
Id.
253
39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2890 (May 30, 1866).
254
Howard recognized and corrected a typographical error in the printed version of the
proposal, replacing the phrase “States wherein they reside” with “State wherein they
reside.” Id. at 2892. A subsequent proposal by Senator William Fessenden to insert the
phrase “or naturalized” after the phrase “all persons born” was accepted by unanimous
consent. Id. at 3040.
255
Compare U.S. Const. amd XIV § 1 (“All persons born or naturalized in the United
States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the
State wherein they reside.”), with Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27 (“[A]ll
persons born in the United States, and not subject to any foreign Power, excluding Indians
not taxed, are citizens of the United States.”).
256
Id. at 2890. Howard observed that while he viewed the proposed addition as
“simply declaratory of what I regard as the law of the land already,” its inclusion in the
proposed amendment would “settle[] the great question of citizenship and remove[] all
doubt as to what persons are or are not citizens of the United States,” which had “long been
a great desideratum in the jurisprudence and legislation of this country.” Id.
250
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further revise the citizenship declaration by adding the phrase “excluding
Indians not taxed,” which had appeared in the Civil Rights Act’s citizenship
definition but not in Howard’s proposal. 257 Not to be outdone, Senator
Edgar Cowan of Pennsylvania, another opponent of the Amendment, made
a lengthy speech questioning whether the proposed citizenship definition
would extend to “the child of the Chinese immigrant in California” or the
“child of the Gypsy born in Pennsylvania.”258
At the outset of his remarks, Cowan affected uncertainty regarding the
“legal definition of ‘citizenship of the United States,’” observing that:
[s]o far as the courts and the administration of the laws are concerned, I have
supposed that every human being within their jurisdiction was in one sense of
the word a citizen, that is, a person entitled to protection; but in so far as the
right to hold property, particularly the right to acquire title to real estate was
concerned that was a subject entirely within the control of the States... . I have
supposed further, that it was essential to the existence of society itself, and
particularly essential to the existence of a free State, that it should have the
power, not only of declaring who should exercise political power within its
boundaries but that if it were overrun by another and a different race, it would
have the right to absolutely expel them.259

Cowan inquired “[a]re those people [i.e., gypsies], by a constitutional
amendment, to be put out of the reach of the State in which they live? ... If
the mere fact of being born in the country confers that right, then they will
have it; and I think it will be mischievous.”260 Expressing similar concerns
regarding the dangers of a future influx of Chinese immigrants, Cowan
concluded that “before we assert broadly that everybody who shall be born
in the United States shall be taken to be a citizen of the United States, we
ought to exclude others besides Indians not taxed” because other groups
might be more dangerous if so recognized.261
The principal response to Cowan came from Senator John Conness of
California. Conness dismissed Cowan’s stated concerns regarding the
Chinese, insisting that “this portion of our population [i.e., the children of
Chinese immigrants] is very small indeed and never promises to be very
257

Id.
Id. The issues raised by Doolittle and Cowan regarding the possible inclusion of
Indians and children of resident aliens reopened questions that had been thoroughly
examined during the earlier debates over the proposed Civil Rights bill. See, e.g., Cong.
Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 498 (1866) (Sen. Cowan) (questioning whether citizenship
definition in the Civil Rights bill would encompass “the children of Chinese and Gypsies
born in this country”); id. at 571-72 (Sen. Doolittle) (discussing effect of limiting that bill’s
citizenship definition to “Indians not taxed”).
259
Id. at 2890.
260
Id. at 2891.
261
Id.
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large.”262 As for the purported problem of gypsies in Pennsylvania, Conness
observed that though he had “lived in the United States for now many a
year,” he had “heard more about Gypsies within the last two or three
months than I have heard before in my life.”263
Conness’s dismissive response avoided a direct engagement with
Cowan’s professed uncertainty regarding the nature of United States
citizenship. Notably, however, neither Conness nor any other Senator
provided what might have been the most natural response to Cowan’s stated
concerns had it been thought applicable—i.e., that recognition of a person
as a “citizen of the United States” would not, as Cowan suggested “put him
out of reach of State power” but would merely confer a formal legal status
entitling the person to, for example, sue in the federal courts and be elected
to federal office. This narrow conception of citizenship had been urged on
the Senate only a few months earlier by Senator Henderson of Missouri in
connection with the Civil Rights Act debates.264 But as noted above, no
other participant in those debates endorsed Henderson’s description of what
citizenship entailed and nobody so much as mentioned such a possibility
during the Senate debate on May 30.
To the extent the remarks of participants in the May 30 debate touched
on the legal rights corresponding to citizenship, such remarks (with the
arguable exception of Cowan’s) uniformly endorsed a conception of
“citizenship” that would encompass, at least, the equal enjoyment of basic
civil rights to the same extent enjoyed by other citizens. For example, in his
response to Cowan, Conness observed that the nation had already “declared
... by law” in the Civil Rights Act that the U.S. born children of Chinese
immigrants would be citizens and that he himself had “voted for the
proposition to declare that the children of all parentage whatever born in
California should be citizens of the United States, entitled to equal civil
rights with other citizens of the United States.” 265 Moments later, he
described what he understood to be the effect of the proposed declaration of
citizenship in the Fourteenth Amendment:
Here is a simple declaration that a score or a few score of human beings born
in the United States shall be regarded as citizens of the United States, entitled
to civil rights, to the right of equal defense, to the right of equal punishment
for crime with other citizens; and that such a provision should be deprecated
by any person having or claiming to have a high humanity passes all my
understanding and comprehension.266
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Id. at 2891.
Id. at 2892.
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See supra notes 207-210 and accompanying text.
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Id. at 2892.
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To Conness at least, recognition as a “citizen” meant something more than
having a formal legal status and entailed, at least, a “right of equal defense
[and] of equal punishment for crime” to the same extent that other citizens
were defended or punished in like circumstances.
A similar conception of citizenship was reflected in the parallel debate
between Senators Doolittle and Howard regarding whether or not the
Citizenship Clause should expressly exclude “Indians not taxed.” Notably,
both Doolittle and Howard agreed that Native Americans who maintained
their tribal relations should be excluded from citizenship but merely
disagreed as to whether Doolittle’s “Indians not taxed” language or
Howard’s “subject to the jurisdiction” alternative was better suited to
achieving that end. After insisting that both the “wild Indians of the plains”
and those confined to reservations were subject to the laws of the United
States and thus “subject to” its jurisdiction, Doolittle remarked:
Mr. President, citizenship, if conferred, carries with it, as a matter of course,
the rights, the responsibilities, the duties, the immunities, the privileges of
citizens, for that is the very object of this constitutional amendment to
accomplish.267

In reply, Senator Howard, argued that Native Americans who
maintained their tribal relations were not “subject to the jurisdiction” of the
United States within the meaning of his proposal and characterized
Doolittle’s proposed alternative as “an unconscious attempt ... to naturalize
all the Indians within the limits of the United States” because each state
could extend citizenship to its Native American residents simply by taxing
them.268 Howard remarked that he was “not quite so liberal in” his views as
to agree to such a proposal and observed that he was:
not yet prepared to pass a sweeping act of naturalization by which all the
Indian savages, wild or tame, belonging to a tribal relation, are to become my
fellow-citizens and go to the polls and vote with me and hold lands and deal in
every other way that a citizen of the United States has a right to do.269

Though Howard’s suggestion that recognizing Indians as “citizen[s] of the
United States” would confer upon them a “right” to “go to the polls and
vote” might charitably be attributed to the type of hyperbole one might
expect in an extemporaneous exchange, 270 his suggestion is nonetheless
267

Id. at 2893 (emphasis added).
Id. at 2895.
269
Id. (emphasis added).
270
In his earlier speech introducing the proposed Amendment in the Senate on May 10,
Howard had expressly denied that the Amendment would “give … the power to Congress
of regulating suffrage in the states,” a view he maintained after the Amendment’s
ratification. Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2542 (1866); see also Cong. Globe, 40th
Cong. 3rd Sess. 1003 (1869) (Sen. Howard) (denying that Amendment conferred voting
268
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clear evidence that citizenship was viewed by members of the 39th
Congress as anything but inconsequential and that such members fully
expected that recognizing particular classes of persons as “citizens” would
have significant practical and legal consequences.
Doolittle’s proposed revision was rejected by a vote of 30 to 10 and
debate quickly moved on to other Sections of the Amendment. 271 This
marked the end of substantive debate on the proposed addition of the
Citizenship Clause, which spans less than eight pages of the Congressional
Globe and consumed, at most, a few hours of the Senate’s time. 272 The
House approved the final version of the Fourteenth Amendment on June 11,
1866 without substantive debate on the addition of the Citizenship Clause.273
After that, the focus of debate over the Amendment shifted from Congress
to the states.
D. The Ratification Debate in the States
As noted above, the Senate’s relatively abbreviated discussion of the
Citizenship Clause prior to its inclusion in the Fourteenth Amendment has
led many modern scholars to view the provision as an “afterthought” that
added relatively little of substance to the proposed Amendment.274 But if
rights).
271

Id. at 2897.
See id. at 2890-97.
273
Discussion of the Citizenship Clause in the House was limited to the following brief
statement by Representative Thaddeus Stevens summarizing the changes that had been
made in the Senate:
272

The first section is altered by defining who are citizens of the United States and of
the States. This is an excellent amendment, long needed to settle conflicting
decisions between the several States and the United States. It declares this great
privilege to belong to every person born or naturalized in the United States.
Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 3148 (1866). On June 8, Senator Henderson of
Missouri delivered a speech in which he argued that the proposed citizenship definition
was merely declaratory of existing law. Id. at 3031-32. Henderson claimed that if he was
right regarding the preexisting legal status of the birthright citizenship rule, then it would
“be a loss of time to discuss the remaining provisions of” Section One because “they
merely secure the rights that attach to citizenship in all free Governments.” Id. at 3031. As
discussed above, Henderson was the lone member of Congress who had argued during the
earlier Civil Rights Act debates that a conferral of citizenship would not necessarily carry
with it an entitlement to equal civil rights. See supra notes 207-210 and accompanying text.
His speech of June 8, which treated the specific requirements of the Amendment’s Due
Process, Privileges or Immunities and Equal Protection Clauses as mere entailments of the
citizenship recognized by the Amendment’s first sentence, strongly suggests that he had
been persuaded by the more expansive conception of citizenship defended by other
members of the 39th Congress.
274
See supra note 177.
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one looks instead to the debates surrounding ratification of the Amendment
in the states, a much different picture emerges. Rather than being viewed as
an inconsequential addition, the Amendment’s declaration of constitutional
citizenship was frequently treated in the ratification debates as a central
focus, and, in some cases, the central focus, of the Amendment’s first
Section.
For example, in August 1866, Senator Trumbull delivered a widely
publicized speech in Chicago275 in which he characterized Section One as
“declar[ing] the rights of the American citizen” and as a mere “reiteration of
the Civil Rights Bill.”276 The Civil Rights Bill, in turn, was described by
Trumbull as having been “intended ... to confer upon every person born
upon American soil the right of American citizenship, and every thing
belonging to the free citizen of the Republic.” 277 “In other words,” its
purpose “was to make all people equal before the law” with respect to rights
of contract, property and “every right which belongs to man as a man.”278
Although Trumbull characterized Section One as “an unnecessary
declaration, perhaps, because all the rights” identified in that provision
already “belong to the citizen,” he noted that it was “nonetheless thought
proper to put in the fundamental law the declaration that all good citizens
were entitled alike to equal rights in this Republic ... and that all who were
born here or who ... were naturalized were to be deemed citizens of the
United States in every State where they might happen to dwell.”279 These
remarks, all of which focused on the constitutional declaration of
citizenship and the concomitant entitlement of citizens to equal rights,
reflected the entirety of Trumbull’s comments on Section One.
To similar effect were the remarks of Senator Henry Lane of Indiana in
a speech delivered a few weeks after Trumbull’s Chicago speech in which
he characterized “[t]he first clause in the Constitutional Amendment” as
“simply a re-affirmation of the first clause in the Civil Rights Bill, declaring
the citizenship of all men born in the United States, without regard to race
or color.”280 In September of the same year, the National Union Republican
275

Trumbull’s speech originally appeared in the Chicago Tribune on August 4, 1866
and was subsequently republished in full the next day in the Cincinatti Commercial.
The latter newspaper subsequently republished Trumbull’s Chicago speech, along with a
number of other prominent speeches by both advocates and opponents of the proposed
amendment in book-form shortly after the conclusion of the 1866 election. See SPEECHES
OF THE CAMPAIGN OF 1866 IN OHIO, INDIANA, AND KENTUCKY, 6 (1866) [hereinafter
“SPEECHES AND DEBATES”].
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Id.
278
Id.
279
Id.
280
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Committee issued a campaign address to the American people in which the
“substance” of Section One was described as follows:
I. All persons born or naturalized in this country are henceforth citizens of
the United States, and shall enjoy all the rights of citizens evermore; and no
State shall have the power to contravene this most necessary and righteous
provision.281

In a written message submitting the proposed Amendment to the Illinois
state legislature and urging its ratification, the state’s Republican governor
limited his remarks regarding Section One to the following statement:
Are not all persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject to its
jurisdiction rightfully citizens of the United States and of each State and
entitled to all the political and civil rights citizenship confers? and should any
State possess the power to divest them of these great rights, except for treason
or other infamous crime?282

These statements, and similar remarks by supporters emphasizing the
citizenship declaration as the central focus of Section One,283 are consistent
with supporters’ efforts to link Section One with the Civil Rights Act,
which was widely perceived as a relatively moderate measure. Because the
Citizenship Clause was the only portion of the Amendment that mimicked
the language used in the Civil Rights bill, it was natural for supporters to
focus on that provision in support of their claim that Section One did little
more than “embody” the more specifically worded protections of the Civil
Rights bill.284
supra note 275, at 14).
281
Chicago Tribune, Sept. 22, 1866, p. 2. The address was signed by New Jersey
Governor Marcus L. Ward, the Committee’s chairman, and other party leaders, including
Horace Greeley.
282
JOURNAL OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE TWENTY-FIFTH GENERAL
ASSEMBLY OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, AT THEIR REGULAR SESSION BEGUN AND HELD AT
SPRINGFIELD, JANUARY 7, 1867, 40 (Baker, Bailache & Co. 1867).
283
See also, e.g., Cincinnati Commercial, Aug. 27, 1866 (speech of Gen. Benjamin
Butler) (“The first section [of the proposed amendment] … is that every citizen of every
state shall have the right of every citizen of every state …”) (reprinted in SPEECHES AND
DEBATES, supra note 275, at 20); New York Times, Sept. 27, 1866 (quoting resolutions
adopted by Pittsburgh Convention of Union Soldiers and Sailors) (proposed amendment
“clearly defines American citizenship and guaranties all his rights to every citizen”);
Cincinnati Commercial, Aug. 31, 1866, p. 2 (speech of Rep. Columbus Delano) (describing
Section One as “in substance, a definition of citizenship”) (reprinted in SPEECHES AND
DEBATES, supra note 275, at 23).
284
See, e.g., text accompanying supra note 276 (quoting Trumbull’s characterization
of Section One as a “reiteration of the Civil Rights Bill.”); text accompanying supra note
280 (quoting Sen. Henry Lane’s statement describing Section One as “a re-affirmation of
the first clause in the Civil Rights Bill”); Cincinnati Commercial, Sept. 24, 1866, p. 1
(speech of Sen. John Sherman) (describing Section One as the “embodiment of the Civil
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The significance of the Citizenship Clause to supporters of the
Amendment is also reflected in contemporaneous editorial commentary that
appeared in the pro-ratification press. An October 1866 editorial in the
strongly pro-Republican Chicago Tribune titled “American Citizenship”
praised the proposed Amendment for correcting the “anomaly” that had
previously existed whereby “a citizen of the United States residing in Maine
is not necessarily a citizen of the State of Virginia.”285 Observing that this
“anomalous condition of civil rights exists in no other civilized country,”
the editorial praised the proposed Amendment for “defin[ing] in the
Constitution itself what constitutes a citizen and ... declar[ing] ... that a
citizen of the whole Republic ... shall also be a citizen of the State in which
he resides.” 286 While the paper observed that the “proposed provision
making citizenship uniform” would “concede[] no political rights,” it
nonetheless insisted that the provision would “entitle[]” the persons so
recognized “to civil rights on equal terms” with other citizens, including
rights to enter into contracts, to buy, sell, devise and inherit real and
personal property and to bring actions in the courts.287 The author of the
editorial appears to have assumed that all of these rights would follow as a
result of the constitutional declaration of citizenship, which was the only
provision of the proposed Amendment mentioned in the editorial.
An anonymous editorial published a month later in the New York Times
similarly praised the Amendment’s citizenship declaration as a much
needed response to the problem of state discrimination and referred to
Justice Washington’s Corfield opinion as indicative of “the “long-defined
rights of a citizen of the United States, with which States cannot
constitutionally interfere.” 288 An editorial in the North American and
United States Gazette of Philadelphia during this same period declared “that
the primary importance” of Section One “lies in the fact that it specifically
places the citizenship of the republic above that of the States, and makes
Rights Bill, namely: that every body—man, woman and child—without regard to color,
should have equal rights before the law; … that every body born in this country or
naturalized by our laws should stand equal before the laws”) (reprinted in SPEECHES AND
DEBATES, supra note 275, at 39).
285
American Citizenship, Chicago Tribune, Oct. 10, 1866, p.2.
286
Id.
287
Id.
288
The National Question, The Constitutional Amendment—National Citizenship, N.Y.
Times, Nov. 10, 1866. In a subsequent editorial in the same series describing the
Privileges or Immunities Clause, the same unidentified author referred to the catalogue of
rights listed “in the first number” (i.e., in the first unsigned editorial) as indicative of “what
privileges and immunities were intended” by that provision. The Proposed Constitutional
Amendment—What it Provides, N.Y. Times, Nov. 15, 1866. This latter editorial also
suggested that the Amendment would extend to citizens “protection … coextensive with
the whole Bill of Rights” against the state governments. Id.
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every man, native or naturalized a citizen of the United States, so that
hereafter there shall be no such excuse for rebels as that their paramount
allegiance was due to their respective states.”289
The Citizenship Clause also featured prominently in the arguments of
those opposed to ratification. But whereas supporters of the Amendment
invoked the provision to tie Section One to the relatively narrow and
uncontroversial rights enumerated in the Civil Rights bill, opponents
emphasized the potential breadth of the Amendment, placing particular
emphasis on the danger that recognizing blacks as “citizens” might require
that they be admitted to suffrage on equal terms with white citizens.290 In
289

The Amendment Alone, Philadelphia North American and United States Gazette,
Nov. 22, 1866, p.2.
290
Such claims were pervasive among the Amendment’s opponents in both the North
and the South. See, e.g., TEX. HOUSE J. 578 (1866) (report of Committee on Federal
Relations) (objecting to Section One on the ground that it “deprive[s] the States of the right
… to determine what shall constitute citizenship of a State” and contending that its “object”
was to declare “under the color of a generality” that “negroes [are] citizens of the United
States, and therefore, citizens of the several Sates, and as such entitled to all ‘the privileges
and immunities’ of white citizens,” including the right to vote, serve on juries and to bear
arms in the militia); Cincinnati Commercial, Aug. 9, 1866 (speech of Sen. Thomas
Hendricks) (arguing that the Amendment would “confer citizenship on the Negroes and the
Indians” and suggesting that such citizenship would entitle blacks to “stand by your side at
the polls—and claim to be voted for, to hold office, sit upon juries, to exercise all the rights
and enjoy all the privileges which you now enjoy”) (reprinted in SPEECHES AND DEBATES,
supra note 275, at 9); IND. HOUSE J. 102 (1867) (minority report of Select Committee on
Constitutional Amendment) (first section “places all persons, without regard to race or
color, who are born in this country, and subject to its jurisdiction, upon the same political
level, by constituting them ‘citizens of the United States, and of the State wherein they
reside,’ thus conferring upon the negro race born in this country the same rights, civil and
political, that are now enjoyed by the white race,” including the right of suffrage); WIS.
SEN. J. 96 (1867) (minority report of Committee on Foreign Relations) (“The apparent
object of the proposed amendments [sic] is to declare the Africans lately in servitude …
citizens, and to give to the Congress of the United States the power to make them citizens
of the several states wherein they reside, and thereby to extend to them the right of
suffrage.”).
These arguments found some support in leading dictionaries of the day, many of which
defined the term “citizen” as a person who possessed political rights. See, e.g., NOAH
WEBSTER, AN AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE, 208 (George &
Charles Merriam, 1850) (defining “citizen,” as used in the United States, to mean “a
person, native or naturalized, who has the privilege of exercising the elective franchise, or
the qualifications which enable him to vote for rulers, and to purchase and hold real
estate.”); 1 JOHN BOUVIER, A LAW DICTIONARY ADAPTED TO THE CONSTITUTION AND
LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND OF THE SEVERAL STATES OF THE
AMERICAN UNION, (T. & J. W. Johnson, 1843) (defining “citizen” as “[o]ne who, under the
Constitution and laws of the United States, has a right to vote … and who is qualified to fill
offices in the gift of the people.”). These definitions failed to account for the existence of
non-voting citizens, including women and children, a fact supporters of the Amendment
were quick to point out in criticizing arguments that relied on such definitions. See, e.g.,
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response to such claims, many supporters of the Amendment vigorously
denied that extending citizenship to free blacks would confer suffrage or
other “political” rights. In a speech delivered in Indianapolis on August 8,
1866, Speaker of the House Schuyler Colfax ridiculed opponents’ reliance
on the “chimera and hobgoblin of negro suffrage,” granting that “the man
who votes has the right to be called a citizen,” but contending that “it don’t
follow that every citizen has a right to vote.”291 Senator Lane of Indiana
likewise dismissed the asserted connection between citizenship and voting
rights claiming that “[t]here is no good lawyer who will contend that
conferring citizenship alone implies the right to vote and hold office.”292
Representative Columbus Delano of Ohio went even further, asserting that
there was “nobody in this community so illy informed as not to know that
voting does not follow from citizenship ...”293
But denying that citizenship necessarily entailed suffrage was as far as
most supporters of the Amendment were willing to go in cabining the
effects of Section One. Even those who denied that the Amendment would
confer voting rights generally assumed that citizenship would confer
equality with respect to more basic “civil rights,” including,
paradigmatically, those enumerated in the 1866 Civil Rights Act.294
III.

EARLY INTERPRETATIONS OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT

A. Early Congressional Interpretations of the Fourteenth Amendment
On July 28, 1868, Secretary of State William Seward proclaimed the
Fourteenth Amendment ratified.295 Even before that proclamation, members
of the radical Republican faction in Congress had begun looking to the
Amendment as a source of constitutional power to require states to allow
black citizens to vote. In March 1868, Thaddeus Stevens, who had served
on the Joint Committee on Reconstruction during the 39th Congress,
Cincinnati Commercial, Aug. 25, 1866 (speech of the Hon. John Hannah) (criticizing
opponents’ reliance on definitions from Bouvier and Webster and insisting that citizenship
does not require suffrage) (reprinted in SPEECHES AND DEBATES, supra note 275, at 21).
291
Cincinnati Commercial, Aug. 8, 1866 (reprinted in SPEECHES AND DEBATES, supra
note 275, at 14).
292
Cincinnatti Commercial, Aug. 20, 1866 (reprinted in SPEECHES AND DEBATES,
supra note 275, at 13-14).
293
Cincinatti Commercial, Aug. 31, 1866 (reprinted in SPEECHES AND DEBATES, supra
note 275, at 23).
294
See, e.g., Cincinnati Commercial, Aug. 8, 1866 (speech of Rep. Colfax) (denying
citizenship confers suffrage but pointing to Civil Rights Act as indicative of “what the
rights of a citizen of the United States are …”) (reprinted in SPEECHES AND DEBATES,
supra note 275, at 14).
295
See William H. Seward, 15 Stat 708, 708–10 (July 28, 1868) (announcing adoption
of the Amendment).
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pointed to the Citizenship and Privileges or Immunities Clauses of the
Fourteenth Amendment as authority for such a bill:
If by the amended Constitution every American citizen is entitled to equal
privileges with every other American citizen, and if every American citizen in
any of the States should be found entitled to impartial and universal suffrage
with every other American in any State, then it follows as an inevitable
conclusion that suffrage throughout this nation is impartial and universal so
far as every human being, without regard to race or color, shall be found
concerned, and so far as it affects the whole nation.296

The most thorough explanation of the interpretation underlying the
radicals’ claim that the Fourteenth Amendment authorized federal
legislation conferring voting rights was offered by Representative George
Boutwell of Massachusetts, who, like Stevens, had been one of the fifteen
members of the Joint Committee on Reconstruction.297 After quoting both
the Citizenship and Privileges or Immunities Clauses, Boutwell observed
that “[o]ne of the privileges, then, of a citizen of the United States is that he
shall be a citizen of the State where he resides ...” 298 This citizenship,
according to Boutwell, was by its very nature equal. 299 Boutwell then
attempted to demonstrate that voting was “one of the privileges of the
citizen” by invoking the Kentucky Supreme Court’s 1822 decision in Amy v.
Smith, 300 which Boutwell described as “an authority ... in which the
characteristics of citizens are laid down ... in the most satisfactory and
conclusive language.”301 Boutwell quoted at length from the Amy decision,
including the Kentucky court’s declaration that one could not, “in the
correct sense of the term, be a ‘citizen’ of a State, who is not entitled ... to
all the rights and privileges” conferred upon “the highest class of society.”302
Boutwell’s invocation of Amy v. Smith, which was one of the earliest
judicial decisions denying that free blacks were “citizens” within the
meaning of the federal Constitution, 303 as support for extending voting
rights to blacks was more than a bit ironic. But his argument illustrates the
way in which the political valence of the citizenship issue was changed by
the Fourteenth Amendment’s adoption. Before the Civil War, an expansive
296

Cong. Globe, 40th Cong., 2d Sess. 1967 (1868).
MALTZ, supra note 170, at 81.
298
Cong. Gobe, 40th Cong., 3d Sess. 558 (1869).
299
Id. (“Under that Constitution, … [w]e cannot say that a white citizen shall enjoy
privileges which are denied to a black citizen or to a naturalized citizen, white or black.”).
300
11 Ky (1 Litt.) 326 (Ct. of App. 1822).
301
Id.
302
Id. at 558-59 (quoting Amy v. Smith, 11 Ky (1 Litt.) 326 (Ct. of App. 1822)).
Boutwell’s invocation of Amy v. Smith was echoed by his fellow radical, Senator George
Edmunds of Vermont. See id. at 1001 (Sen. Edmunds).
303
See supra notes 80-87 and accompanying text.
297
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conception of citizenship such as the one reflected in Amy, had been used to
deny that free blacks were eligible for citizenship.304 Proponents of black
citizenship sometimes responded by embracing a narrower view of what
citizenship entailed in order to demonstrate that recognizing such a status
for free blacks was not necessarily inconsistent with denying them voting
rights or even certain more basic civil rights.305 But after the Fourteenth
Amendment’s ratification, those seeking to further the goal of black
equality no longer had reason to resist the expansive view of what
“citizenship” entailed.
Of course, Boutwell’s claim that the right to vote was one of the rights
inhering in citizenship was hardly representative of the Republican
mainstream. The repeated pre-enactment assurances from supporters that
the Amendment would not require black suffrage were still fresh in the
minds of all concerned.306 The radicals’ proposed interpretation also stood in
arguable tension with the Amendment’s second section, which appeared to
recognize the right of states to regulate suffrage subject only to a
proportionate reduction in Congressional representation for those states that
refused to extend voting rights to all of their adult male citizens.307 Though
Boutwell and other radicals had responses to such objections, 308 more
moderate Republicans, including former members of the 39th Congress
who had supported the Amendment, rejected the radicals’ claim that the
Amendment authorized Congress to regulate suffrage in the states.309 The
proposed legislation attracted relatively little Congressional support and
was eventually abandoned in favor of an alternative strategy of securing
equal suffrage through constitutional amendment.310
304

See supra Section I.C.1.
See supra Part I.B.3.c (describing moderate pro-citizenship position); see also
supra Part I.C.2 (discussing Justice Curtis’s Dred Scott dissent).
306
See supra notes 291-294 and accompanying text.
307
See U.S. Const. amd. XIV § 2 (providing that “when the right to vote at any
[federal] election” is “denied to any of the male inhabitants of such State, being twenty-one
years of age, and citizens of the United States, or in any way abridged” (except as
punishment for crime) “the basis of representation therein shall be” subject to a
proportionate reduction); see also, e.g., Cong. Globe, 40th Cong. 3rd Sess. 1003 (1869)
(Sen. Howard) (contending that Section Two demonstrated that Section One did not confer
voting rights).
308
Boutwell acknowledged that “some persons” in the 39th Congress may have
conceded that the Amendment would not confer political rights but denied that he had ever
made such a concession and contended that the provision in Section Two merely provided
a “penalty” for a state’s failure to extend voting rights to all citizens as Section One
required. Id.at 559.
309
See, e.g., Cong. Globe, 40th Cong. 3rd Sess. 1003 (1869) (Sen. Howard); id. at
1002 (Sen. Drake); id. at 977-79 (Sen. Frelinghuysen).
310
MALTZ, supra note 170, at 146-47.
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A decidedly less controversial vision of the rights corresponding to
citizenship appeared in the subsequent debate over the proposed Civil
Rights Act of 1871, which reflected one of the earliest legislative
interpretations of the newly adopted Fourteenth Amendment. The 1871 Act
(popularly known as the “Ku Klux Act”)311 was motivated by the Southern
states’ failure to adequately protect their black populations against political
violence perpetrated by the Ku Klux Klan and similar organizations and
was targeted primarily at ensuring the protection of free blacks against
private and official violence.312
The law’s supporters naturally focused much of their constitutional
argument on a straightforwardly literal interpretation of the term “protection”
in the Equal Protection Clause.313 But multiple supporters buttressed such
arguments with the claim that the constitutional recognition of blacks’
citizenship provided the requisite federal authority to protect them from
racially motivated violence. For example, Republican Senator John Pool of
North Carolina, after quoting the Fourteenth Amendment’s Citizenship
Clause asked “[w]hy this express declaration of citizenship” had been
included in the Amendment “unless it implies some right or class of rights
as incident thereto, which were meant to have thus thrown around them a
national protection?”314 Though Pool conceded that “[t]he full scope of the
rights incident to citizenship may not be easy to define,” he insisted that
such rights “[c]ertainly ... cannot be less than the three absolute rights
recognized by the common law,” namely, the rights to “personal liberty,
personal security and private property,” and contended that upon the failure
of any state to “protect the rights incident to citizenship,” the “national
Government must intervene ...”315
To similar effect were the remarks of Representative Samuel
Shellabarger of Ohio, the principal sponsor of the proposed legislation in
the House. Shellabarger began his argument in support of the 1871 Act’s
constitutionality by averting to the constitutional theory underlying the Civil
Rights Act of 1866, which Shellabarger described as having been passed “to
enforce the rights of citizenship to which the slave was admitted by the act
of his emancipation.”316 After observing that several courts had affirmed the
constitutionality of that earlier measure, Shellabarger contended that
311

Christopher R. Green, The Original Sense of the (Equal) Protection Clause:
Subsequent Interpretation and Application, 19 GEO. MASON U. CIV. RIGHTS L. J. 219, 239
n.88 (2009).
312
Id. at 224-25.
313
See id. at 227-52 (collecting statements of supporters reflecting a “duty to protect”
interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause).
314
Cong. Globe 42nd Congress 1st Session 607 (1871).
315
Id.
316
Cong. Globe 42nd Congress 1st Sess., app. 68 (1871).
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Congress thus possessed power under the Thirteenth Amendment “to define
and punish as a crime against the United States any act of deprivation of the
newly made United States citizenship.”317 Shellabarger argued that “if the
[T]hirteenth [A]mendment had done so much as this, the far more explicit,
complete and careful provisions” of the Fourteenth Amendment had done
that much and more.318 According to Shellabarger:
[W]hen the United States inserted into its Constitution that which was not
there before, that the people of this country born or naturalized therein are
citizens of the United States and of the States also in which they reside, and
that Congress shall have power to enforce by appropriate legislation the
requirement that their privileges and immunities as citizens should not be
abridged, it was done for a purpose, and that purpose was that the United
States thereby were authorized to directly protect and defend throughout the
United States those privileges and immunities ... which inhere and belong of
right to the citizenship of all free Governments. The making of them United
States citizens and authorizing Congress by appropriate law to protect that
citizenship gave Congress power to legislate directly for enforcement of such
rights as are fundamental elements of citizenship.319

Opponents adopted divergent and, to some extent, conflicting strategies
in responding to the supporters’ citizenship-based arguments. One strategy,
reflected in Indiana Democrat Michael Kerr’s response to Shellabarger,
focused on the “declaratory” nature of the Fourteenth Amendment’s
Citizenship Clause.320 According to Kerr, because birthright citizenship had
been the rule even before the Fourteenth Amendment’s adoption, as
recognized in the 1866 Civil Rights Act, the Citizenship Clause conferred
no new power on Congress but instead left both the definition of “citizen”
and the “constituent elements of citizenship of the United States or of the
States ... where it found them, to rest upon the common law and the laws of
the several States.”321
Not all opponents of the 1871 Act endorsed Kerr’s narrow interpretation
317

Id.
Id.
319
Id. at 69. For other examples of Republicans invoking the Citizenship Clause as
support for the bill’s constitutionality, see Cong. Globe, 42nd Cong., 1st Sess., 693-94
(1871) (Sen. Edmunds); id. at 382 (Rep. Hawley); id. at 500 (Sen. Frelinghuysen).
320
Id. at 47.
321
Id.; see also, e.g., id. app. at 165 (Rep. Bird) (endorsing the “lucid and exhaustive
argument” of Representative Kerr); id. app. at 259 (Rep. Holman) (arguing that United
States citizenship existed before the Fourteenth Amendment’s adoption and that the
Citizenship Clause “only enlarges the body of citizens, nothing more”). Such arguments
marked a significant shift from the rhetorical strategies of the Fourteenth Amendment’s
opponents prior to enactment. See supra notes 200 & 290 and accompanying text
(discussing opponents’ arguments that making blacks citizens would require that they be
given full legal and political equality).
318
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of the Citizenship Clause. The more common response was simply to deny
that Congress could invoke its Section Five enforcement power in the
absence of overtly discriminatory state action.322 A notable example of this
line of argument was offered by Senator Garrett Davis of Kentucky who
claimed that Congress’s Section Five enforcement power was limited to
“pass[ing] acts declaring all State laws which contravene [the] objects” of
Section One “to be unconstitutional, null and void or to provide for all cases
involving them to be instituted in” or removed to federal courts. 323 But
despite this extremely narrow construction of Section Five, Davis endorsed
a significantly broader interpretation of the Citizenship Clause:
The only purpose of this provision [i.e., the Citizenship Clause] was to abolish
discriminations and to give, “without regard to race, color or previous
condition,” citizenship; and to invest those who previously had been withheld
from any rights, privileges or immunities all that had been common to persons
then citizens of the United States and thus to put the colored citizen upon the
same level with white citizens. ... [I]ts only effect is to abolish discrimination
against the black or colored race. To the extent that the laws of any State may
make such discriminations Congress may intervene to abolish them, but no
further.324

Davis’s description of the Citizenship Clause was strikingly egalitarian,
especially for a border-state Democrat who had opposed both the Civil
Rights Act and the Fourteenth Amendment while a member of the 39th
Congress in 1866. 325 Davis clearly viewed the Citizenship Clause as the
source of a legally enforceable equality principle that would justify federal
intervention if states engaged in explicitly race-based discrimination against
their own citizens. Significantly, Davis appears to have viewed this
antidiscrimination requirement as arising directly from the Citizenship
Clause itself, independently of the express prohibitions contained in the
second sentence of Section One, which he discussed separately.326
B. The Slaughter-House Cases
In 1869, the Republican-controlled legislature of Louisiana conferred a
monopoly in the maintenance of butchering and slaughtering operations in
New Orleans and its surrounding areas on a single private corporation,
322

See, e.g., id. app. at 218-19 (Rep. Thurman); id. app. at 138-39 (Rep. McCormick);
id. at 573 (Sen. Stockton); id. at 337-38 (Rep. Whitthorne).
323
Id. at 648.
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Id.
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See Cong. Globe, 39th Cong. 1st Sess. 1809 (1866) (recording Davis’s vote against
the Civil Rights Act); id. at 3042 (recording Davis’s vote against the Fourteenth
Amendment).
326
Cong. Globe 42nd Congress 1st Sess. 648-49 (1871).
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prompting a series of legal challenges by individual butchers and smaller
corporations whose livelihoods were threatened by the law.327 These legal
actions culminated in the Supreme Court’s notorious 1873 decision in The
Slaughter-House Cases 328 in which the Court, by a five-to-four majority,
rejected the private butchers’ constitutional claims and, in doing so,
practically “eviscerated” the Fourteenth Amendment’s Privileges or
Immunities Clause.329
The Citizenship Clause featured prominently in Justice Miller’s
majority opinion and provided the textual point of departure for the
majority’s narrow construction of the Privileges or Immunities Clause.
Focusing on the fact that the former provision referred to both United States
citizenship and state citizenship whereas the latter focused solely on United
States citizenship, Miller claimed that it was “quite clear” that “citizenship
of the United States, and ... citizenship of a State ... are distinct from each
other” and claimed that the Privileges or Immunities Clause must therefore
have been “intended” to protect solely those rights pertaining to the former
status with rights pertaining to state citizenship left to the exclusive control
of the states.330 Miller’s opinion classified all rights traditionally associated
with Corfield and other Comity Clause cases as the exclusive province of
state citizenship and state protection.331 The “privileges or immunities” of
national citizenship, by contrast, were confined to a relatively narrow set of
structurally derived rights such as the privilege of traveling from state to
state and “[t]he right to use the navigable waters of the United States.”332
Justice Miller’s majority opinion in Slaughter-House is among the most
widely criticized opinions in Supreme Court history. 333 Miller’s narrow
interpretation of the Privileges or Immunities Clause is susceptible to
327

The background of the Louisiana legislation and the cases challenging its
constitutionality are described in RONALD M. LABBÉ & JONATHAN LURIE, THE
SLAUGHTERHOUSE CASES: REGULATION, RECONSTRUCTION, AND THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT (2003).
328
83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).
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See, e.g., Roosevelt, supra note 239, at 64 (describing Slaughter House as “famous
… for its evisceration of the Privileges or Immunities Clause”); see also, e.g., Harrison,
supra note 55, at 1387 (decision “virtually read [the Privileges or Immunities Clause] out
of” the Constitution).
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83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 74.
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Id. at 77-78.
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Id. at 78-80.
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See, e.g., Saenz v. Roe, 526 U. S. 489, 522, n.1 (1999) (Thomas, J., dissenting)
(“Legal scholars agree on little beyond the conclusion that the [Privileges or Immunites]
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numerous criticisms, the most familiar of which being that the interpretation
finds no support in the extensive legislative and ratification debates that
preceded the Amendment’s adoption.334 This difficulty might not have been
dispositive if Miller had provided a persuasive textual account of the
Amendment’s language. But he did not. As Justice Field observed in his
dissent, because all the “privileges or immunities” of national citizenship
that Miller identified would have been adequately protected without the
Fourteenth Amendment,335 Miller’s interpretation rendered the Amendment
“a vain and idle enactment, which accomplished nothing, and most
unnecessarily excited Congress and the people on its passage.”336
Miller’s interpretation is also difficult to reconcile with the text of the
Citizenship Clause, a considerable difficulty given that provision’s
centrality to his textual argument. As Professor Harrison observes,
although the Citizenship Clause “recognizes that there are separate
citizenships of the states and the United States, the Amendment does not
divide those citizenships, but staples them together” by conferring upon
every United States citizen a citizenship in whichever state he or she
chooses to reside.337 Miller himself conceded as much by acknowledging
that, under the Citizenship Clause, “a citizen of the United States can, of his
own volition, become a citizen of any State of the Union by a bona fide
residence therein, with the same rights as other citizens of that State.”338 It
is thus difficult to escape the conclusion that the right to enjoy the privileges
or immunities of state citizenship (at least on the same terms as are
extended to other citizens of the same state) is therefore one of the
“privileges or immunities” of United States citizenship protected by the
334

See, e.g., FONER, supra note 172, at 530 (observing that the Court’s “studied
distinction between the privileges deriving from state and national citizenship, should have
been seriously doubted by anyone who read the Congressional debates of the 1860s.”); cf.
Slaughter-House, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 129 (Swayne, J. dissenting) (contending that the
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ratification. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 79 (citing Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35
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Amendment.339
The principal dissent in the case, authored by Justice Field, drew
inferences from the Citizenship Clause that were directly contrary to those
drawn by Miller’s majority opinion. After noting the “diversity of opinion”
that had existed before the Amendment’s adoption regarding the
relationship between state citizenship and United States citizenship, Field
observed that the Citizenship Clause:
changes this whole subject, and removes it from the region of discussion and
doubt. It recognizes in express terms, if it does not create, citizens of the
United States ... . A citizen of a State is now only a citizen of the United States
residing in that State. The fundamental rights, privileges, and immunities
which belong to him as a free man and a free citizen now belong to him as a
citizen of the United States, and are not dependent upon his citizenship of any
State... . They do not derive their existence from [the State’s] legislation, and
cannot be destroyed by its power.340

Field noted that the Amendment did “not attempt to confer any new
privileges or immunities upon citizens, or to enumerate or define those
already existing” but rather “assumes that there are such privileges and
immunities which belong of right to citizens as such.”341 Rejecting Miller’s
narrow construction of the Privileges or Immunities Clause, Field
contended that the most logical interpretive source for identifying the
“privileges or immunities” of United States citizenship was in the judicial
interpretations that had been given to the similarly phrased Comity Clause,
which Field described as “a clause which insures equality in the enjoyment
of ... rights between citizens of the several States whilst in the same
State.”342 Field argued that:
[w]hat the [Comity Clause] did for the protection of the citizens of one State
against hostile and discriminating legislation of other States, the [F]ourteenth
[A]mendment does for the protection of every citizen of the United States
against hostile and discriminating legislation against him in favor of others,
whether they reside in the same or in different States. If under the fourth
article of the Constitution equality of privileges or immunities is secured
between citizens of different States, under the [F]ourteenth [A]mendment the
same equality is secured between citizens of the United States.343

Justice Bradley’s separate dissenting opinion likewise emphasized the
inherent link between the newly recognized status of United States
339

Harrison, supra note 55, at 1415 (characterizing this conclusion as “virtually
impossible to avoid”); see also infra notes 310-315 and accompanying text (discussing
similar argument made by Senator Boutwell in post-Slaughter-House legislative debate).
340
83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 95-96 (Field, J. dissenting).
341
Id. at 96.
342
Id. at 98.
343
Id. at 100-01.

66

ORIGINALISM AND BOLLING

[2012

citizenship and the equality of all United States citizens:
The question is now settled by the [F]ourteenth [A]mendment itself, that
citizenship of the United States is the primary citizenship in this country, and
that State citizenship is secondary and derivative, depending upon citizenship
of the United States and the citizen’s place of residence. … . A citizen of the
United States has a perfect constitutional right to go to and reside in any State
he chooses, and to claim citizenship therein, and an equality of rights with
every other citizen, and the whole power of the nation is pledged to sustain
him in that right.... . Citizenship of the United States ought to be, and,
according to the Constitution, is, a sure and undoubted title to equal rights in
any and every States in this Union, subject to such regulations as the
legislature may rightfully prescribe. If a man be denied full equality before the
law, he is denied one of the essential rights of citizenship as a citizen of the
United States.344

Thus, for both Field and Bradley, 345 the status of United States
citizenship along with the corresponding constitutional recognition of the
“privileges or immunities” associated with that status provided sufficient
grounds for a legally enforceable equality guarantee that was apparently
distinct from the separate Equal Protection Clause, which both dissenters
mentioned only in passing.346
A great deal has been written about the possible motivations that may
have driven Miller and the other members of the Slaughter-House majority
to impose upon the Amendment the narrow construction reflected in the
majority’s opinion.347 But whatever the Justices’ motivations, their decision
unquestionably altered the subsequent development of constitutional law by
de-emphasizing the significance of citizenship in interpreting the Fourteenth
Amendment and channeling constitutional arguments toward the
344

Id. at 112-13 (Bradley, J. dissenting).
In a separate dissenting opinion, Justice Swayne endorsed the opinions of Justices
Field and Bradley as “full and conclusive upon the subject” of the legislation’s
constitutionality under the challenged provisions. Id. at 128 (Swayne, J.). Chief Justice
Chase joined in Justice Field’s dissent without writing a separate opinion.
346
The only reference to “equal protection” in Field’s opinion was as part of a full
quotation of the language of Section One. Id. at 93-94 (Field, J. dissenting). Following
extended explanations of why the proposed Louisiana law violated both the Privileges or
Immunities and Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, Justice Bradley
remarked without elaboration that “[s]uch a law also deprives those citizens of the equal
protection of the laws, contrary to the last clause of the section.” Id. at 122 (Bradley, J.
dissenting).
347
See, e.g., Michael W. McConnell, The Forgotten Constitutional Moment, 11 CONST.
COMMENTARY 115, 133 (1994) (characterizing Miller’s opinion as “an attempt to assuage
the conflict over Reconstruction by prudent compromise”); Michael Les Benedict,
Preserving Federalism: Reconstruction and the Waite Court, 1978 SUP. CT. REV. 39, 61-62
(1978) (attributing Miller’s decision to the “almost universal desire of Americans to
preserve the basics of the federal system”).
345
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Amendment’s separate Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses, both of
which referred to “persons” rather than “citizens.” 348 Although the
Slaughter-House dissenters’ views strongly influenced the jurisprudence
that developed under the latter two provisions,349 the damage inflicted by the
Slaughter-House majority to the significance of citizenship in interpreting
the Fourteenth Amendment persists to this day.350
C. The Civil Rights Act of 1875
Although the Slaughter-House decision marked the beginning of the end
of citizenship as a central concept in the Fourteenth Amendment’s
interpretation, the transition from citizenship-based arguments to equalprotection arguments did not happen all at once or without resistance. This
transition played out most visibly in connection with the legislative debates
surrounding a series of proposals that eventually culminated in the Civil
Rights Act of 1875.351
In May 1870, Senator Charles Sumner of Massachusetts, a leader of the
radical wing of the Congressional Republicans, introduced legislation that
would prohibit racial discrimination in various public accommodations,
including public schools, common carriers, inns, theaters, cemeteries,
churches and benevolent institutions throughout the United States. 352
Sumner’s proposed legislation sparked a series of legislative debates and
counter-proposals that would span nearly five years. 353 In a speech
348

Cf. Roosevelt, supra note 239, at 62-63 (describing modern academic “consensus”
that, if not for Slaughter-House, much of Supreme Court’s modern due process and/or
equal protection doctrine could have evolved instead under the Privileges or Immunities
Clause).
349
See, e.g., DAVID E. BERNSTEIN, REHABILITATING LOCHNER, at 17-20 (2011)
(describing the Slaughter-House dissents as “crucial to the development of the liberty of
contract idea” in the late nineteenth century); Saunders, supra note 50, at 294-301
(discussing influence of Field and Bradley in early development of equal protection
doctrine).
350
See, e.g., McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S.Ct. 3020, 3030-31 (2010) (plurality
opinion) (refusing to overrule Slaughter-House and holding that the constitutional right to
keep and bear arms applies to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process
Clause rather than the Privileges or Immunities Clause).
351
18 Stat. 335 (1875); see McConnell, supra note 5, at 998-1005 (describing
evolution of supporters’ constitutional theories in the wake of Slaughter-House).
352
McConnell, supra note 5, at 987.
353
See id. at 984-1117 (describing legislative history of the 1875 Civil Rights Act).
Because the debates surrounding the proposed legislation reflect a far more detailed
explication of the Fourteenth Amendment’s requirements than was reflected in the preenactment debates, scholars have looked to these debates as a “rich source of information
about how the Fourteenth Amendment was understood at the time of its adoption …”
Harrison, supra note 55, at 1425; see also, e.g., McConnell, supra note 5, at 984-1117
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delivered in 1872 in support of an early version of the proposed bill,
Sumner specifically invoked the newly conferred constitutional citizenship
of African Americans as the basis for the legal equality the bill sought to
confer:
Ceasing to be a slave the former victim has become not only a man, but a
citizen, admitted alike within the pale of humanity and within the pale of
citizenship... . [A]s a citizen he becomes a member of our common household
with equality as the prevailing law. No longer an African, he is an American;
no longer a slave, he is a component part of the Republic, owing to it patriotic
allegiance in return for the protection of equal laws. By incorporation with
the body-politic, he becomes a partner in that transcendent unity, so that there
can be no injury to him without injury to all ... . Our rights are his rights; our
equality is his equality; our privileges and immunities are his great
possession.354

Sumner was far from alone in drawing a link between the legal status of
United States citizenship and the equality guarantees set forth in his bill.
Republican supporters of the bill routinely connected the equality rights the
bill sought to protect with the “privileges or immunities” of United States
citizenship and drew a link between those rights and the newly ratified
Fourteenth Amendment.355 Though this theory was sometimes tied to the
specific language of the Amendment’s Privileges or Immunities Clause,356
many Republicans took the position that equality of rights and privileges
inhered in the very nature of United States citizenship itself.357
(looking to evidence of legislative debates and votes regarding 1875 Act as evidence
Reconstruction-era understanding concerning school segregation).
354
Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. 385 (1872).
355
See, e.g., Harrison, supra note 55, at 1425 (referring to the legislative debates
surrounding the 1875 Civil Rights Act as “show[ing] that the equality theory of the
Privileges or Immunities Clause was prominent among Republicans.”).
356
See, e.g., Cong. Globe, 42nd Cong., 2nd Sess. 762 (1872) (Sen. Carpenter) (“The
fourteenth amendment assumes that there are certain privileges and immunities belonging
to citizens of the United States, and it declares that no State shall abridge those privileges
and immunities… . [T]o abridge the rights of any citizen it must follow that the privileges
and immunities of all citizens must be the same.”).
357
See, e.g., 2 Cong. Rec. 4081 (1874) (Sen. Pratt) (“No one reading the Constitution
can deny that every colored man is a citizen, and as such, so far as legislation may go,
entitled to equal rights and privileges with white people.”); 2 Cong. Rec. 425 (1874) (Rep.
Purman) (“A citizen of the United States and a State is always equal to any other citizen of
said state.”); 2 Cong. Rec. 414 (1873) (Rep. Lawrence) (“The colored man is a citizen of
the republic, and his rights, equally with all others, this Congress must respect if this
Constitution is to be obeyed.”); Cong. Globe, 42nd Cong., 2nd Sess. 436 (1872) (Sen.
Frelinghuysen) (“[A]n equality of citizenship is established [by the Constitution] and we
are directed to see to it that citizenship is nowhere abridged. It is therefore, perfectly
constitutional for Congress to say to the States, … you shall treat citizenship as
citizenship.”); id. at 845 (Sen. Sherman) (“It seems to me clear as day … that if in any
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As in the earlier Congressional debates concerning the constitutionality
of the 1871 Ku Klux Act, 358 many opponents of the 1875 legislation
conceded the link between citizenship and equality posited by the
legislation’s supporters but merely denied the supporters’ claim of broad
Congressional authority. 359 One of the most notable examples of such a
concession came from Democratic Representative Alexander Stephens of
Georgia, the former Vice President of the Confederacy who “was
considered by many to have been the most eloquent defender of slavery in
the later years of the antebellum period.” 360 But in the Congressional
debates of the 1870’s, Stephens acknowledged that, as a result of the Civil
War and the Reconstruction Amendments, “all classes of men, whether
white, red, brown or black” now had “an equal right to justice and to stand,
so far as governmental powers are concerned or exercised over them,
perfectly equal before the law.”361 Describing the effect of the Fourteenth
Amendment specifically, Stephens declared his understanding that Section
One had “but two objects,” first “to declare the colored race to be citizens of
the United States, and of the States, respectively, in which they reside” and
second, to “prohibit the States from denying to the class of citizens so
declared, the same privileges, immunities and civil rights which were
secured to the citizens of the several States, respectively, and of the United
States, by the Constitution as it stood before citizenship to the colored race
was declared by this amendment.”362
community where a great number of black men are, by law citizens, if a law of the State
prevents those men from sitting on a jury because they are black men, such a law does
deprive such citizen of a privilege and immunity which they have a right to enjoy in every
part of the country as citizens of the United States”); id. at 900 (Sen. Edmunds) (“If it is not
a privilege and immunity of a citizen, being otherwise equal and otherwise qualified, to
stand on an equality irrespective of color, what is a privilege and an immunity of
citizenship upon which you can stand?”); Cong. Globe, 42nd Cong. 2nd Sess. 273 (1871)
(Sen. Sawyer) (“I believe … that as long as the Constitution stands as it does now, every
citizen of the country should stand upon an equal plane with every other; that to every
citizen of the country, the same rights and privileges should belong as to every other.”).
358
See supra notes 322-326 and accompanying text.
359
See, e.g., 2 Cong. Rec. app. 241 (1874) (Sen. Norwood) (“Now, it is clear that all
citizens of the United States possess the same privileges and immunities. In their relation
as citizens of the federal government, are not the rights of all citizens precisely the same?
No one can deny it.”); id. at 1-2 (Rep. Southard) (conceding that Fourteenth Amendment
guaranteed equality with respect to “fundamental rights” of citizenship, including
protections set forth in the Civil Rights Act of 1866, but denying that it had any “relation to
the peculiar and special privileges comprehended in the bill before the House”).
360
McConnell, supra note 5, at 1065.
361
2 Cong. Rec. 381 (1874).
362
Id. at 380. Though Stephens agreed that the Amendment prohibited states from
discriminating against their black citizens, he argued that the only “proper remedies” for a
state’s violation were “the judgment of courts, to be rendered in such a way as Congress
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The Slaughter-House decision was handed down in the midst of the
Congressional debates regarding the proposed civil rights legislation and
significantly altered the trajectory of the debates.363 Prior to that decision,
supporters had premised their claims to constitutional authority to enact the
bill almost exclusively on the Privileges or Immunities Clause and the
inherent equality of United States citizens.364 Justice Miller’s opinion for
the majority thus gave the legislation’s opponents a powerful weapon to
argue against the bill’s constitutionality.365
The bill’s supporters initially adopted divergent arguments in response
to the opponents’ invocations of Slaughter-House. Some simply denied that
the case had any bearing on Congress’s authority to pass the proposed
legislation. 366 Others argued for a narrow interpretation of the decision,
denying that it prohibited Congressional efforts to address racial
discrimination.367
The most forceful challenge to the decision’s authority came from
radical Senator George Boutwell of Massachusetts. Though Boutwell
conceded that the decision was the “law of the case” for the parties, he
denied that the decision had any broader legal significance. 368 Boutwell
harshly criticized Justice Miller’s majority opinion, contending that the
majority had “made a great mistake” by suggesting “that there were two
classes of rights appertaining to citizens of the United States: those derived
from the Government of the United States, and those derived from the
might provide …” Id. at 380-81.
363
McConnell, supra note 5, at 998 (observing that “[t]he constitutional argument”
regarding the bill “took an abrupt and surprising turn in 1873, when the Supreme Court
handed down its” Slaughter-House decision and that the decision “changed the tenor of the
debate and forced the Republicans to clarify or revise the textual basis for their
constitutional position.”).
364
Id. at 997-98; see also Harrison, supra note 55, at 1425-29.
365
See, e.g., McConnell, supra note 5, at 1000 (“Democratic opponents of the bill
immediately seized on the Slaughter-House decision and quoted it over and over.”);
Harrison, supra note 55, at 1429 (observing that “opponents [of the legislation] took up
Slaughter-House as a chorus”).
366
See, e.g., 2 Cong. Rec. app. 304 (1874) (Sen. Alcorn) (denying opinion issued by
“another branch” of the government was binding on Congress); 2 Cong. Rec. 3453 (1873)
(Sen. Frelinghuysen) (conceding that “as citizens of the United States we are all bound to
respect that decision and not erect slaughter-houses in that district” but denying that it
affected Congress’s power to adopt the proposed law).
367
See, e.g., 3 Cong. Rec. 943 (1875) (Rep. Lynch) (claiming that Slaughter-House
allowed legislation to redress “distinctions and discriminations … made on account of race,
color, or previous condition of servitude” even if Amendment did not extend to other
contexts).
368
3 Cong. Rec. 1792 (1875) (stating that the Court’s decision “is the law of the case,
but it is not law beyond the case; it is not law with reference to the rights of the States
generally, and certainly is not law for the Senate”).
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States.”369 Invoking the Citizenship Clause, Boutwell argued:
Now, then, what is the effect of this [i.e., the Citizenship Clause]? First, [the
persons described in the Clause] are citizens of the United States; and
secondly, they are citizens of the State in which they reside. First and best, the
most comprehensive, indeed the only definition of citizenship, is equality of
rights. You need no other definition... . and of course one of the first rights,
not of the citizen of the State, but of the citizen of the United States, is that in
the State in which he chooses to reside he shall be the equal of any other
citizen in that State. That is his first immunity, his first privilege; and therefore
he claims as a citizen of the United States every privilege and immunity of
citizenship in the State in which he resides ... . 370

Boutwell argued that even if the Fourteenth Amendment had contained
“nothing substantive” except for the declaration of citizenship and
Congress’s Section Five enforcement power, Congress would still possess
sufficient authority to adopt the proposed civil rights bill.371
Despite the many imaginative attempts to explain away, distinguish or
reject the authority of Slaughter-House, the more common response among
Republicans was to turn away from the Citizenship and Privileges or
Immunities Clauses as grounds of the legislation’s constitutionality and
embrace instead an alternative textual theory grounded in the Equal
Protection Clause. 372 Because the Slaughter-House majority had only
obliquely touched upon that provision, the equal protection justification
avoided a direct conflict with the Court’s authority.373 The transition from
the citizenship-based justification to equal-protection theories did not
happen all at once and was hardly seamless. 374 But the evidence of the
transition was clearly reflected in the final language of the bill. Unlike
earlier drafts, which had prohibited discrimination against “citizen[s] of the
United States,” the final version approved by Congress and enacted into law
369

2 Cong. Rec. 4116 (1874).
Id.
371
Id.; see also, e.g., 2 Cong. Rec. app. 359 (1874) (speech of Sen. Morton)
(conceding that Amendment conferred no power on Congress to protect rights that “belong
to the citizens of States as States” but insisting that the right to be free from racial
discrimination was not such a right because the “right of a citizen of one State to go into
another State and there enjoy all the privileges and immunities of citizens of that State on
equal terms is one of the highest privileges of citizens of the United States.”).
372
See McConnell, supra note 5, at 1002.
373
Cf. Slaughter-House, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 81 (identifying the existence of
discriminatory laws “in the States where the newly emancipated negroes resided,” as “the
evil to be remedied by” the provision and expressing doubt that the provision should apply
in any other context).
374
See McConnell, supra note 5, at 1001 (“So unnatural was the Slaughter-House
reasoning that most members of Congress continued to speak in terms of privileges and
immunities except when explicitly discussing the decision itself”).
370
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tracked the language of the Equal Protection Clause by extending protection
to “all persons within the jurisdiction of the United States.”375
D. The Civil Rights Cases
The Civil Rights Act of 1875 was the last significant civil rights
legislation adopted by the Reconstruction Congress. 376 Congressional
Republicans suffered “disastrous” losses in the elections of 1874 and the
1876 Republican Presidential nominee, Rutherford B. Hayes, narrowly
secured election through a brokered agreement following a disputed
Electoral College victory tainted by allegations of pervasive voting fraud.377
The contested election of 1876 produced the notorious “Compromise of
1877,” which resulted in the removal of federal military authority from the
southern states and marked the effective end of Reconstruction.378
Following the election of 1876, federal enforcement of the Civil Rights
Act of 1875 was sporadic and haphazard.379 In addition to the declining
national political will to protect the rights of southern blacks, federal civil
rights enforcement was hampered by the Supreme Court’s narrow
construction of the Fourteenth Amendment in Slaughter-House and
subsequent cases. 380 The Court adhered to this pattern of narrow
interpretation in its 1883 decision in the Civil Rights Cases, 381 its first
decision addressing the constitutionality of the private discrimination
provisions of the 1875 Civil Rights Act.
In crafting the private discrimination provisions of the 1875 Act,
Congressional Republicans had specifically targeted institutions that were
assumed to operate under a common law or statutory duty to serve all
members of the public without discrimination, such as inns, common
carriers and licensed providers of public accommodations. Supporters thus
contended that the law did not create any new legal rights or obligations but
merely provided a means for enforcing rights to which all citizens were

375

Id. at 1070 (observing that the changed language “reflected the doctrinal shift from
the Privileges or Immunities Clause to the Equal Protection Clause” as the basis for the
bill).
376
McConnell, supra note 347, at 136.
377
McConnell, supra note 5, at 1088-89.
378
McConnell, supra note 347, at 127-30. The background of the disputed Election of
1876 and the Compromise of 1877 are described in FONER, supra note 172, at 564-87.
379
McConnell, supra note 5, at 1087-88.
380
See, e.g., United States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629 (1882) (invalidating portions of Ku
Klux Act of 1871); United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1875) (holding that right to
assemble and right to keep and bear arms were not privileges or immunities of national
citizenship that Congress had power to protect).
381
109 U.S. 3 (1883).
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already entitled.382 Justice Bradley’s opinion for the eight-Justice majority
rejected the proponents’ constitutional theory, holding that “civil rights,
such as are guarantied by the constitution against state aggression, cannot
be impaired by the wrongful acts of individuals, unsupported by state
authority … .”383
The Court’s lone dissenter, Justice Harlan, complained that Bradley’s
decision had “proceed[ed] ... upon grounds entirely too narrow and
artificial ...”384 Picking up on Bradley’s concession that Section Two of the
Thirteenth Amendment gave Congress “power to pass all laws necessary
and proper for abolishing all badges and incidents of slavery,”385 Harlan first
contended that the law could be defended as a proper exercise of that
constitutional power.386
Harlan then turned to the Fourteenth Amendment, focusing specifically
and extensively on the significance of the Citizenship Clause. Harlan
argued that “[t]he citizenship … acquired by” the former slaves “in virtue of
an affirmative grant by the nation,” could be “protected not alone by the
judicial branch of the government, but by congressional legislation of a
primary direct character” pursuant to Congress’s Section Five power. 387
Harlan observed that the “essential inquiry” in determining the scope of
such power was “what, if any, right, privilege, or immunity was given by
the nation to colored persons when they were made citizens of the state in
which they reside?”388
Harlan asserted that there was at least one right, “if there be no others”
that was “secured to colored citizens of the United States—as between them
and their [own] respective states—by the grant to them of state citizenship,”
namely “exemption from race discrimination in respect of any civil right
belonging to citizens of the white race in the same state.”389 According to
Harlan:
Citizenship in this country necessarily imports at least equality of civil rights
382

See McConnell, supra note 5, at 992-97 (describing supporters’ constitutional
theory); see also Harrison, supra note 55, at 1425 (observing that “the private persons
covered by the 1875 Act were those already under a duty to serve the public without
discrimination.”).
383
109 U.S. at 17.
384
109 U.S. at 26 (Harlan, J. dissenting).
385
Id. at 20-21. Bradley rejected the claim that the Thirteenth Amendment provided
the requisite constitutional authority for the 1875 Act by denying that racial discrimination
by common carriers, public accommodations and similar facilities was an “incident” of
slavery. Id. at 22-23.
386
Id. at 34-37 (Harlan, J. dissenting).
387
Id.
388
Id. at 47.
389
Id. at 48.
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among citizens of every race in the same State. It is fundamental in American
citizenship that, in respect of such rights, there shall be no discrimination by
the State, or its officers, or by individuals or corporations exercising public
functions or authority, against any citizen because of his race or previous
condition of servitude.390

Harlan’s dissent in the Civil Rights Cases is today one of the bestremembered articulations of the “equal citizenship” interpretation of the
Fourteenth Amendment expressed during the Reconstruction era.391 It was
also among the last. The ascendance of the Slaughter-House “dual
citizenship” theory, which by 1883 had become firmly entrenched in
Supreme Court doctrine, rendered Harlan’s effort to revive the Citizenship
Clause as a source of legally enforceable equality rights a “lost cause.”392
IV.

THE ORIGINAL MEANING OF THE CITIZENSHIP CLAUSE

The foregoing discussion has focused on surveying the copious
historical evidence demonstrating that at least one widely shared
understanding of “citizenship” at the time of the Fourteenth Amendment’s
enactment entailed a commitment to extending equal civil rights to all
persons legally recognized as “citizens.” It remains to be shown, however,
that this understanding should lead self-professed originalists to embrace an
interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Citizenship Clause that
encompasses such an “equal citizenship” component. This Part assesses the
equal citizenship interpretation of the Citizenship Clause in light of the two
leading theories of originalist interpretation—original intent originalism and
original public meaning originalism. This Part also considers how the equal
citizenship interpretation of the Citizenship Clause relates to the more
explicit equality guarantee set forth in the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal
Protection Clause.
A. The Equal Citizenship Interpretation and Originalist Methodology
Originalism has been famously described as a “theory working itself
pure.”393 A perhaps more fitting description might be that of originalism as
a “big tent” comprising diverse, and to some extent, conflicting theories
390

Id.
See, e.g., Goodwin Liu, Education, Equality and National Citizenship, 116 YALE L.
J. 330, 355-56 (2006) (citing Harlan’s dissent as support for the equal citizenship
understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment); Kenneth L. Karst, Foreward: Equal
Citizenship Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1, 19-20 (1977) (same).
392
Benedict, supra note 347, at 76-77; see also Karst, supra note 391, at 19 (observing
that Bradley’s opinion for the majority in the Civil Rights Cases “sealed the fate of the
equal citizenship principle for some seventy years.”).
393
Vasan Kesavan & Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Interpretive Force of the
Constitution’s Secret Drafting History, 91 GEO. L.J. 1113, 1114 (2003).
391
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united by a core commitment to the interpretive primacy of the “fixed”
meaning of the constitutional text at the time of enactment.394 The existence
of significant diversity among originalist theories complicates efforts to
make definitive claims regarding whether a particular result either is or is
not consistent with “originalism” as an interpretive methodology. At a
minimum, such claims must be attentive to the diversity of originalist
theories and, where necessary, clearly explain the particular version of
“originalism” that is driving one’s argument.
Though it is possible to categorize originalist theories across a range of
dimensions, it is common to divide such theories into two broad families—
“original intent” theories, which focus on the intentions or understandings
of the particular historical actors who participated in the relevant drafting
and/or ratification processes, and “original public meaning” theories, which
focus on how the relevant constitutional text would most likely have been
understood by a hypothetical “reasonable person” at the time of
enactment. 395 Over time, the weight of academic originalist opinion has
shifted away from intent-focused theories, which had predominated during
the 1970’s and 1980’s, and toward approaches that emphasize original
public meaning. 396 Despite this shift in emphasis, intent-based theories
continue to attract the support of prominent adherents.397
In the two subparts that follow, I consider how proponents of original
intent and original public meaning theories, respectively, might assess the
case for recognizing an equality component as inhering in the original
meaning of the Citizenship Clause based on the evidence surveyed in Parts I
394

See, e.g., Thomas Colby & Peter Smith, Living Originalism, 59 DUKE L.J. 239, 244
(2009) (arguing that “originalism” is “not a single, coherent, unified theory of
constitutional interpretation, but rather a smorgasbord of distinct constitutional theories …
.”); Lawrence B. Solum, Semantic Originalism, at 2 (Illinois Pub. Law Research Paper No.
07-24, 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1120244 (acknowledging diversity
among originalist theories but describing the proposition “that the meaning … of a given
Constitutional provision was fixed at the time the provision was framed and ratified” as a
core commitment uniting the “family of originalist theories”).
395
See, e.g., John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Original Methods
Originalism: A New Theory of Interpretation and the Case Against Construction, 103 NW.
L. REV. 751, 758-61 (2009) (identifying “original intent” and “original public meaning”
approaches as the “two leading positive theories of [originalist] interpretation”).
396
See, e.g., Colby & Smith, 394 note 409, at 247-55 (describing the shift from
“original intentions” originalism to “original public meaning” originalism).
397
Prominent intentionalist originalists include Keith Whittington, Richard S. Kay,
Larry Alexander and Saikrishna Prakash.
See, e.g., KEITH E. WHITTINGTON,
CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION: TEXTUAL MEANING, ORIGINAL INTENT, AND JUDICIAL
REVIEW 110-59 (1999); Richard S. Kay, Original Intention and Public Meaning in
Constitutional Interpretation, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 703 (2009); Larry Alexander &
Saikrishna Prakash, “Is that English You’re Speaking?” Why Intention Free Interpretation
Is an Impossibility, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 967 (2004).
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through III above. In view of the shear diversity among originalist theories,
it may not be possible to construct an argument that will fully satisfy all
originalists. But as the following subparts will show, a compelling
argument can be made for recognizing an equality component in the
Citizenship Clause under both an original intent and an original public
meaning framework.398
1. Equal Citizenship and Original Intent
Proponents of original intent theories generally argue that the meaning
of language necessarily depends upon the intentions or understandings of
some actual or assumed speaker.399 And because the Constitution’s status as
law derives from its enactment by actual, historically situated framers and
ratifiers, original intent theorists argue that the actual subjective intentions
and understandings of these historical actors, rather than the understanding
of some imagined “reasonable person,” must furnish the standard for
interpretive correctness.400
398

At a minimum, the historical evidence surveyed in the preceding Parts should be
sufficient to convince proponents of either approach that the equality interpretation
defended in this Article falls within the broad range of historically plausible interpretations
of the constitutional text. Cf. H. Jefferson Powell, Rules for Originalists, 73 VA. L. REV.
659, 690 (1987) (observing that history “sometimes reveals a range of ‘original
understandings’” rather than a single determinate understanding). For some originalists,
this conclusion alone would likely suffice to justify judicial invalidation of federal laws
that subject citizens to legal inequalities on the basis of race. Cf. JACK BALKIN, LIVING
ORIGINALISM, 267-68 (2011) (defending a version of originalism that emphasizes objective
meaning of the text and values history primarily “as a check on our assumptions about
what” meanings the text can plausibly bear); see also id. at 249-54 & 433 n.150 (arguing
that Bolling and its associated doctrine are consistent with the objective meanings of
multiple provisions, including the Citizenship Clause and the Fifth Amendment Due
Process Clause). Other originalists, however, insist on a more demanding standard that
would limit courts to enforcing only the “most probable” interpretation from among the
range of textually and historically plausible candidates. See, e.g., McGinnis & Rappaport,
supra note 395, at 779 (arguing that interpreters should “choose the most probable
interpretation available with the aid of interpretive rules—norms internal to the enterprise
of originalism.”). The analysis in the subparts that follow will be addressed primarily to
those who advocate this more demanding standard.
399
See, e.g., Alexander & Prakash, supra note 397, at 969 (asserting that “one cannot
interpret texts without reference to the intentions of some author.”); Richard S. Kay,
Adherence to the Original Intentions in Constitutional Adjudication: Three Objections and
Responses, 82 NW. U. L. REV. 226, 230 (1988) (“Words are only meaningless marks on
paper or random sounds in the air until we posit an intelligence which selected and
arranged them.”).
400
See, e.g., Kay, supra note 397, at 970 (arguing that substituting ordinary meaning
for intended meaning “in interpreting a legal text raises an acute issue of authority because
it replaces the actual lawmaker with a hypothetical normal speaker of the language.”).
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One possible objection to the equal citizenship interpretation of the
Citizenship Clause that might be asserted from an original intent
perspective arises from the somewhat unusual circumstances through which
the provision came to be included in the Amendment. As discussed above,
the provision was inserted late in the drafting process with relatively little
debate or discussion and seems to have been added largely for the purpose
of clarifying who would be entitled to claim the benefits of Section One’s
separate Privileges or Immunities Clause. 401 Based on this background,
Professor Siegel contends that “[f]or originalists wedded to the constitution
makers’ specific intent, the Citizenship Clause can be read only to specify
those who participate in the status” of citizenship but “cannot be read to
secure for status holders any particular panoply of rights.”402
If one focuses narrowly on the specific motivations that drove the
decision to include a definition of citizenship in the Fourteenth Amendment,
this objection has some force. The Congressional debates preceding the
Amendment’s enactment suggest that the drafters understood the
Amendment’s separate Privileges or Immunities and Equal Protection
Clauses as the primary constraints on state discrimination.403 The principal
motivation for including the Citizenship Clause was, as Siegel observes,
simply to clarify who would be protected by the former provision. 404
Moreover, there seems to have been virtually no explicit discussion of the
potential effect of the Clause on the permissibility of discrimination by the
federal government during the framing and ratification debates. 405 An
original intent originalist who insists on identifying the relevant “intent” as
encompassing only those consequences specifically foreseen and discussed
during the enactment process may thus have difficulty accepting the
Citizenship Clause as the source of a judicially enforceable equality norm
applicable to the federal government.
Without denying that some original intent originalists might insist upon
a similarly narrow approach to identifying the relevant “original intent,” it
is clear that such a narrow focus is neither compelled by the theory of
original intent, as such, nor embraced by all original intent originalists.406
401

See Part II.D supra.
Siegel, supra note 19, at 580.
403
McConnell, supra note 5, at 997-1005.
404
See supra notes 248-256 and accompanying text (discussing Senator Wade’s
proposal to clarify the Privileges or Immunities Clause and subsequent addition of
Citizenship Clause).
405
See Siegel, supra note 19, at 585 (“[I]n extensive congressional and public debates,
no one ever specifically intimated the Fourteenth Amendment’s first section had any effect
on the national government beyond settling the vexed definition of citizenship.”).
406
See, e.g., WHITTINGTON, supra note 397, at 178-79 (distinguishing between
extratextual “motivations” or “expectations” that drove the decision to include a particular
402
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For example, Professor Richard Kay, one of the leading modern proponents
of original intent originalism, argues that “[a]s a practical matter, an
approach which relies on ordinary meanings will usually result in the same
interpretation that would follow from original intentions adjudication.” 407
As Kay explains:
We expect the constitution-makers to use words according to ordinary usage
at the time of enactment. The best evidence of the enactors’ intent is the
language they used. Indeed, in many cases, any other conclusion is so unlikely
that an explicit reference to extrinsic evidence of intent is unnecessary.
Certainly, when most readers agree that a particular clause or phrase means
one thing, the burden of persuasion ought to be on the advocate of some other
meaning. Such a presumption is fully consistent with original intentions
adjudication . . . .408

Because enactors choose language deliberately for the purpose of conveying
their intended meaning and because such language is carefully considered
during the drafting and ratification processes, Kay argues that occasions
where the intended meaning of a text fails to match its objective public
meaning should be “extremely rare.”409 In fact, Kay contends that any such
divergence would involve “some kind of mistake by the rulemakers” in
attempting to convey their intended meaning.410
Thus, an original intent originalist working within a framework similar
to Kay’s, should presume that the “original intent” underlying the
Citizenship Clause corresponds to the public meaning of its text at the time
of enactment absent compelling evidence of some “mistake” by the enactors
that caused its public meaning to diverge from the meaning they
collectively intended. Kay suggests two possible categories of “mistakes”
that may cause the intended meaning of a constitutional provision to diverge
from its original public meaning. The first category involves a simple
provision in the Constitution and the “illocutionary intentions” conveyed by the text itself
and arguing that only the latter should be considered binding); cf. RAOUL BERGER,
GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
363 (1977) (defining “original intent” as “the meaning attached by the framers to the words
they employed in the Constitution.”).
407
Id. at 234; see also Kay, supra note 397, at 713 (contending that “the public
meaning of the constitutional text will almost always mirror the intentions of the human
beings who drafted and approved it.”). Kay’s work is unusually detailed in specifying a
methodology by which the “intentions” of the relevant constitutional enactors may be
discerned and aggregated together into a single collective “original intent.” See, e.g.,
Solum, supra note 394, at 42 (crediting Kay with providing the “best answers to the
collective intentions problem”). For this reason, I focus particular attention on Kay’s
methodology for identifying the relevant “original intent” of the Citizenship Clause.
408
Kay, supra note 399, at 234-35 (footnotes omitted).
409
Kay, supra note 397, at 712.
410
Id.
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drafting or transcription error of the type typically associated with the
“scrivener’s error” doctrine in statutory interpretation. 411 The second
category involves situations in which the scope of a constitutional provision
is vague or otherwise unclear such that results that were not collectively
intended by all the enactors whose assent was necessary to enactment might
nonetheless fall within the literal meaning of the enacted text.412
Though these two categories are conceptually distinct and, on Kay’s
account, call for different methods of resolution,413 they may, for present
purposes, be collapsed into a single overarching inquiry—namely, whether,
based on the available evidence of the intentions of the Fourteenth
Amendment’s framers and ratifiers, we can be confident that a specific
proposal to prohibit the federal government from discriminating against
United States citizens would have been rejected. If this question is
answered in the affirmative, we can be reasonably confident that
interpreting the Citizenship Clause to achieve this result would be
inconsistent with the original intent of the relevant enactors, even if a
hypothetical “reasonable person” at the time of enactment might have read
the provision more broadly.414 By contrast, if this question is answered in
the negative, a proponent of Kay’s version of original intent originalism
should have relatively little difficulty concluding that the “original intent”
of the Citizenship Clause on this particular issue is consistent with the
“public meaning” of the enacted text.
In assessing the evidence of the enactors’ intentions on this point, it will
be useful to proceed in stages. As an initial matter, it seems abundantly
clear that the Citizenship Clause was intended to bind both state and federal
actors. This intention is plainly reflected in language of the provision,
which, unlike the Fourteenth Amendment’s second sentence, is not limited
to “state” conduct. 415 Further evidence on this point is provided by the
411

Id. at 713.
Id.
413
Kay argues that mistakes of the first variety should be resolved by giving the text its
obviously intended meaning rather than its unintended objective meaning. Id. at 713-14.
Somewhat more controversially, he urges that “mistakes” involving vague and open-ended
provisions should be resolved by narrowing the provision to a “core” intended meaning
shared by the group of enactors whose assent was necessary to enactment, excluding any
“idiosyncratic” meanings that were held by only a minority of the enacting coalition. Id. at
713; see also Kay, supra note 399, at 248-51; cf. Brett Boyce, Originalism and the
Fourteenth Amendment, 33 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 909, 954-55 (1998) (criticizing Kay’s
proposed “core meaning” approach for summing different understandings).
414
Cf. Kay, supra note 397, at 714-21 (criticizing public meaning originalism as
insufficiently connected to the democratic processes that rendered the constitutional text
authoritative and as unduly prone to manipulation by modern interpreters).
415
If anything, the applicability of the Clause to the federal government would have
been even more apparent than its applicability to the states given the relevant background
412
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remarks of Senator Jacob Howard, the provision’s principal sponsor, during
the Senate debate of May 30, 1866. During that debate, Senator Doolittle,
who opposed the Fourteenth Amendment, asserted that the proposed
Citizenship Clause demonstrated that the Amendment’s supporters
entertained doubts regarding Congress’s authority to confer citizenship by
statute, as it had done in the earlier-adopted Civil Rights bill.416 Howard
denied Doolittle’s assertion and insisted that the provision’s goal was to
entrench the citizenship definition against future repeal by a pro-Southern
Congress:
We desired to put this question of citizenship, and the rights of citizens and
freedmen under the civil rights bill beyond the legislative power of such
gentlemen as the Senator from Wisconsin, who would pull the whole system
up by the roots and destroy it, and expose the freedmen again to the
oppression of their old masters.417

This response would have been unavailable to Howard had he not
understood the Citizenship Clause as a restraint on federal as well as state
lawmaking and no other Senator questioned Howard’s explanation.
It is equally apparent that many members of the 39th Congress shared
the understanding that United States citizenship carried with it certain rights,
including, paradigmatically, a right to equal legal treatment at the hands of
government. The legislative debates concerning both Section One and its
predecessor provision in the Civil Rights bill abound with statements
evincing this understanding. 418 Indeed, my review of the debates has
revealed only a single occasion where a member of Congress expressed a
contrary understanding.419 Those remarks not only failed to persuade but
seem to have sparked genuine puzzlement on the part of those to whom they
were addressed.420
Combining these two understandings—namely, that the Citizenship
Clause bound the federal government and that citizenship required legal
interpretive presumptions applied to constitutional provisions at the time. See Barron v.
Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243, 247 (1833) (holding that “the limitations on power,” set
forth in the Constitution “if expressed in general terms, are naturally, and we think
necessarily, applicable to the government created by the instrument.”).
416
Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2896 (1866).
417
Id.
418
See supra Parts II.A-II.C. For particularly clear illustrations of this understanding,
see the text accompanying supra notes 182-192 (Sen. Trumbull), 197 (Rep. Wilson), 202204 (Sen. Van Winkle), 269 (Sen. Howard).
419
See supra note 207 and accompanying text (discussing remarks of Senator
Henderson during the debate over the Civil Rights Act).
420
See supra notes 208-209 and accompanying text (quoting reactions to Henderson’s
remarks). Even Henderson himself seemed to embrace the broader conception of
citizenship in a subsequent speech addressing the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment’s
Citizenship Clause. See supra note 273.
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equality with respect to civil rights—yields a fairly strong inference that the
federal government, like the states, was constitutionally required to respect
the legal equality of all U.S. citizens.
There remains, however, the question of why this specific understanding,
if intended, failed to leave any clear trace in the legislative record.421 Two
plausible answers suggest themselves. First, the central problem at which
both Section One and the subsequent Reconstruction-era civil rights
legislation were targeted was the problem of state discrimination.
Constitutional debates surrounding these issues understandably focused on
the source of Congress’s power to redress such state abuse and the scope of
that power. By contrast, Congressional efforts to eliminate racially
discriminatory federal laws and policies—many of which had already been
eradicated during the Civil War period422—raised no comparable questions
of constitutional authority. Because members of the Reconstruction
Congress generally supported efforts to eliminate race-based discrimination
in federal laws on policy grounds, invocations of the Constitution in such
contexts would have been largely beside the point. It is thus hardly
surprising that Reconstruction-era lawmakers devoted relatively little
attention to the Amendment’s effect on the permissibility of federal
discrimination.
A second explanation for the lack of explicit discussion of the
Citizenship Clause as a source for a federal constitutional equality
requirement arises from the fact that many Reconstruction-era lawmakers
assumed that the federal government was already prohibited from
discriminating on the basis of race before the Fourteenth Amendment’s
enactment. 423 Though Republican lawmakers were not always clear or
consistent in identifying the precise source of such a requirement,424 it is
421

See supra note 405.
Siegel, supra note 19, at 549; see also id. at 559 (noting that “the Civil War and
Reconstruction Congresses repealed almost all laws granting preferences to ‘whites.’”).
423
See, e.g., Mark Graber, A Constitutional Conspiracy Unmasked: Why “No State”
Does Not Mean “No State”, 10 CONST. COMMENTARY 87, 89 (1993) (“Leading
participants in the debate over the Fourteenth Amendment treated as common knowledge
the proposition that the pre-Civil War Constitution already prohibited federal laws
inconsistent with equal protection.”); Eric Schnapper, Affirmative Action and the
Legislative History of the Fourteenth Amendment, 71 VA. L. REV. 753, 787-88 (1984)
(“[T]here is substantial evidence that the framers of the fourteenth amendment ... believed
that Congress was, and indeed always had been, bound by the principles that the
amendment extended to the states”).
424
See, e.g., BALKIN, supra note 398, at 250-51 (discussing belief by Bingham and
others that “equal protection” was synonymous with the Fifth Amendment’s “due process
of law”); Siegel, supra note 19, at 553-54 (discussing Sumner’s argument that the
Declaration of Independence prohibited the federal government from discriminating on the
basis of race); cf. Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2549 (1866) (Rep. Stevens) (asserting
422
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clear that many viewed the requirement as inhering in the very nature of
United States citizenship itself. 425 Given the prevailing view among
Congressional Republicans that the Citizenship Clause was merely
declaratory of what existing law already required,426 it is hardly surprising
that such lawmakers did not point to that specific provision as the source of
the federal government’s obligation to treat all citizens equally—a
requirement they presumed would have existed even if the Fourteenth
Amendment was never added to the Constitution.427
In arguing that the equal citizenship interpretation is consistent with the
extrinsic evidence of the enactors’ intentions, I do not wish to be understood
as making the stronger claim that such evidence is so overwhelming as to
compel such an interpretation without regard to the objective meaning of
the enacted text. As discussed above, the original version of Section One
that emerged from the Joint Committee in April 1866 contained no express
limitation on federal conduct whatsoever. 428 Had this version of the
that “every one of [the] provisions” proposed to be included in the Fourteenth Amendment
(including the Equal Protection Clause) was already “asserted, in some form or other, in
our DECLARATION or organic law” and that the principal Amendment was needed
because the existing limitations applied only to the federal government and not the states).
425
See supra note 418.
426
See supra notes 170 & 193 and accompanying text (discussing pre-Fourteenth
Amendment Republican belief that native birth alone established citizenship).
427
The declaratory understanding of the Citizenship Clause does suggest that
Congressional Republicans most likely expected that the Clause would only clarify, rather
than change, the content of existing law. It does not follow, however, that they did not
understand or intend the provision’s language to require equality. To see why, consider the
Seventeenth Amendment, which opens with a declaration that “[t]he Senate of the United
States shall be composed of two Senators from each State” before providing that such
Senators are to be “elected by the people” of the State. U.S. Const. amd. XVII. The
enactors of this Amendment clearly expected that their “elected by the people” language
would change the existing practice of allowing each state’s legislature to select its Senators.
See U.S. Const. art. I, § 3, cl. 1. But they almost certainly did not expect that the language
providing for “two Senators from each State” would change existing law, as that language
merely repeated language that already appeared in the Constitution. Id. It does not follow,
however, that the “two Senators” requirement was not part of the Amendment’s intended
meaning. If, by some bizarre chain of events, the meaning of “two Senators” at the time of
the Seventeenth Amendment’s adoption had somehow diverged from its original intended
meaning at the time of Article I’s adoption, it would not change the fact that the adopters of
the later amendment intended their own understanding of “two Senators” despite their
failure to recognize the inconsistency between that portion of their Amendment and the
intended meaning of the preexisting constitutional rule. Similarly, if the Fourteenth
Amendment’s framers understood citizenship to require equality, then it seems natural to
read the citizenship declaration they adopted as embodying that understanding, even if
those framers had no conscious awareness that they were changing the content of existing
law. Cf. Williams, supra note 13, at 500-09 (elaborating similar argument with respect to
the relationship between the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clauses).
428
See Part II.C supra.
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Amendment been enacted into law without the addition of the Citizenship
Clause, an original intent originalist might have a very difficult time
accepting that Section One could nonetheless be interpreted to bind the
federal government.429
But if one accepts the seemingly uncontroversial claim that the
objective meaning of the enacted text provides strong evidence of intended
meaning, 430 then such objective meaning should provide an important
interpretive baseline against which claims about intended meaning may be
judged.
Identifying that baseline involves an inquiry that largely
corresponds to the methodology of original public meaning originalism,
which will be considered in the following subpart.431 For present purposes,
the critical point is simply that the extrinsic evidence of the relevant
enactors’ intentions provides no grounds for confidence that the enactors
specifically intended to leave the federal government free to discriminate.432
As such, there is little basis for believing that original intent originalism and
original public meaning originalism would point to inconsistent
interpretations on this particular issue.
2. Equal Citizenship and Original Public Meaning
Unlike original intent theorists, proponents of original public meaning
originalism reject the proposition that the “meaning” of constitutional
language is equivalent to the meaning subjectively understood or intended
by the actual actors who participated in the drafting and ratification
processes.433 Instead, most original public meaning originalists identify the
relevant “meaning” as the objective public meaning of the constitutional
text, when read in context, as it would have been understood by a
reasonable observer at the time of the provision’s adoption.434
429

Professor Mark Graber has suggested such an argument, contending that the
Amendment’s framers “chose the limiting phrase ‘No State shall deny’ only because they
believed that the Constitution already prohibited federal officials from making arbitrary
and discriminatory distinctions among individuals.” Graber, supra note 423 at 91. For a
critique of Graber’s argument, see Siegel, supra note 19, at 573-78.
430
See Kay, supra note 397, at 712.
431
See id. at 712-14 (discussing overlap between original intent and original public
meaning approaches).
432
See also infra note 468.
433
See, e.g., Gary Lawson, Controlling Precedent: Congressional Regulation of
Judicial Decision-Making, 18 CONST. COMMENT. 191, 196 n.20 (2001) (“[M]ost modern
originalists … reject any strict reliance on direct historical evidence of founding-era
beliefs”).
434
See, e.g., BARNETT, supra note 246, at 92 (“[O]riginal meaning’ originalism seeks
the public or objective meaning that a reasonable listener would place on the words used in
the constitutional provision at the time of its enactment”); McGinnis & Rappaport, supra
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Though different public meaning originalists describe the “reasonable
observer” at the center of their methodological approach in subtly different
ways,435 most agree on a handful of key characteristics such an individual
should possess, including the ability to competently speak and understand
English and at least a reasonable degree of familiarity with the provision’s
background political and legal context and the particular circumstances that
motivated its adoption.436 To determine the objective public meaning that
the relevant constitutional language would have conveyed to such a
hypothetical observer, public meaning originalists consult a broad range of
interpretive sources, including standard dictionary definitions,
contemporaneous legal treatises and judicial opinions, public statements
regarding the provision during the drafting and ratification processes, and
early post-enactment interpretations and applications of the provision.437
Accepting these methodological premises as a starting point, it seems
reasonable to conclude that most public meaning originalists would
consider the full range of materials surveyed in Parts I through III as
bearing on the most probable original public meaning of the Citizenship
Clause. A hypothetical reasonable person at the time of the Fourteenth
Amendment’s enactment could at least potentially have been aware of all
the materials surveyed in Parts I and II, all of which pre-date the
Amendment’s adoption. And although the early interpretations surveyed in
Part III would not have been available at the time of enactment, they are
nonetheless probative evidence of how actual interpreters at a point close in
the time to the Amendment’s enactment understood and discussed its
note 395, at 761 n.29 (“Most original public meaning theorists rely on a reasonable reader
or author.”).
435
See, e.g., Kay, supra note 397, at 721-24 (describing various formulations public
meaning originalists have used to describe the hypothetical “reasonable person”).
436
See, e.g., Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of
United States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A MATTER OF
INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 3, 37–38 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997)
(arguing that the Constitution should be interpreted in accordance with the original
meaning of the text as understood by “intelligent and informed people of the time”);
Kesavan & Paulsen, supra note 393, at 1132 (focusing on the understanding of a
“hypothetical, objective, reasonably well-informed reader”).
437
See, e.g., Kesavan & Paulsen, supra note 393, at 1148 (identifying various
“commonly-accepted” sources of original public meaning, including public statements
made during ratification process, “early congressional, executive, and judicial precedents”
and “the works of early commentators on the Constitution”); cf. Steven G. Calabresi &
Julia T. Rickert, Originalism and Sex Discrimination, 90 TEX. L. REV. 1, 27 (2011) (“In
order to recapture the objective original public meaning of Section One, it is helpful to
consult extratextual sources that document the events that led to the writing of the
Amendment, the intellectual history of the times, contemporaneous dictionaries, the
discussion of the Amendment, and newspaper accounts at the time of the Fourteenth
Amendment’s adoption”).
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terms.438
Viewing the Citizenship Clause in light of this background context
gives rise to a strong inference that a hypothetical “reasonable person” at
the time of the Fourteenth Amendment’s adoption would most likely have
recognized the Clause as doing something more than conferring a formal
legal status on the persons it recognizes as “citizens of the United States.”
During the antebellum period, both the pro-Southern theory underlying the
denial of free black citizenship and the abolitionist theory supporting free
blacks’ entitlement to equal civil rights were premised on the assumption
that “citizenship” carried with it an entitlement to certain legal rights,
including the right to equal treatment at the hands of government.439 This
assumption was reflected in numerous antebellum legal opinions, including
Chief Justice Taney’s Dred Scott opinion—the specific holding that drove
the decision to include a definition of citizenship in the Constitution.440 The
assumption was also clearly reflected in the extensive legislative debates
surrounding the Citizenship Clause’s predecessor provision in the Civil
Rights Act as well as in the more abbreviated Senate debate preceding the
adoption of the Citizenship Clause itself and the subsequent ratification
debates in the states.441
There are, however, at least two potential objections that might be raised
against the equal citizenship interpretation of the Citizenship Clause under a
public meaning originalist framework—one grounded in the provision’s
text and the other in the background historical and legal context against
which it was enacted.
The textual challenge arises from the absence of a federal equivalent to
the “No state shall ...” language that introduces the Privileges or Immunities,
Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Amendment’s second
sentence. The absence of parallel prohibitory language explicitly binding
the federal government to the restrictions expressly imposed upon the states
through the latter set of provisions might reasonably be thought to invite the
inference that the Amendment should be read to impose no similar restraints
on federal conduct.442
While an express prohibition of federal discrimination would have left
438

See, e.g., Kesavan & Paulsen, supra note 393, at 1182 (arguing that post-enactment
evidence “is probative of original linguistic meaning and should be consulted even when”
pre-enactment evidence “is seemingly unambiguous.”).
439
See Part I.B.3 supra.
440
See supra Part I.C.1.
441
See Part III.A-D supra.
442
See Siegel, supra note 19, at 585 (suggesting that “originalists may decide that the
… failure [of the Fourteenth Amendment’s framers] to specifically constrain the power of
the national government to discriminate indicates a determination to leave that power
undiminished”).
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little room for doubt, it does not necessarily follow that the absence of such
express language should be understood to negate reasonable inferences that
might otherwise be drawn from the Citizenship Clause as a standalone
provision. As an initial matter, while it is true that most rights-conferring
provisions of the federal Constitution contain explicit mandatory or
prohibitory language,443 this is not the only textual formulation capable of
conveying an intention to confer rights. Consider the following two
alternative formulations for recognizing a right to be free from
“unreasonable searches and seizures,” the first drawn from the Fourth
Amendment to the federal Constitution and the second from the Declaration
of Rights in Massachusetts’ Constitution of 1780:
1. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall
not be violated ...444
2. Every subject has a right to be secure from all unreasonable
searches, and seizures, of his person, his houses, his papers, and all
his possessions.445
Unlike the Fourth Amendment, which contains the familiar “shall not”
language used in most of the federal Constitution’s rights-conferring
provisions, the Massachusetts provision merely recognizes the existence of
the right without expressly declaring that it “shall not” be infringed. But the
omission of express prohibitory language in the Massachusetts provision
does not render it any less clear than its federal counterpart. Because the
prohibition on infringement inheres in the very nature of a “right,” the
textual recognition of the right itself connotes that governmental actors may
not violate that right even if such a prohibition is not expressly spelled out
on the face of the constitutional text. 446
Of course, the Citizenship Clause stops short of even explicitly
acknowledging a right to equal treatment at the hands of government as an
incident of citizenship. Instead the Clause merely declares who is entitled
443

See, e.g., Gregory Brazeal, A Machine Made of Words: Our Incompletely Theorized
Constitution, 9 UNIV. N.H. L. REV. 425, 435 (2011) (“Unlike Declarations of Rights in
many state constitutions, the federal Bill of Rights consists [almost] entirely of concise,
functional rules in the form of ‘shall’ and ‘shall not’ statements …”).
444
U.S. CONST. amd. IV.
445
MASS. CONST. pt. I, art. XIV (1780).
446
See, e.g., Jeremy Waldron, A Right-Based Critique of Constitutional Rights, 13
OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 18, 27 (1993) (“The term correlative to the [constitutional] claimright is, of course, the duty incumbent upon officials and others to respect and uphold that
right.”); cf. Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied
in Judicial Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16, 31-32 (1914) (describing correlative relationship
between a grant of “rights” and the corresponding “duties” that arise as a result).
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to citizenship without saying anything specific about what that status
entails.447 But while the Citizenship Clause alone does not explicitly require
the federal government to accord any particular rights to its citizens, the
Fourteenth Amendment as a whole does something quite similar. The
Citizenship Clause requires the federal government to recognize certain
individuals—i.e., those born or naturalized in the United States and subject
to its jurisdiction—as its citizens. The Privileges or Immunities Clause
recognizes a class of “privileges or immunities” that belong to “citizens of
the United States” and prohibits the states from “mak[ing]” or “enforc[ing]”
any laws that “abridge” such rights.448 While the federal government is not
similarly prohibited from “abridging” such rights by the express terms of
the Amendment’s second sentence, reading that sentence in conjunction
with the first sentence’s mandate that certain persons be recognized as
“citizens of the United States” gives rise to a strong inference that the
federal government, like the states, is bound to respect the “privileges or
immunities” that belong to such individuals.449 As in the above-described
example drawn from the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights, the textual
recognition of certain rights as belonging to “citizens of the United States”
suggests that the United States, like the states, may not abridge those
rights.450
Moreover, even if construed strictly as a standalone provision, apart
from any additional inferences that might be drawn from the Privileges or
447

See Smith, supra note 62, at 683 (observing that “technically, the language of the
first sentence of Section 1 does not provide a true ‘definition’ of the term ‘citizen,’ but
rather a statement of the conditions sufficient for attaining the status of ‘citizen’ of a state
as well as of the United States.”).
448
Cf. Lawrence Solum, Incorporation and Original Meaning, 18 J. CONTEMP. L.
ISSUES 409, 423 (2009) (“The semantic content of the [Privileges or Immunities Clause] is
sufficient, by itself, to support the conclusion that at least some rights must be included—
otherwise the clause would be without legal effect.”).
449
See, e.g., Balkin, supra note 29, at 87 (“[T]he text of the [Fourteenth] [A]mendment
recognizes and confirms the existence of privileges and immunities of national citizenship.
If the states may not abridge these privileges or immunities, a fortiori neither may the
federal government.”).
450
See supra notes 444-446 and accompanying text. This inference is particularly
strong if the Privileges or Immunities Clause is understood to refer to “privileges or
immunities” that persons possess by virtue of their United States citizenship. On this
reading, the Privileges or Immunities Clause would be equivalent to a declaration that
United States citizenship does, in fact, confer certain privileges and immunities. It should
be noted that this is not the only possible way to make textual sense of the Amendment’s
reference to “privileges or immunities of citizens of the United Sates.” See, e.g., Solum,
supra note 448, at 423-26 (surveying various possible readings of this phrase). But this
reading is a very plausible way of understanding the text and is consistent with the way
numerous contemporaneous interpreters actually described the “privileges or immunities”
referred to in the Clause. See infra notes 463-464 and accompanying text.
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Immunities Clause, the Citizenship Clause alone could reasonably be
construed to require that the United States refrain from abridging whatever
inherent rights its citizens were understood to possess by virtue of their
citizenship. Sometimes, the mere textual recognition of a preexisting legal
status or concept might be understood to incorporate the incidents or
attributes traditionally associated with that status or concept. For example,
the Constitution’s textual recognition of certain public officials as
“judges”451 might reasonably be understood “to mean not simply a judicial
official who decides cases according to law” but rather “an official who
possesses” at least some “of the traditional powers and immunities of
Anglo-American judges,” such as the common law rule of absolute judicial
immunity against damages suits.452 Nor is this example unique. Similar
textual arguments have been advanced in support of recognizing inherent
attributes or incidents of other constitutionally recognized concepts,
including “states,”453 “Indian tribes,”454 “Congress”455 and “war.”456
If arguments of this form are acknowledged as legitimate ways of
reasoning from the constitutional text, there seems to be little basis, at least
in principle, to resist reading the Citizenship Clause as encompassing those
rights that were widely recognized at the time of its adoption as traditional
“incidents” of citizenship. In fact, the proposition that the declaration of
citizenship encompasses at least some rights that were not expressly
identified in the Constitution seems difficult to resist. For example, it
seems dubious, under any reasonable understanding of “citizenship” (either
in 1868 or today), that the federal government could forcibly deport persons
See, e.g., U.S. Const. art. III § 1 (referring to “[t]he Judges … of the supreme and
inferior Courts …”).
452
Michael B. Rappaport, Reconciling Textualism and Federalism: The Proper
Textual Basis for the Supreme Court’s Tenth and Eleventh Amendment Decisions, 93 NW.
U. L. REV. 819, 824 (1999).
453
Id. at 831-60 (arguing that Constitution’s reference to “states” provides a defensible
textual basis for immunizing certain aspects of states’ sovereign functions from federal
regulation and control).
454
See Robert N. Clinton, There Is No Federal Supremacy Clause for Indian Tribes,
34 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 113, 130 (2002) (arguing that Indian Commerce Clause and exclusion of
“Indians not taxed” from the Census Clause reflects an “unquestionabl[e]” textual
recognition of “the sovereignty of Indian tribes”).
455
See Josh Chafetz, Executive Branch Contempt of Congress, 76 CHI. L. REV. 1083,
1093-1131, 1143 (2009) (surveying historical foundations of Congress’s implied power to
hold nonmembers in contempt and concluding “that such a power was considered inherent
in what it meant to be a legislature”).
456
See, e.g., United States v. Miller, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 268, 304-06 (1870)
(interpreting Congress’s power to “declare war” as encompassing “the power to prosecute
it by all means and in any manner in which war may be legitimately prosecuted,” including
the power to confiscate enemy property).
451
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acknowledged to be “citizens” or make it a crime for them to remain within
the territorial jurisdiction of the United States. 457 If one is prepared to
concede that the status of “citizen” carries with it at least some
corresponding rights and privileges (beyond the bare “privilege of writing
‘citizen’ after your name”),458 then the question of which particular rights
and privileges should be understood to inhere in the Fourteenth
Amendment’s declaration of constitutional citizenship under an original
public meaning framework requires a historical and factual inquiry to
identify the types of rights members of the ratifying generation generally
understood “citizenship” to entail.459
The contextual objection to interpreting the Citizenship Clause as
encompassing a guarantee of constitutional equality stems from the
narrower conception of “citizenship” that was embraced by Chancellor Kent,
Justice Curtis and certain other legal commentators prior to the
commencement of Reconstruction.460 This narrower view understood the
status of “citizenship” to confer very few concrete rights and left
governments free to prescribe different rules for different “classes” of
citizens, even with respect to basic civil rights. The existence of this
narrower conception of “citizenship,” which competed with the equally
prominent, broader understanding throughout the antebellum period, might
reasonably give one pause before concluding that the ratifying public at the
time of the Fourteenth Amendment’s enactment would necessarily have
interpreted the Citizenship Clause as encompassing the broader
understanding.461
457

See, e.g., United States v. Worthy, 328 F.2d 386, 394 (5th Cir. 1964) (“[I]t is
inherent in the concept of citizenship that the citizen, when absent from the country to
which he owes allegiance, has a right to return, again to set foot on its soil.”).
458
Cf. CHARLES BLACK, STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW,
62-63 (1969) (arguing that the Fourteenth Amendment’s “conferral of citizenship” must
encompass some rights unless “one is prepared to say that all that relationship implies is
the privilege of writing ‘citizen’ after your name”).
459
In this regard, it is notable that contemporaneous dictionaries tended to define the
term “citizen” by reference to a bundle of rights inhering in that status, typically
identifying “citizenship” with the right to vote and own property. See sources cited in note
290 above. Though many supporters of the Amendment denied that citizenship would
entail voting rights, see supra notes 291-294 and 322 and accompanying text, they were
virtually unanimous in endorsing the proposition that citizenship entailed equality of basic
civil rights. See supra Parts II.A-D.
460
See supra notes 118-122 and accompanying text (discussing Kent’s views) and
supra notes 144-150 and accompanying text (discussing Curtis’s Dred Scott dissent).
461
The difference between the narrow understanding of citizenship endorsed by Kent
and Curtis and the broader understanding embraced by both southern courts and northern
abolitionists during the antebellum era (and by most Reconstruction-era Congressional
Republicans) reflect two markedly different conceptions of what it means to be a
“citizen”—i.e., either a person who possesses a formal legal status, though not necessarily
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Most textually minded originalists believe that ambiguities of this nature
can usually be resolved by looking to the surrounding context of the
ambiguous term, including the immediately surrounding linguistic context,
how well each proposed meaning fits within the broader constitutional
structure and the circumstances surrounding the provision’s enactment. 462
Although the matter is not entirely free from doubt, there are reasonably
strong grounds for concluding that the broader conception of citizenship
provides the more plausible of the two senses of “citizens” as that term is
used in the Citizenship Clause.
A significant problem with viewing the narrower understanding of
citizenship as reflecting the relevant sense of the term “citizens” in the
Fourteenth Amendment’s first sentence is the difficulty that such an
interpretation would pose for interpreting the reference in the Amendment’s
second sentence to the “privileges or immunities of citizens of the United
States.” As reflected in Senator Howard’s speech introducing the
Fourteenth Amendment in the Senate (before the addition of the Citizenship
Clause), a common way of interpreting the Amendment’s Privileges or
Immunities Clause at the time of its enactment was as a protection for those
privileges and immunities that belonged to “citizens of the United States as
any particular rights or privileges (under the Kent-Curtis view), or the possessor of a set of
rights and entitlements, the possession of which inheres in and defines the status of
citizenship (under the broader view). See supra Section I.B.3; cf. Linda Bosniak,
Constitutional Citizenship through the Prism of Alienage, 63 OHIO ST. L.J. 1285, 1305-06
(2002) (noting a similar distinction between “thin” and “thick” conceptions of citizenship
in modern political and social theory).
Identifying which of these two conceptions reflects the most probable original
meaning of the term “citizens” in the Fourteenth Amendment involves a problem of
ambiguity in that there are two distinct senses of the term from which to choose; the term
“citizens,” particularly as used in its broader sense, might also be vague to the extent there
was disagreement regarding how broadly the rights inhering in the status of citizenship
should be understood to extend. See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett, Interpretation and
Construction, 34 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 65, 67 (2012) (explaining that “language is
ambiguous when it has more than one sense” and “is vague when its meaning admits of
borderline cases that cannot definitively be ruled in or out of its meaning”). Though public
meaning originalists generally agree that problems of ambiguity will usually be resolvable
by looking to the surrounding historical and linguistic context of a given provision, see
infra note 462, they express differing views regarding the extent to which such interpretive
methods are capable of resolving vagueness. Compare Barnett, supra at 68 (arguing that
vague provisions, even when interpreted contextually, “simply do not contain the
information necessary to decide matters of application”), with, McGinnis & Rappaport,
supra note 395, at 774-76 (predicting that constitutional vagueness will usually be
resolvable through traditional interpretive techniques).
462
See, e.g., Barnett, supra note 461, at 68 (“When it comes to resolving ambiguity,
the context of a statement usually reveals which sense is meant.”); Rappaport, supra note
452, at 823 (“When judges are resolving an ambiguity, textualism requires that they take
various considerations into account,” including structure, purpose and background history).
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such,”463 that is, those rights that citizens enjoyed by virtue of their status as
United States citizens.464 Another common view of that provision was that
it would protect (at least) the types of non-discrimination rights identified in
Corfield and in the Civil Rights Act of 1866.465
But under the narrower of the two available senses of “citizenship,” at
least one of these understandings must have been mistaken. If one’s status
as a “citizen of the United States” conferred no or very few legal rights or
privileges, then prohibiting states from abridging the “privileges or
immunities” belonging to persons in their capacity as United States citizens
would not support a Corfield-type equality rule. Rather, the prohibition of
abridging the “privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States”
would yield, at most, a relatively narrow set of rights similar to those
described by the Supreme Court majority in Slaughter-House.466 But while
such a narrow interpretation might reflect a thinly plausible linguistic
reading of the text, it faces the considerable historical and contextual
difficulties of having virtually no relation to either the public statements
regarding the Amendment that were made before the Slaughter-House
decision itself or to the types of concerns that motivated the Amendment’s
adoption.467 If one takes seriously the contemporaneous characterization of
the Privileges or Immunities Clause as protecting a class of preexisting
rights that individuals possessed by virtue of their United States citizenship,
463

See text accompanying supra note 251 (quoting Senator Howard’s speech).
See also, e.g., Cong. Globe, 42nd Cong. 2nd Sess. 820 (1872) (Sen. Morton)
(referring to “the privileges or immunities that belong to citizens of the United States as
such”); id. at 1650 (Sen. Butler) (“The only privileges and immunities secured by the
Constitution are those of citizens of the United States as such.”). Notably, this
understanding of the Privileges or Immunities Clause as protecting rights that inhere in the
status of United States citizenship was one of the few points of agreement between the
majority and dissenting Justices in the Slaughter-House Cases. See 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at
74-75 (Miller, J.) (identifying “privileges or immunities” protected by the Clause as
“privileges and immunities belonging to a citizen of the United States as such”); id. at 96
(Field, J. dissenting) (Privileges or Immunities Clause “assumes that there are such
privileges and immunities which belong of right to citizens as such”); id. at 119 (Bradley, J.
dissenting) (“It was not necessary to say in words that the citizens of the United States
should have and exercise all the privileges of citizens … . Their very citizenship conferred
these privileges, if they did not possess them before.”). The Justices, of course, divided on
the question of precisely what “privileges or immunities” United States citizenship
entailed. See Part III.B supra (discussing Justices’ opinions)
465
See, e.g., Harrison, supra note 55, at 1414-33 (surveying evidence supporting this
understanding); see also Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 600 (1866) (Sen. Trumbull)
(identifying Corfield and other Comity Clause cases as providing the judicial sense of
“what was meant by the term ‘citizen of the United States.’”).
466
Cf. supra notes 328-339 and accompanying text (describing Miller’s interpretation
of the Privileges or Immunities Clause).
467
See supra notes 334-335 and accompanying text.
464
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it seems necessary to acknowledge the broader understanding of “citizens”
as reflecting the more plausible meaning of “citizens of the United States”
in both sentences of Section One.
The broader understanding of “citizens” also provides a better fit with
the Amendment’s overall structure and the constitutional structure as a
whole. The Fourteenth Amendment significantly altered the relationship
between the states and the federal government by repudiating the doctrine
of primary state citizenship through which the Confederate states had
justified their rebellion and emphasizing the paramount nature of national
citizenship. An important component of this changed relationship was the
conferral of an express power on Congress and the federal courts to protect
the rights of United States citizens against state infringement and
discrimination. In restructuring this trilateral relationship between the state
and federal governments on the one hand and between those two
governments and their respective citizens on the other, it would have been
more than a bit odd for the federal government to have reserved to itself a
right to violate the very same rights of its citizens that it was simultaneously
seeking to protect against state infringement.468 Thus, while Chief Justice
Warren’s “unthinkable” dictum in Bolling might have overstated the matter,
his remark nonetheless reflects a reasonable intuition that there would be
something at least deeply incongruous about prohibiting the states from
discriminating against their citizens on the basis of race while leaving the
federal government free to engage in identical forms of discrimination.
Of course, the original version of Section One that emerged from the
Joint Committee in April 1866 proposed to do exactly that. By focusing
468

Such differential treatment might have made sense if the Republican lawmakers
who championed the Amendment had believed that the federal government was less prone
to abusing its citizens’ rights than were the states. Cf. McConnell, supra note 18, at 166-67
(suggesting that the Fourteenth Amendment’s framers may have believed that “the federal
government [was] less likely to countenance the systematic oppression of minority
groups”). But the evidence for such a hypothesis is lacking. The members of the 39th
Congress and their contemporaries had lived through the fugitive slave controversies of the
1850’s and had witnessed first-hand the dangers posed by discriminatory and oppressive
federal legislation. See, e.g., Paul Finkelman, Prelude to Reconstruction: Black Legal
Rights in the Antebellum North, 17 RUTGERS L.J. 415, 450-63 (1986) (discussing northern
hostility to the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850 and conflict between federal enforcement of that
law and “personal liberty laws” enacted by northern states to protect accused fugitives).
And, as Professor Siegel, notes, the threat of a future, pro-Southern Congress hostile to
black equality was “very much on the … minds” of those who framed the Fourteenth
Amendment and was reflected in multiple of its provisions, including the Citizenship
Clause itself. Siegel, supra note 19, at 572-73 (citing the Citizenship Clause as well as
provisions limiting Congress’s power to allow certain ex-Confederates to hold public office
and prohibiting the federal government from paying Confederate war debts as examples of
provisions restricting future federal lawmaking).
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narrowly on the problem of state abuse and selecting language that
expressly and exclusively applied only to “state” governments, the Joint
Committee’s proposal seemed to foreclose any plausible reading that would
ban federal racial discrimination.469 The addition of the Citizenship Clause,
however, significantly changed the meaning of Section One. That provision
required both the states and the federal government to recognize as “citizens”
all persons who were born or naturalized in the United States and subject to
its jurisdiction. Following the Amendment’s adoption, the entitlement of
such persons to “citizenship” was no longer a matter of governmental
discretion or political morality but rather a legally enforceable right
recognized in the text of the Constitution. While the types of structural
concerns identified above might not have sufficed to contradict the plain
meaning of the Amendment’s second sentence, 470 the use of such
considerations to resolve a textual ambiguity of the type presented by the
reference to “citizens” in the Amendment’s first sentence is fully consistent
with both textualism and originalism.471
B. Equal Citizenship and the “Equal Protection of the Laws”
To this point, I have argued that the Fourteenth Amendment’s
Citizenship Clause provides a more historically defensible textual source for
the equality guarantee that the Bolling Court applied to the federal
government through the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. But just
as Bolling raised questions about the relationship between Fifth Amendment
due process and Fourteenth Amendment equal protection,472 the arguments
presented here raise similar questions regarding the precise relationship
469

See, e.g., Siegel, supra note 19, at 577 (“To the extent that originalism is a species
of textualism, ‘No state’ is what the [Amendment’s second] sentence enacts, and ‘no state’
is all that originalists can read the sentence to encompass.” ).
470
See, e.g., Michael Ramsey, Missouri v. Holland and Historical Textualism, 73 MO.
L. REV. 969, 972 (2008) (“A historical textualist will be skeptical of conclusions
supposedly based on an abstract constitutional ‘structure’ or ‘purpose’ but not tied to
particular words and phrases.”); Ryan C. Williams, The Ninth Amendment as a Rule of
Construction, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 498, 568-69 (2011) (collecting additional criticisms of
such abstract structural reasoning).
471
See, e.g., John F. Manning, Federalism and the Generality Problem in
Constitutional Interpretation, 122 HARV. L. REV. 2003, 2067 (2009) (“Modern textualists
readily embrace” the “proposition that when a structural provision is semantically
indeterminate, its meaning can sometimes be illuminated by considering its fit with, and
functional relationship to, other provisions of the text.”).
472
See Primus, supra note 19, at 986-89 (describing initial uncertainty regarding the
precise relationship between the due-process standard applied to federal conduct and the
equal-protection standard applied to the states but observing that “[b]y the mid-1970s, the
Court asserted flatly and repeatedly that the” two standards “were, and had always been,
the same”).
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between the equality component of the Fourteenth Amendment’s
Citizenship Clause and the Equal Protection Clause.
The Equal Protection Clause complicates the argument for viewing the
Citizenship Clause as Bolling’s proper constitutional source in two ways.
First, because the Citizenship Clause applies to states as well as to the
federal government, some might question whether identifying that provision
as containing an equality component would violate the familiar “antisurplussage” canon by rendering the Equal Protection Clause wholly
redundant.473 Second, and conversely, if the Equal Protection Clause were
originally understood to be broader than the equal citizenship aspect of the
Citizenship Clause, the federal government might be permitted to make
certain types of race-based distinctions among its citizens that would be
unconstitutional if made by the states. The available evidence regarding the
public understandings of “citizenship” and “equal protection” at the time of
the Fourteenth Amendment’s enactment, however, render both of these
possibilities unlikely.
Responding to the surplussage argument does not require looking very
far beyond the text of the two provisions. The class of persons who can
claim the rights of state citizenship under the Citizenship Clause is
obviously limited to those whom the Clause itself identifies as “citizens”—
i.e., persons born or naturalized in the United States and who also reside
within the state. The Equal Protection Clause, by contrast, extends
protection to all “persons” within the state’s territorial jurisdiction,
regardless of whether or not those persons are also citizens. 474 This
distinction did not go unrecognized during the pre-enactment Congressional
debates. Multiple members of the 39th Congress, including Bingham and
Howard, expressly noted that the Equal Protection Clause, unlike the
Privileges or Immunities Clause, would extend protection to non-citizens.475
Thus, even if there is a perfect overlap between the equality rights citizens
enjoy by virtue of their status as “citizens” and the “equal protection” to
which they are entitled as “persons,” the Equal Protection Clause would not
473

Cf. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 174 (1803) (“It cannot be
presumed that any clause in the Constitution is intended to be without effect, and therefore
such construction is inadmissible unless the words require it.”).
474
U.S. Const. amd. XIV § 1 (“No State shall … deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”) (emphasis added).
475
See, e.g., Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1090 (1866) (Rep. Bingham) (“Is it
not essential … that all persons, whether citizens or strangers, within this land, shall have
equal protection in every State in this Union in the rights of life and liberty and
property?”); id. at 2765-66 (Sen. Howard) (stating that the Fourteenth Amendment would
“disable a State from depriving not merely a citizen of the United States, but any person,
whoever he may be, of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, or from
denying to him the equal protection of the laws of the State.”).
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be redundant.
The distinction between “citizens” and “persons” also suggests a likely
relationship between the rights inhering in citizenship and the “equal
protection” that states must extend to citizens and non-citizens alike.
Nineteenth-century legal and political thought recognized a clear distinction
between the rights of citizens and the rights of persons who were not
citizens.476 In view of this background, it is reasonable to conclude that the
rights extended to “citizens” by the Amendment’s Citizenship and
Privileges or Immunities Clauses are broader than the rights extended to all
“persons” by the Equal Protection Clause.477
A clear indication of the relationship between the equality rights thought
to inhere in citizenship and the equality rights protected by the Equal
Protection Clause is provided by a federal law adopted in 1870 to extend to
non-citizens the protections of most (but not all) of the protections of the
Civil Rights Act of 1866.478 The legislative history of that provision, which
was adopted as part of the Voting Rights Act of 1870,479 indicates that it was
“designed to enforce the Equal Protection Clause for the benefit of alien
immigrants, mainly Asians in California.”480 The 1870 Act largely mirrored
the language of Section One of the 1866 Civil Rights Act with two
significant exceptions. First, unlike the Civil Rights Act, which was limited
to “citizens of the United States,” the 1870 Act applied to all “persons.”481
Second, the 1870 Act omitted language that had been included in the Civil
Rights Act, which prohibited states from making race-based distinctions
476

Certain scholars have argued that the Equal Protection Clause was originally
understood to apply solely to the types of legal “protection” to which non-citizens were
presumptively entitled, such as the right to claim protection by law enforcement and the
right to bring legal actions in court. See, e.g., Green, supra note 311, at 219-20 (endorsing
a “protection-only” reading of the Equal Protection Clause); Harrison, supra note 55, at
1434-51 (same). This view has been contested by other scholars who argue that the
original meaning of the Equal Protection Clause was much broader. See, e.g., Saunders,
supra note 55, at 251-93; cf. Calabresi & Rickert, supra note 437, at 23 (observing that “a
number of the [Fourteenth Amendment’s] Framers seemed to understand ‘equal protection
of the laws’ as a requirement of equal legislation …”). For reasons explained in the text, I
believe that even under the broader of these two interpretations, the equality rights the
provision extends to all “persons” are properly viewed as a subset of the equality rights that
citizens enjoy by virtue of their status as “citizens.” See infra notes 478-490 and
accompanying text.
477
See, e.g., McConnell, supra note 5, at 1002 (arguing that “the Privileges or
Immunities Clause applies to a smaller class of persons and a larger class of rights” than
the Equal Protection Clause).
478
The background of the enactment is described in Harrison, supra note 55, at 144347.
479
Act of May 31, 1870, cl. 114, § 16, 16 Stat. 144.
480
Harrison, supra note 55, at 1444.
481
Id.
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with respect to the right to buy, hold, sell, lease or convey real or personal
property.482 The omission of the 1866 Act’s property provisions, which the
sponsor of the 1870 Act acknowledged had been intentional, 483 strongly
suggests that Reconstruction-era lawmakers understood the Equal
Protection Clause to allow at least some race-based distinctions among
“persons” that would not be permitted if the “persons” discriminated against
were also “citizens.”484
An additional indication that the equality rights attaching to citizenship
were understood to sweep at least as broadly as the equality rights derived
from the Equal Protection Clause is provided by post-enactment statements
regarding the relationship between the status of citizenship and the “equal
protection of the laws.” In Strauder v. West Virginia, 485 “the Supreme
Court’s first great Equal Protection Clause case,”486 the Court described the
Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause as having been intended
merely to provide a mechanism by which the federal government could
enforce the preexisting rights that former slaves possessed by virtue of their
citizenship:
By their manumission and citizenship, the colored race became entitled to the
equal protection of the laws of the States in which they resided, and the
apprehension that, through prejudice, they might be denied that equal
protection, … was the inducement to bestow upon the national government
the power to enforce the provision that no State shall deny to them the equal
protection of the laws. Without the apprehended existence of prejudice, that
portion of the amendment would have been unnecessary, and it might have
been left to the States to extend equality of protection.487

In other words, according to the Court, the entitlement of citizens to the
“equal protection of the laws” derived from their status as citizens and it
was only out of apprehension that state officials would, “through prejudice”
deny them that right that the framers had included an explicit guarantee of
equal protection in the Fourteenth Amendment.
To similar effect were the remarks of Justice Bradley in an 1870 Circuit
Court opinion, which addressed one of the early constitutional challenges
482

Id.
Id. at 1445-46 (recounting colloquy between Senator Stewart, the 1870 Act’s
sponsor, and Senator Samuel Pomeroy of Kansas).
484
Id. at 1446; see also, e.g., Earl M. Maltz, Citizenship and the Constitution: A
History and Critique of the Supreme Court's Alienage Jurisprudence, 28 ARIZ. ST. L.J.
1135, 1148 (1996) (citing the 1870 statute as evidence that “the rights guaranteed by the
Fourteenth Amendment to persons generally were viewed as less sweeping than those
guaranteed to citizens”).
485
100 U.S. 303 (1880).
486
Harrison, supra note 55, at 1443.
487
100 U.S. at 309 (emphasis added).
483
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that eventually culminated in the Supreme Court’s Slaughter-House
decision three years later.488 Bradley’s opinion, which reflects one of the
earliest judicial interpretations of the Fourteenth Amendment, declared that
one of “the essential privileges which belong to a citizen of the United
States, as such, and which a state cannot by its laws invade” was “to have,
with all other citizens, the equal protection of the laws.”489 Likewise, the
Supreme Court of Indiana, on multiple occasions in the 1870’s, declared its
understanding that “[t]he only effect of the” Fourteenth Amendment had
been “to extend the protection and blessings of the constitution and laws to
a new class of persons” by conferring citizenship upon them and that when
these persons had been:
made citizens they were as much entitled to the protection of the constitution
and the laws as were the white citizens, and the states could no more deprive
them of privileges and immunities than they could citizens of the white race.
Citizenship entitled them to the protection of life, liberty, and property, and
the full and equal protection of the laws.490

Thus, according to multiple courts during the immediate postratification period, the right of equal protection recognized in the Fourteenth
Amendment’s second sentence arose by virtue of, and existed as a
necessary incident and consequence of, the citizenship that had been
recognized in the Amendment’s first sentence. In view of this background,
there is a strong basis for concluding that whatever equality rights citizens
possess against state governments by virtue of their status as “persons”
protected by the Equal Protection Clause are equally enforceable against the
federal government by virtue of their status as “citizens” under the
Citizenship Clause.
CONCLUSION
I do not entertain any illusions that the fate of originalism as an
interpretive theory will stand or fall based on its ability to justify the result
in a single case, even a case as significant as Bolling (or, for that matter,
Brown).491 Likewise, more than a half-century of skepticism that Bolling
can be reconciled with a plausible account of the Constitution’s text and
488

Live-Stock Dealers’ & Butchers’ Ass’n v. Crescent City Live-Stock Landing &
Slaughter-House Co., 15 F. Cas. 649 (C.C.D. La. 1870) (No. 8,408).
489
Id. at 652.
490
Cory v. Carter, 48 Ind. 327, 353 (1874) (emphasis added) (quoting State v. Gibson,
36 Ind. 389, 393-94 (1871)); cf. State v. Moody, 26 Ind. 299, 306-07 (1866) (holding state
constitutional provision prohibiting migration by free blacks was void in view of the 1866
Civil Rights Act’s recognition of blacks’ citizenship).
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original understanding has not prevented that decision and its associated
doctrine from becoming deeply entrenched in modern constitutional law.
At the same time, however, neither originalism nor Bolling emerges
fully unscathed from a conclusion that the former is incapable of justifying
the latter. If originalist theory aspires to real-world practical significance
for constitutional adjudication, then it seems fair to judge the desirability of
such an adjudicative approach at least in part by asking what real-world
changes in legal doctrine that approach requires. While the inability of
originalism to justify a particular politically popular result—or even a series
of such results—would not necessarily be fatal to the theory’s acceptance,
such inabilities should certainly be counted as a mark against the theory.492
And, in the absence of sufficiently desirable offsetting benefits, such results
might legitimately call into question the utility of a strictly originalist
approach to resolving constitutional controversies.
Bolling too suffers to at least some extent from its perceived
inconsistency with the Constitution’s text and original meaning. Though
originalism as a distinctive theory of constitutional interpretation remains
controversial, virtually all plausible interpretive theories acknowledge an
important role for the Constitution’s text and original meaning.493 Decisions
like Bolling that appear to ignore (or openly flout) such traditional
interpretive criteria thus raise legitimate concerns regarding the proper role
of courts in our constitutional system.494
If this Article’s conclusions are correct, then the longstanding
conventional wisdom regarding Bolling’s suspect originalist provenance has
been mistaken. Although Chief Justice Warren’s opinion identified the
wrong textual source for the prohibition of federal racial discrimination, his
intuition that there would be something deeply problematic about
interpreting the Fourteenth Amendment to subject states to an equality
principle that the federal government was free to violate at will was hardly
492
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constitutional interpretation?” RANDY E. BARNETT, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: CASES IN
CONTEXT, 538-39 (2008); see also Rubin, supra note 14, at 1885-86 (discussing
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ahistorical. Rather, this intuition was widely shared among participants in
the Fourteenth Amendment framing and ratification debates, as evidenced
by the pervasive characterizations of the rights protected by the Amendment
as rights that citizens already possessed by virtue of their United States
citizenship. The adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Citizenship
Clause constitutionalized this understanding by requiring both the states and
the federal government to recognize certain persons as “citizens” and
foreclosing future legislative efforts to deny such citizenship.
Of course, a comprehensive originalist defense of Bolling could not end
here. Just as the mere existence of the Fourteenth Amendment’s express
prohibition of state discrimination through the Equal Protection and
Privileges or Immunities Clauses did not resolve all questions regarding the
originalist defensibility of Brown, the mere existence of an analogous
constitutional ban on federal discrimination does not answer the question of
whether Bolling was correctly decided.
Among other things, a
comprehensive originalist defense of Bolling would require proof that
public education fell within the class of interests to which the citizenequality principle would have been understood to extend and that racial
segregation in public schools should be understood to deny equality in a
constitutionally relevant way.495
But questions of this nature, which apply with equal force to both
Bolling and Brown, do not account for Bolling’s distinctive status or explain
why originalists who readily defend Brown as correctly decided balk at
similarly defending Bolling. 496 Instead, Bolling’s assumed originalist
indefensibility has stemmed largely from the assumption, encouraged by
Chief Justice Warren’s opinion, that a judicially enforceable constitutional
equality principle applicable to federal conduct must be located in an
eighteenth century Constitution that not only tolerated but openly supported
the institution of slavery.497 Once the Fourteenth Amendment’s Citizenship
Clause is recognized as the appropriate textual source for the ban on federal
racial discrimination and understood in light of its full historical context,
this difficulty evaporates. Those originalists who support Brown as
correctly decided should thus feel little hesitancy in concluding that Bolling
was correctly decided as well.
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